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INTRODUCTION
The American public school system is in the midst of a vast and promising
reform. The core architectural principle of the emergent system is the grant by
higher-level authorities-federal government, states, and school districts-to
lower level ones of autonomy to pursue the broad goal of improving education.
In return, the local entities-schools, districts, and states-provide the higher
ones with detailed information about their goals, how they intend to pursue
them, and how their performance measures against their expectations. The core
substantive commitment of the emergent system is the provision to all students,
and particularly to racial and other minorities whom the public schools have
traditionally short-changed, of an adequate education, where the definition of
adequacy is continuously revised in the light of the improving performance of
the best schools. The reform seeks an education that builds on the curiosity and
needs of diverse students and uses the whole school system as a vast laboratory
to determine how best to achieve this end. If it succeeds, it will attain on a
national scale enduringly the goals that John Dewey's famous Laboratory School
in Chicago was able to approximate for roughly a hundred students for a few
years. '
The reform grows out of and contributes to a new form of collaboration
among courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies on the one side and bet-
ween these organs of government and new forms of public action on the other. It
thus redefines the separation of powers and recasts the administrative state more
generally, while opening the way to new forms of citizen participation in the
orientation and operation of key public institutions. At the limit, school reform
raises the prospect of a broader redefinition of our very democracy.
The sad history of education in the last fifty years, and particularly the
troubled efforts to improve public education in its closing decades, invites an
incredulous reaction to such claims. For most of the twentieth century, admini-
strators-local, state, then federal-tried to control classroom behavior through
uniform rules and hierarchy. 2 Teachers retained significant autonomy over their
1. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, A Pedagogical Experiment, in 5 THE EARLY WORKS OF JOHN
DEWEY, 1882-1898, at 245 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1972); JoHN DEWEY, The School and Society, in
I THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, at 44 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1976); JoHN DEWEY, The
University School, in 5 THE EARLY WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1882-1898, supra, at 436 app. See
also ELLEN CONDLIFFE LAGEMANN, AN ELUSIVE SCIENCE: THE TROUBLING HISTORY OF EDUCATION
RESEARCH 47-56 (2000).
2. See LARRY CUBAN, How TEACHERS TAUGHT: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN
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day-to-day activities, but only at the high cost of using standard textbooks and
regimenting students in accordance with administrative precept.3 Periodic efforts
to introduce what could very broadly be conceived as Deweyite reforms or other-
wise to assist at-risk students left traces in individual classrooms and schools.
4
But they changed next to nothing at the higher levels of the school admini-
stration or at the leading institutions that trained school administrators.5
If this stalemate demonstrated the limited reform capacities of state legis-
latures and district and state school administrations, the spotty successes of
school desegregation and school finance-equity suits revealed the judiciary's
modest capacity to compensate directly for defects of the other branches. As the
United States Supreme Court recognized this and absented itself from school
reform efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, advocates sought to redress the inequities
of American schooling at the state level.6 There, too, judicial findings of liability
seldom translated into actual improvements in schooling. Judges in many states
found wide disparities in per pupil expenditures between rich and poor districts
to be inconsistent with state constitutional equal protection provisions or with
state constitutional guarantees of "an efficient education." But substantial court-
ordered redistribution of public funding for education sometimes reduced overall
state spending on schools: equalizing down. It nearly always triggered protracted
acrimony between state legislatures and courts.
7
CLASSROOMS, 1890-1990 (1993); DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMER-
ICAN URBAN EDUCATION 126-76 (1974); Molly O'Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the
"Deregulated" Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137, 139, 140-52 (2000) (discussing the evolution
of "one size fits all" public schools in the United States and arguing that this "factory model"
departs from democratic ideals).
3. See DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA: A CENTURY OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL REFORM 85-109 (1995).
4. See CUBAN, supra note 2, at 61 ("No more than an estimated one of four elementary
teachers, and even a lesser fraction of high school teachers, adopted progressive teaching practices,
defined broadly, and used them to varying degrees in their classrooms.").
5. See LAGEMANN, supra note 1, at 60-63.
6. See, e.g., William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending
the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong
and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721, 722-23 (1992); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School
Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave ": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151,
1151-53 (1995); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1186-91 (1999); Gail F. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave:
Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507
(1991); Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM 88, 89-90 (Jay R. Heubert ed.,
1999); Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy, Democracy and the Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: CONFERENCE SUMMARY 218, 232-39, 252-53 nn.53-54
(Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002); Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical
Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 498-502 (1995); infra notes 77-107 and accompanying text.
7. See McUsic, supra note 6, at 105 ("What successful school finance suits have failed to do
however is translate success in the courtroom into success in the classroom. Instead, often after
prolonged and bruising legislative battles, a somewhat more equitable funding system is devised,
but for a variety of reasons even this system does not result in measurably greater educational
achievement for low-income students. Ironically, it appears that the more plaintiffs succeed in
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From the 1980s onward the performance of the school system deteriorated
both in international comparison and as measured against the needs of an ever
more knowledge-intensive economy. 8 Poor and African-American communities
were embittered by the failures of desegregation and finance-equity reform. 9
Frustration with the public schools gave rise to a ferocious debate between those
who would improve existing school systems, locally based in theory but
bureaucratically organized in fact, and those who would replace public schools
with privately controlled ones. 10 Advocates of public schools argued that
shortcomings could ultimately be traced to failures of political will that had
thwarted successive reform efforts in the courts and legislatures. If the public
would dedicate the resources to integrate white and black children, reduce class
size, add specialized programs, or simply increase federal funding, public
schools would work for all."1 In contrast, advocates of privatization maintained
that public control always invites self-dealing by entrenched interests. That
selfishness explains why public schools inevitably waste the resources they have.
Provision of more only encourages further profligacy. The only remedy from
this point of view is privatization. 12
weaning the school funding system from its dependence on local property taxes, the less money
will be spent overall on education."); Douglas S. Reed, The People v. the Court: School Finance
Reform and the New Jersey Supreme Court, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 172 (1994); infra
notes 219-47 and accompanying text.
8. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK, MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND
CONTROLLING COSTS 39-48 (1994).
9. See PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 64-65 (1994) (characterizing the voucher movement as, in part, a "poor people's
revolt"); JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S
FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM (2000); Scott S. Greenberger, Many Blacks Seek Choice of Schools,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2001, at B5 (citing poll showing that fifty-seven percent of African-
Americans support vouchers, compared to forty-nine percent of the general population). See also
Robert Berne, Educational Input and Outcome Inequities in New York State, in OUTCOME EQUITY
IN EDUCATION 1, 12-21 (Robert Berne & Lawrence 0. Picus eds., 1994).
10. See, e.g., 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE THEORY OF CHOICE AND
CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990); 2 CHOICE AND
CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE PRACTICE OF CHOICE, DECENTRALIZATION AND SCHOOL
RESTRUCTURING IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990);
HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN EDUCATION (Helen F. Ladd
ed., 1996).
11. See, e.g., JONATHON KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991); articles collected in LAW AND
SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 6.
12. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1990); JoHN COONS & STEPHEN SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE (1978); MYRON LIEBERMAN,
PRIVATIZATION AND SCHOOL CHOICE (1989); LEARNING FROM SCHOOL CHOICE (Paul E. Peterson &
Brian C. Hassel eds., 1998); SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND
LAW (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999); Jay P. Greene et al., Effectiveness of
School Choice: The Milwaukee Experiment, 31 EDUC. & URB. SOC. 190 (1999). Broadened educa-
tional markets might be achieved by the contractual transfer of control of public schools to private
management companies. See, e.g., Paul T. Hill et al., REINVENTING PUBLIC EDUCATION: How
CONTRACTING CAN TRANSFORM AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1997). Or it might occur by expanding en-
rollments in private and parochial schools through tax subsidies for the tuition payments of pupils
otherwise unable to afford private education. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra; MILTON FRIEDMAN,
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This debate, too, is stalemated. School-management companies have repeatedly
failed to fulfill their contracts with public authorities, leaving the advocates of
privatization without evidence that private schools can outperform public
institutions without handpicking their students. 13 Court-ordered redistribution of
state financing mechanisms have seldom met the plaintiffs' expectations that
more spending on education by itself produces better schools. 14 These failures
weigh heavily against the claim that privatization is a necessary and sufficient
condition for educational reform and the contrary conviction that better schools
spring from political will.
As these disappointments dimmed prospects for better public schools, how-
ever, a new and promising model of school governance was arising out of two
apparently contradictory clusters of piecemeal reforms, each only loosely con-
nected to the large choices that have long framed public debate. 15 The first
cluster went in the direction of increased centralization, even nationalization, of
the public school system. Its central element was a drive to set minimum
standards for school and student performance at the state and federal level; to
rank pupils and schools accordingly; and to deny promotion and diplomas to
students and to reconstitute schools that persistently failed to meet the new
requirements. 16 Advocates of such "high-stakes testing" believed the penalties of
failure were sufficient to force individuals and institutions to improve their
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Paul E. Peterson & William G. Howell, When Low-Income
Students Move from Public to Private Schools, in CITY SCHOOLS: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK 339
(Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2000) [hereinafter CITY SCHOOLS].
13. Reasons for doubting the economic viability of private management of public schools are
discussed in Henry M. Levin, Potential of For-Profit Schools for Educational Reform, (National
Center for the Study of Privitization in Education Occasional Paper No. 47, 2001), available at
http://www.ncspe.org/publicationsfiles/ 179_OP47.pdf (questioning whether there is a sound basis
for expecting for-profit schools to achieve the economies of scale needed to make them succeed
economically) and Henry M. Levin & Cyrus E. Driver, Costs of an Educational Voucher System, 5
EDUCATION ECONOMICS 303-311 (1997) (stating that school choice on a national scale will entail
extensive administrative and other services significantly increasing costs).
14. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 12, at 194-201 (identifying bureaucratizing and
localizing trends and claiming that their contradictory impulses doom reform efforts within public
educational institutions); Ravitch & Viteritti, Introduction to CITY SCHOOLS, supra note 12, at 8
(noting same contradiction in context of particular reforms in New York City public schools).
16. See, e.g., DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BACK: A CENTURY OF FAILED SCHOOL REFORMS 408-52
(2000); Amy R. Argetsinger, State Plans School Takeovers; Education Officials Looking to
Baltimore for First Targets, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2000, at B9; Rochelle Carter, School Watch: No
Stranger to Change, New Superintendent in Step with Predecessors' Moves, ATLANTA CONST.,
July 1, 1999, at JD8 (discussing Atlanta School Superintendent's policy of taking over and
reconstituting poorly performing schools); B. G. Gregg, State Plans Second School Takeover,
DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 11, 2000, at C I (reporting that the State of Michigan is considering takeover
of Benton Harbor School District, after taking responsibility for restructuring Detroit school
systems); Lori Olszewski, School District Takeovers Take Off: Oakland Effort Follows U.S.
Educational Trend, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1999, at A17 (reporting on proposed legislation giving
Oakland mayor responsibility for distressed schools). See also Aaron Singer, Note, Disestablishing
Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830 (1999)
(proposing reform strategy based on states' power to disestablish entire school districts).
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performance. 17
The second cluster of reforms went in the direction of a new localism. It
aimed to devolve authority for classroom instruction away from state education
administrations and towards districts, principals, teachers--especially those
professionally mortified by the rigidities of the traditional system-and some-
times parents. Other elements were an increased willingness by educational
authorities to allow teachers and parents to create new schools within the public
system, particularly small and specialized ones, and increased acceptance of a
parent's right to choose to send his or her child to a school outside the assigned
catchment area. 18
As these reforms intersected, they changed in complementary ways. High-
stakes testing turned out to be an unreliable measure of the performance of
individuals or institutions. It often created perverse incentives-to teach to the
test, or to exclude from the testing pool the students most in need of help. It
unfairly penalized students (particularly poor and minority students) for the
failings of institutions over which they had no control. 19 Above all, the test
17. By high-stakes tests, which are to be distinguished from the diagnostic accountability
schemes that are the focus of this Article, we mean "tests that states and school districts use in
deciding whether individual students will receive high-school diplomas or be promoted to the next
grade." Jay P. Heubert, High-Stakes Testing in a Changing Environment: Disparate Impact,
Opportunity to Learn, and Current Legal Protections 1 (2002) (draft manuscript, on file with NYU
Review of Law & Social Change); see infra notes 124-27 (distinguishing high-stakes testing and
the diagnostic uses of assessments). For a careful examination of high-stakes testing regimes, see
Jay P. Heubert, High-Stakes Testing and Civil Rights: Standards of Appropriate Test Use and a
Strategy for Enforcing Them, in RAISING STANDARDS OR RAISING BARRIERS? INEQUALITY AND
HIGH-STAKES TESTING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 179, 179-94 (Gary Orfield & Mindy L. Kornhaber
eds., 2001) [hereinafter RAISING STANDARDS OR RAISING BARRIERS?].
18. See, e.g., Jane L. David, School-Based Decision Making: Kentucky's Test of
Decentralization, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 706 (1994); Sharon Elder, The Power of the Parent:
James Comer is Proving that Family Involvement Is a Potent Antidote to Drugs and Guns in the
Nation's Schools, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Oct. 1990, at 50; Pearl Rock Kane, The Difference
Between Charter Schools and Charterlike Schools, in CITY SCHOOLS, supra note 12, at 65; Tom
Loveless & Claudia Jasin, Starting from Scratch: Political and Organizational Challenges Facing
Charter Schools, 34 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 9, 9-30 (1998) (concluding that eight Massachusetts charter
schools under study typically began as informal organizations with scanty resources and had
substantial difficulty converting the early endeavors to robust institutions with stable relations to
the states); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 152-74 (discussing trend towards, and reform goals of,
charter schools); Mary O'Connell, School Reform Chicago Style: How Citizens Organized to
Change Public Policy, a special issue of THE NEIGHBORHOOD WORKS, Spring 1991; Wendy Parker,
The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TuL. L. REv. 563, 574-80 (2001) (discussing
distinguishing characteristics and procedures generally used to establish charter schools); Priscilla
WohIstetter & Noelle Griffin, Creating and Sustaining Learning Communities: Early Lessons from
Charter Schools (Consortium for Pol'y Research in Educ., Occasional Paper Series, OP-03, 1998).
19. See, e.g., ALFIE KOHN, THE CASE AGAINST STANDARDIZED TESTING: RAISING THE SCORES,
RUINING THE SCHOOLS 40 (2000); LINDA C. MCNEIL, CONTRADICTIONS OF SCHOOL REFORM:
EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF STANDARDIZED TESTING 153-271 (2000); SUSAN OHANIAN, ONE SIZE FITS
FEW: THE FOLLY OF EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS 1-127 (1999); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIGH
STAKES: TESTING FOR TRACKING, PROMOTION, AND GRADUATION 178-79 (Jay P. Heubert & Robert
M. Hauser eds., 1999) [hereinafter HIGH STAKES]; J.J. Cannell, Nationally Normed Elementary
Achievement Testing in America's Public Schools: How All Fifty States Are Above the National
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results gave little or no indication of how to reorganize failing institutions or aid
students who did not measure up. In response to these criticisms, a new class of
diagnostic standards emerged with the express aim of using tests both to direct
local reform and to orient pedagogic attention to individual students. 20
The new localism contributed to the development of these diagnostic stan-
dards and pioneered methods of using the disaggregated testing data as a tool of
self-assessment. In so doing, the movement for professional regeneration became
accountable for ensuring not only that teachers taught well but also that students
actually learned. Practitioners also came to see that accountable professionalism
required new forms of peer monitoring. 2 1
At its best this recombination of local initiative and diagnostic standards
turns the traditional school topsy-turvy. The teacher no longer executes instruc-
tions set at the state or district level, but rather monitors the learning strategies of
individual students and helps them correct difficulties as they arise. The princi-
pal assures that classrooms in his or her school can be organized in this way. The
superintendent provides the conditions that principals need to succeed at that
task. The state no longer writes detailed rules and regulations for the operation of
schools and districts but sets and periodically revises school standards and the
means for assessing them, aids schools struggling to improve, and reconstitutes
those that are unable to do so.
The emergent structure is not, however, a hybrid of traditional hierarchy and
economic or political markets. In a hierarchy, there is a clear distinction between
the superiors who set the rules and the subordinates who execute them.22 In
school systems reformed on the principles we discuss below, rules are provi-
sional frameworks for action and are corrected at the urging of "subordinates" in
light of their experience "implementing" them: Ends are revised in light of
means and vice versa. Markets in theory know neither superiors nor sub-
ordinates. They operate by purely voluntary expressions of preference. Sellers
adjust their behavior in response to buyers' decisions; officials react to their con-
stituents' votes. In schools reforming along the lines adumbrated here, on the
contrary, service providers at all levels respond to continuing comparisons of
their performance with that of their peers, where the dimensions of the com-
parison and the definition of "peer" are themselves subject to discussion and
revision. 23
Average, 7 EDUC. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC. 5 (1988); M. Gail Jones et al., The Impact of
High-Stakes Testing on Teachers and Students in North Carolina, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 199
(1999); Linda McNeil & Angela Valenzuela, in RAISING STANDARDS OR RAISING BARRIERS, supra
note 17, at 127; D. Monty Neill & Noe J. Medina, Standardized Testing: Harmful to Educational
Health, 70 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 688, 689-92 (1989).
20. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
2 1. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 329-41
(A. H. Henderson trans. & Talcott Parsons ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1947).
23. This routine questioning of institutional processes that results from the continuing re-
vision of means and ends in the light of comparative assessment of performance is observable
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The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB") 24 requires states
to adopt a general accountability scheme of this sort as a condition for receiving
federal funds for education. The wide bipartisan support for this complex
legislation 25 is a measure of the extent to which the familiar contest between
more market or more state diverted attention-legal and otherwise-forms the
actual course and possibilities of renewal of the schools. Indeed, agreement on
the broad outlines of the NCLB's reform agenda was so deep and widespread
that participants and commentators oscillated after its passage between won-
dering how deep antagonisms could have evaporated overnight and doubting that
the old debates reflected deep disagreements at all.26
today in other contexts, as different as environmental regulation and community policing, where
the problems for public action have much in common with the problems of school reform. See,
e.g., CHARLES F. SABEL, ARCHON FUNG & BRADLEY KARKKA1NEN, BEYOND BACKYARD
ENVIRONMENTALISM (Beacon Press, 2000); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment
Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) (discussing
recent innovations in the use of court-monitored treatment plans for drug-addicted offenders);
Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Com-
munities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (2000) (exploring the uses of community-
based planning and monitoring as a method of managing police discretion). For other examples,
see ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END To SWEATSHOPS? (2001) (advocating a system of
third party-monitored self-monitoring of overseas working conditions by corporations operating
global supply chains); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (describing the potential role of democratic
experimentalism in resolving difficult questions of constitutional interpretation); Brandon L.
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 41 (2001) (advocating a
system of monitored information collection, sharing, and comparison among police departments as
a means of combating racial profiling); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J.
257 (2001) (proposing the systematic use of performance monitoring and benchmarking as
regulatory tools in the environment and other areas); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter
NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002)
(suggesting that NEPA be retooled as a mechanism for progressively redefining government
projects to moderate their environmental effects to the extent currently possible); James S.
Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation
Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 CoLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (advocating a multi-tiered
and interactive "regulatory" framework for use by trial courts in managing the compliance process
in employment discrimination lawsuits); CHARLES F. SABEL & WILLIAM SIMON, DESTABILIZATION
RIGHTS: How THE NEW PUBLIC LAW SUCCEEDS (forthcoming 2003). For a general overview, see
WILLIAM H. SIMON, SOLVING PROBLEMS V. CLAIMING RIGHTS: THE PRAGMATIST CHALLENGE TO
LEGAL LIBERALISM (forthcoming 2003) (describing a new school of pragmatist thought that
advocates carefully monitored problem-solving, instead of the announcement and enforcement of
fixed entitlements, as the most effective means of reforming social institutions and responding to
the needs of disadvantaged communities).
24. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001).
25. For an interesting discussion of the new thinking that went into the NCLB, see Ronald
Brownstein, Bush Moves to Reposition Republicans on Education, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at
A12; other articles cited infra note 27.
26. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 25; Sue Kirchhoff, Federal Role Is Switch in GOP
Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2001, at A1; Jodi Wilgoren, Education Plan by Bush Shows New
Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at A . See also Ronald Brownstein, For a Start, Education
Reform Offers Bush a Policy Path of Least Resistance, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at A5 ("What
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The aim of this Article is precisely to rethink legal strategies for reforming
the public schools in light of these unanticipated developments and the possi-
bilities they reveal. Our intent is at once explanatory and programmatic. In Part I,
focusing on desegregation and school finance litigation, we trace two successive
reform cycles in which courts first determined to conform existing institutions to
constitutional values, recognized the limits of doctrinally directed interventions,
and, disheartened, abandoned their original ameliorative ambitions in order to
defend the integrity of the judiciary. We will see, however, that at the end of
both cycles, and especially in connection with recent litigation asserting a broad
right to an "adequate" education, courts collaborated with nonjudicial actors to
give substance to their understanding of constitutional obligations and remedies.
Part II traces the top-down movement for standards-based reform and the
bottom-up movement of professional protest in favor of new classroom
practices. Focusing on New York City's School District 2, Part II shows how
educators fused elements of both movements into the "New Accountability" in
the mid-1990s. In Part III, we detail yet more comprehensive reforms in Texas
and Kentucky to show how they link change in the classroom and new forms of
administrative oversight, and to illustrate the reforms' accomplishments so far.
Some readers may suspect that the disentrenchment of interests and other
transformations described in Parts II and III magically suspend iron laws of
politics and the fundamental limits of collective action. 27 But we argue in Part
IV that this suspicion overlooks the possibilities for innovative public action that
arise when the parties exhaust familiar programmatic solutions and yet still face
urgent requirements for action. We argue that educational reform succeeded in
Texas and Kentucky because of explicit alliances that ignored traditional ideo-
logical and institutional divisions in favor of an incremental, but cumulatively
transformative, exploration of solutions lying between top-down standards and
bottom-up school-based reforms.
Part IV ends by considering the role of the courts in creating these new
publics and reformed school systems. We take as a central lesson of the
emerging school reforms that neither the separation of powers, the traditional
forms of regulation associated with it, nor even the fundamental distinctions
between the public and private and the political and the technical can today be
assumed. On the contrary, the process of continuing regulatory adjustment re-
quires such profound institutional renovation and such extensive participation in
public decision-making that the distinction between public and private collapses.
For their part, the courts seem to have stumbled upon a way to realize their
virtues as disentrenching institutions, exposing encrusted inequalities through
would an education compromise between Bush and centrist Democrats look like? It would start
with Bush's top education priority: a restructuring of federal education programs that offered states
a trade of flexibility for accountability.").
27. See, e.g., James Traub, What No School Can Do, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 16, 2000, at 52;
infra notes 368-70.
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public and constitutional scrutiny, without, however, directly administering the
positive reforms that they have proved unable to command successfully. These
latter developments suggest the possibility of a non-court-centric form of judicial
review that preserves the capacity for constitutional deliberation as a form of
reflection on the deepest norms of the political community, while substantially
lessening the intrusiveness of the judiciary and so tempering the counter-
majoritarian dilemma.
Part V considers the capacity of the federal No Child Left Behind Act to
create enforceable assurances of improved educational outcomes for poor and
minority children. We claim that the NCLB is neither a Trojan horse for priva-
tization nor for deregulation of federal funding to poor and minority students.
Although the NCLB taxes the capacity of states to build effective governance
systems and of schools to meet the ensuing obligations, we argue that the NCLB
is unlikely to crush reform at either the state or school level. To the contrary,
based on experience to date, we argue that new accountability framework can
trigger a race to the top. It does this both by facilitating exchanges of experience
among states that are already reforming their school systems rapidly and by
exposing laggards to political reprisals by an aggrieved well-informed citizenry.
We argue as well that, despite serious limitations, the NCLB can aid the losers in
this race by reviving and redirecting community-based and litigation strategies
pioneered by the Civil Rights movement. In combination, the race to the top,
political mobilization and corresponding litigation strategies may correct the
serious limitations in federal enforcement in the current legislation.
By way of conclusion, we argue that the new reform can be seen as a
legitimate legatee of the movement for desegregation of the schools.
I.
THE CYCLE OF COURT-CENTRIC REFORM AND ITS LIMITS
During the last half century, educational reformers have used the courts and
the law to pursue racial justice and better schools. 28 Assessments of their impact
diverge wildly.29 For those, mainly on the left, who see the courts' intervention
as a substantial success, law-driven reforms were single-handedly responsible for
ending state-sponsored racial segregation of the schools from South Carolina to
Seattle in the quarter century after Brown v. Board of Education.30 Later judicial
28. See generally articles collected in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 6.
29. For more optimistic views, see for example LAW & SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 6;
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION (1984); MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCH, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE COURTS (1986); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Deseg-
regation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1614-35 (1990). For more pessimistic views, see,
for example, CHUBB & MOE, supra note 12, at 6; LINo GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976); DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
30. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 29, at 26-34, 46-70, 177-90; GARY ORFIELD, PUBLIC
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interventions were also crucially responsible for equalizing the monetary support
for poor and rich schools from Connecticut to California.3 1 From this vantage
point, the failing of court-driven reform was that it didn't go far enough. Judges
lacked the courage of office to apply principles they embraced with the rigor
required to make reform extensive and deep enough to be self-reinforcing.
32
Observers, mainly on the right, who see the courts' intervention as instead a
substantial failure, point chiefly to two aspects of the record. First, high and
(since 1980) increasing proportions of African-American and Latino children are
attending schools with few or no white children. 33 Second, even in states where
judicially sponsored reform resulted in higher and increasingly equal funding for
all public school students, the educational performance of poor and minority
children is still far below that of white and Asian-American children.34 From this
point of view, the failures grew directly out of the courts' disregard for their
institutional competence as defined by the constitutional separation of powers. 35
By presuming to supplant the political branches, or (in later versions) by intru-
ding into spheres more properly left to private ordering, the courts encouraged a
poisonous mixture of bureaucratization and political and racial polarization of
American public education that thwarted the reformers' own program.36 The
courts' retreat was thus seen not as a failure of nerve but as a renewed respect for
the separation of powers. 37
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-1980, 1-12 (1983); Willis Hawley & Mark
A. Smylie, The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial
Integration, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 281, 289 (Phyllis A. Katz &
Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988); David R. James, City Limits on Racial Equality: The Effects of City-
Suburb Boundaries on Public-School Desegregation, 1968-1976, 54 AM. Soc. REV. 963, 974-82
(1989).
31. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 6, at 226-28 & n.53.
32. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 29, at 146-205; James, supra note 30; Gary Orfield,
Conservative Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra
note 6, at 39-83; Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Desegregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1-22 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996).
33. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 163-
210, 221 (1995); David J. Armor, After Busing: Education and Choice, PUB. INTEREST, Spring
1989, at 24-27; John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justice, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1992, at 15;
Pierre DeVise, Integration in Chicago Forty Years After Brown, 15 URB. GEOG. 454 (1994);
Catherine F. Dwyer & Christopher J. Sutton, Brown Plus Forty: The Denver Experience, 15 URB.
GEOG. 421 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Beme, supra note 9, at 12-20; THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR
REALITY? 13-35 (1984).
35. See, e.g., DAVID KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION (1982).
36. See, e.g., GRAGLIA, supra note 29, at 256-62, 277-82; RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN
OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 6-8, 138-39, 288 (1984); Ravitch, supra
note 16, at 382-84; SOWELL, supra note 34, at 12-35. For an early criticism of the Court's lack of
legal competence to desegregate the schools that is steeped in the ideas of the American Legal
Process School described infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1959).
37. See Charles J. Cooper, The Coercive Remedies Paradox, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77,
80-81 (1986).
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Looking closely at these two crucial cycles of court-driven educational
reform-federal court sponsored school desegregation from 1954 to 1990, and
state court sponsored funding equalization since the early 1970s-this section
concludes that both evaluations are partially correct but fundamentally flawed.
As we demonstrate below, when judges could plausibly think that ending a
wrong was itself a sufficient remedy for a grave social injustice, they were
relentless in their willingness to stop the wrong. But when it became clear that
forbidding a wrong, far from immediately correcting a harm, instead required
choices among complex and competing ideas of the right, judges withdrew from
the struggle as relentlessly as they had initiated it. Casting the issue as one of the
boldness or timidity of courts thus misses the mark.
Equally wide of the mark is the opposing view, which trusts the political
branches and private actors to remedy deep social problems if only left free of
judicial meddling. These branches' and actors' tolerance of school segregation
and egregious disparities in public school funding suggests otherwise. Even after
judges, having broken the logjam and forced consideration of these issues,
withdrew from the remedial field, politicians and private actors made little prog-
ress towards effective correctives. Excoriating judges for zealous meddling is no
more help to understanding the successes and failures of school reform than
berating them for timidity.
These symmetrical misunderstandings grow out of common assumptions,
rooted in the American Legal Process School, about the institutional strengths
and weaknesses of our democratic order.38 In the American Legal Process view,
the Constitution, as refined by the New Deal, creates through the separation of
powers an ensemble of public and private institutions well-suited to the changing
problems of complex democracies. 39 But it is not immediately clear which
branch or branches of government, if any, should have responsibility for solving
emergent problems. Misallocating responsibility compounds the original prob-
lem because the appropriate institution is paralyzed, while the inappropriate one
uses its authority to make a bad situation worse. Only by implausibly presuming
that we should be able, on reflection, to identify the right institutional tools for
the job, and yet that we often imprudently select the wrong one, can the contro-
versies of two vast cycles of educational reform be transformed into a dispute
over who the best actor would have been, rather than over which actions would
have been best.
To these common assumptions corresponds a common blind spot regarding
the capacity of our democratic order for fundamental innovation. In assuming
that the basic features of our institutions are fixed, the left and right adherents of
this view miss the possibility of innovation in the tasks of both the judiciary and
public administration and in the relation between citizens and their government.
38. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
39. See id at 179-98.
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We argue below that even as the courts were failing to complete the reforms they
initiated, they were incidentally facilitating just this sort of innovation in demo-
cratic problem solving.
This section retells the story of the successes and failures of these two
cycles of educational reform, focusing not on the fidelity of courts and other
institutions to their putative roles, but on their actual reform capacities and limi-
tations, the relation between these, and the encouragement the courts eventually
gave to the emergence of some of the innovations upon which a comprehensive
and endiring reform of the public schools may be built.
A. School Desegregation
For some observers, the federal courts' desegregation of schools between
1968 and 1973 qualifies as among the most successful and broad-ranging social
reforms in the entire course of American history.40 In the preceding decade and a
half, the Supreme Court repeatedly ruled that the Equal Protection Clause barred
racial segregation of public schools, even if nominally voluntary, because public
education was a crucial governmental service that was rendered inferior for
black children when it was provided separately for whites and blacks.41 But the
Court undercut these affirmations through its respect for local political decision
making and its fear of overturning school systems on the verge of explosion. The
remedial machine was thus to run only at "all deliberate speed."-42 Under these
circumstances, states were able to stop reforms, first through massive, aggressive
public resistance, then through more furtive, privately concerted obstruction. 43
Convinced finally that its deference to the self-reforming capacities of civil
society was being used for mean ends, the Court with the help of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare ordered integration "forthwith.' '44 The result
was the almost instantaneous integration of schools attended by millions of chil-
40. See sources cited supra notes 30, 33.
41. See, e.g., Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968); Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 & n.11 (1954);
Liebman, supra note 29, at 1476-77.
42. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("Brown II"). See JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 206, 389-91 (1994); Liebman, supra note 29, at 1486, 1587.
43. See, e.g., NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 97-81, 237-50 (1969);
GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 217-55; ANTHONY LEWIS & THE NEW YORK TIMES, PORTRAIT OF A
DECADE, THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 32-45, 208-10 (1964); GARY ORFIELD, THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 102-50 (1969); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN
To BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978, at 51-52, 61-127 (1979).
44. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. Of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per cur-
iam); Green, 391 U.S. at 437-39 & n.4; GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 383-91; STEPHEN L.
WASBY, ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, & ROSEMARY METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO
ALEXANDER 377-407 (1977); Liebman, supra note 29, at 1466 n.5, 1472-73. On HEW's role, see
HARRELL R. RODGERS & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 18 (1972); Frank T.
Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 20-26 (1975); ORFIELD, supra note 43; Note, The Courts, HEW, and
Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 356-64 (1967).
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dren in the 1968-1969 to the 1971-1972 school years. 45 A longer-term result
was rising SAT scores of black children who entered desegregated schools
during this period. This substantially narrowed the gap between black and white
achievement levels by the 1980s. 46 No wonder many observers concluded that
courts had an indispensable role to play as a forum of last resort and an
instrument of dramatic social reform.47
This success obscured, however, the narrow circumstances on which it was
ultimately based. What went nationally by the name of desegregation was in fact
something more particular: desegregation of county-wide school districts in the
rural South that were segregated by force of explicit state statutes.48 This focus
was largely by lawyerly design. It was easy to demonstrate in court that rural
southern schools for blacks were not remotely equal to those for whites.49 Not
surprisingly, therefore, when the Court's three famous orders to integrate "now"
finally came, they were all directed towards just this kind of district. 50
A deeper consequence of this strategy was that racial integration, once
finally ordered, occurred almost automatically. 51 Because each county operated
a single set of acceptable public schools for whites and another set of clearly
inferior schools for blacks, shutting down the latter automatically moved black
children to the former. Ending segregation thus achieved racial justice in schools
whose quality was agreeable to the entire community. This solution also im-
proved black educational achievement: Much of the increase in black test scores
during the period can be traced to graduates of rural southern schools that had
desegregated in the early 1970s. 52
45. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 383-91, 398-401; HAROLD HOROWITZ &
KENNETH KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 239-40 (1969); WASBY, D'AMATo &
METRAILER, supra note 44, at 407-08, MARC YUDOF, DAVID L. KIRP & BETSY LEVIN,
EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 486 (3d ed. 1992); Orfield, supra note 32, at 42.
46. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1624-25 & n.675.
47. See sources cited supra notes 30, 33.
48. See, e.g., WILLIS HAWLEY ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION: LESSONS
FROM RESEARCH 4 (1983) ("The greatest progress in desegregation has been in the South where
changes have been dramatic and lasting."); GARY ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1968-80, at 1-12 (1983); FrNIs WELCH & AUDREY LIGHT, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, NEW EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 6, 8, 18-21 & Tables 8-11 (1987); Gary
Orfield, School Desegregation in the 1980s, in 4 EQUITY & CHOICE 25, 25-26 (as of 1984, less
than 30% of all black children in the south attended 90-100% minority schools compared to over
55% in the Northeast). See also Liebman, supra note 29, at 1465-66, 1470-72 (comparing great
progress of school desegregation in rural South to poor progress in urban North and West).
49. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 116-32; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 346-
66 (1975).
50. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 420 (1968). See GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 383-87, 582.
51. See GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 380-81, 388-91, 398-401; Liebman, supra note 29, at
1466 nn.5-6.
52. See, e.g., Jomills Braddock & James M. McPartland, The Social and Academic
Consequences of School Desegregation, Equity & Choice, Feb. 1988, at 7 (African Americans
account for about forty percent of recent overall gains in SAT scores; the "most significant gains
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Soon desegregation moved to southern cities and from there to the urban
North and West. Under these more complex conditions, the ambiguous goals of
desegregation53 became more and more apparent, prompting concerns about the
availability of corresponding remedies. 54 In these settings, it was possible to see
the same schools either as analogous to those in the rural South in the 1950s, or
as the legitimate result of assigning children to schools by locality.55 If the goal
of the original Brown decision was to end deliberate segregation, then neighbor-
hood schools, even if segregated in fact, might be constitutionally acceptable. If
the goal, instead, was to end state-created racial separation, then a neighborhood
assignment principle resulting in segregation was no more acceptable that an
explicitly segregative principle.
Such questions invited endlessly more. Suppose agreement to aim for a
multi-racial society because people draw benefits from interaction with members
of other races. 56 Does that require occasional mixing? Enforced homogen-
ization? 57 Access to crucial pathways to economic and political power?58 Or
suppose the goal is "just" to eliminate government implication in racial
separation.59 Is the state implicated whenever segregation results from lines the
have come in the South, where school desegregation has had its greatest impact"); U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., THE READING REPORT CARD, 1971-1988: TRENDS FROM THE NATION'S REPORT CARD 14-15
(1989) (in 1971, white high school students on average scored fifty-three points (ten percent)
higher than blacks on prestigious testing group's 500-point reading scale; in 1988, the gap was
twenty points (four percent)).
53. Brown I appears today as a confusing melange of explanations for desegregation: ending
explicit, state-mandated racial discrimination; forbidding any technique the state uses to favor one
group of citizens and demean another; creating a multiracial society; enhancing educational
opportunity for African-Americans. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1472-540 & n.353.
54. Brown H now looks like a concoction of high-minded remedial aspirations, na'fve
deference to presumptively well-intentioned state actors, buck-passing discretion to lower courts,
and a dispensation all around from any but deliberate speed. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 42,
at 389-91. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 132 ("The problem is that we are no longer
certain what kind of question public school desegregation really is. Twenty years ago we were
convinced it was a matter of showing southern school segregation to be morally wrong. But with
busing, good moral arguments exist on both sides. To the extent that desegregation has become
less a moral question, or at least more a moral standoff, is it also less clearly a constitutional
requirement the Supreme Court is entitled to impose?").
55. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1472.
56. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT
OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 106 (1982); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 217,
223-24 (1983); Robin West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal
Vision, 46 U. PrIr. L. REv. 673, 716, 735 (1985); Marc Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and
the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411, 456-58 (1973).
57. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1073-75
(1978) (criticizing the assumption that the goal of Brown was to attain a society in which "every-
body is a creamy shade of beige.").
58. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1495-500; Richard Parker, The Past of Constitutional
Theory-and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 245, 249-51 (1981).
59. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-36, 42 (1976); Frank Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 277, 286,
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state draws?60 Or only when there is malice in the heart of the line-drawer? 61 Or
suppose the goal is to improve the public education of black children. 62 Higher
test scores presumedly count as one such improvement. But what about higher
completion rates in white-dominated institutions of higher learning? Lower
teenage pregnancy and delinquency rates? Better jobs as adults? 63
Even as the Court anxiously husbanded its legitimacy by emphasizing points
of agreement rather than divisive questions,64 commentators rendered the
ambiguities of the Court's opinions as fundamental differences of principle. 65
For example, could any order requiring citizens of one named group to ,associate
with citizens of another be justified as the application of any neutral principle
applicable to all citizens in the same situation regardless of particulars such as
their race?66 But isn't the state compelled to correct manifest insults to demo-
cratic principles and the rule of law implicit in state validation of a virulent caste
system? 67 Isn't the state's obligation to perform certain tasks-including the
education of an informed citizenry-so fundamental to a well-ordered democ-
racy that it may, in fulfilling that responsibility, burden particular groups that are
innocent of any improper conduct? 68
No wonder, then, that undertaking to reengineer the nation's schools and
school districts, one by one, in service of an educational, social or political
reform that nobody could define with compelling precision eventually proved
298-310 (1972).
60. See, e.g., Paul Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There Is But One Constitution,
7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2, 4-11 (1972); Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case: Its
Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 698 (1971) [hereinafter
Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg]; Owen M. Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the
Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 18, 34-35 (1974) [hereinafter Fiss, Uncertain Path].
61. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 59, at 12-14; Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
62. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 161-63 (1987); Derrick Bell, Brown
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 90, 98-101 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980); Owen M. Fiss, School Desegregation: The
Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 194, 200, 207 (1975); Freeman, supra note
57, at 1067.
63. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1485-95.
64. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 611 n.62 (1983); Denis
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court 1948-1958, 68
GEO. L.J. 1, 61 (1979); WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 61-62, 78-102 (criticizing the Court for
emphasizing apparent consensus while depriving the nation of needed guidance).
65. See sources cited in Liebman, supra note 29, at 1480 n.104.
66. See Wechsler, supra note 36, at 33. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 172-73 (1976).
67. See Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960).
68. See Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra note 60; Fiss, Uncertain Path, supra note 60, at
33-35. For other ramifications of this debate, see, for example, Brest, supra note 59, at 36-43;
Liebman supra note 29, at 1614-35; Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights:
The Consequences of Uncertainty, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20,
25-31 (Ray C. Rist & Ronald J. Anson eds., 1977).
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too much for the Court. After tarrying with the vague idea of "disestablishing"
previously segregated urban schools without requiring formulaic integration, 69
the Court was finally overtaken by the ambiguities of its decisions when it
ventured into northern and western desegregation. The result was the Court's
adoption in the mid-1970s of three legal rules that radically constrained and
eventually stopped the movement for desegregation.
First was the 1973 holding in the Denver case that the state's operation of
schools in which children in fact were segregated by race did not by itself violate
the Equal Protection Clause and justify judicial intervention. 70 State-operated
schools-however segregated by race and however educationally inferior as a
result-were beyond judicial help unless plaintiffs could prove that responsible
state agencies had deliberately (or, in the word of the day, "invidiously")
intended to operate the schools on a racial basis. 71 Doing so ruled out the philo-
sophically more controversial goals of multi-racialism and educational adequacy.
It also absolved the courts of remedial responsibility for the many racially seg-
regated schools that only "happened" to end up that way though an application
of a neighborhood, choice or other "race-neutral" assignment principle.
Second, in the 1974 Detroit case, the Court ruled that state officials who had
invidiously segregated black children in Detroit from white children in the
suburbs had no legal duty to remedy the situation, because the affected suburban
school districts had not themselves intentionally segregated the city district's
schools. 72 The Court justified this curious ruling on the ground that its remedial
powers were limited by respect for the tradition of "local control" of school
districts (even if state officials had ignored that tradition in reaching the
discriminatory decisions that the Court was refusing to reverse). 73
These constricting rules, however, still left room for relief because racial
discrimination in urban public schools, housing, real estate and banking
regulation, and transportation was pervasive and blatant. To make relief
effectively unattainable, it took a third rule (defined in a series of cases from
Pasadena in 1976 to Kansas City two decades later 74), which required plaintiffs
69. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971).
70. Keyes v. School District No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
71. See id.; see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,464 (1979).
72. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 & n.14, 733, 745-48, 753 (1974); see Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87, 91-97 (1995).
73. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-44; see also Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 97-98. These cases
exacerbated the faultlines running through the legal doctrine and the communities affected by it.
For example, urban working class white families stuck with forced busing within the city (from
which their suburban equivalents were immune) saw the ruling and its aftermath as an example of
gross class discrimination. See J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN
THE LIVES OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES 470-72 (1985). Commentators determined to explain
desegregation as designed to cure the demonstrable effects of intentional segregation chalked it up
to an ill-defined and admittedly uncontrollable doctrine of "remedial limits" that allowed or even
required major effects of desegregation to remain unremedied. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 64, at
646-48.
74. See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 87-97; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491-92, 496
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to match particular state decisions to specific segregative outcomes. Under this
requirement, plaintiff children first had to prove that school districts, trans-
portation agencies, real estate and banking regulators, and housing, urban
renewal and relocations authorities had invidiously tried to separate whites from
blacks. Then they had to prove that those efforts-exclusive of the imperatives
of wealth, economically and socially spawned migration, public policy con-
siderations besides race, and private preferences-"caused" substantial existing
school segregation. In the two decades since the Court made causation a crucial
issue, no court has even attempted to identify the multivariate or other analysis
sufficient for this demonstration. Although the effort to accomplish the necessary
analysis nearly bankrupted the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and other civil
rights organizations, it produced little permanent educational reform.
75
The upshot was to limit intervention to cases where officials publicly
proclaimed their desire to discriminate and publicly exhibited their segregative
successes. There was nothing half-hearted about the Court's retreat from an
expansive program of desegregation, just as there had been nothing half-hearted
about its original embrace of one. When its decisions produced self-evident
remedies, as in the rural South, the Court was fully prepared to mobilize the
coercive powers of the state. When its own decisions raised more questions than
they answered, it was not. Its turnabout was the fruit of a complex and
inarticulate decision about its own capacity to define and solve problems, not a
matter of intestinal fortitude nor a fully considered judgment about the relevant
capacities of other branches of government.
Even in the urban North and West, however, a few multidistrict deseg-
regation cases suggested a distinct potential of courts. When they redistributed
children among schools and redefined districts not as an end in itself but instead
to renew the processes through which local, county and state officials and
educators interacted to administer schools, federal judges in Wilmington, Dela-
ware, Charlotte, North Carolina, and Louisville, Kentucky for a time energized
surprising and effective coalitions of actors, both inside and outside the schools.
Those coalitions, in turn, revitalized entire regional educational systems and
even the cities they straddled.76
(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 406, 417 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976).
75. The first author on this Article was the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's lead attorney on
the Kansas City case from 1982 to 1985.
76. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 29, at 80-82 & nn.140-44; JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, THE
POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE METROPOLITAN REMEDY IN DELAWARE 174-95 (1980);
SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH
CONG., REPORT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 10 (Comm. Print 1982); Willis D. Hawley and Mark
A. Smylie, The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial
Integration, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 281, 285 (Phyllis A. Katz &
Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988); Ward Sinclair, Desegregation's Quiet Success, WASH. POST, June
17, 1978, at Al. These school districts
experience[d] an educational renaissance characterized by curricular reform, moder-
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Two decades later state courts were to stumble again upon the advantages of
this form of external collaboration as they worked through the complexities of
school finance reform, to which we turn next.
B. Equitable Funding
Even as the federal courts advanced and retreated, reformers turned to state
courts to pursue equalization of per-pupil funding across school districts within
states. The focus on the state courts was compelled by the Supreme Court's un-
willingness to entertain claims of this sort.
77
nized grade structures. ., revitalized teaching staffs, enhanced parental involvement
and financial support for the schools, and-perhaps most importantly--a revived admi-
nistrative bureaucracy. This effect.., prompted [black critics of integration] to criticize
desegregation as a screen for enhancing the education opportunities for white children.
Liebman, supra note 29, at 1621. These remedies operated by reconfiguring segregated metro-
politan school districts into new sets of racially mixed districts, then turning the reorganized units
loose, under the guidance of newly interlocked local, regional and state officials and a variety of
actors from the private sector, to reorganize the governance, administrative, and pedagogical struc-
tures of the newly reconfigured schools and districts. Hochschild attributes the success simply to
the capacity of desegregation to shake up previously hide-bound bureaucracies. HOCHSCHILD,
supra note 29, at 81-82. A closer look reveals that the catalyst for change was not just the shake-
up of the schools but also the new combinations of social actors (cutting across racial as well as
jurisdictional and disciplinary lines) that the remedies mobilized and organized and, indeed, a new
form of interracial politics. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1614-66; RAFFEL, supra, at 77-78.
77. Taking seriously the Court's recognition in Brown of public education's fundamental
importance to developing "hearts," "minds," and citizenship, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 494-95 (1954), and citing established equal protection doctrine forbidding states to distribute
fundamentally important public services unequally on the basis of wealth, see, e.g., Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), San Antonio school children attacked Texas's system of distributing
educational resources based on the taxable property wealth of the districts in which they lived. See
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court declined to intervene,
suddenly demoting public education to nonfundamental status, and placing wealth discrimination
absent a fundamental interest beyond equal protection scrutiny. See id. at 18-31. Central to the
Court's explanation for doing so was its lack of competence to identify either the educational
resources that might be deemed fundamental-or, indeed, whether levels of any resources could be
meaningfully linked to desirable educational outcomes-or the proper fiscal measures for making
sure that those resources were evenly distributed. See id at 41-42 ("the Justices of this Court lack
both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise
decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues"; "[i]n addition to matters
of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels
against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels");
see also id. at 43 & n.86, 44, 56-59. Instead, the Court extolled the comparative policy-making
advantages of the political branches and particularly, in the educational sphere, of local political
control. Id. at 44.
This summary compresses and partially reconfigures the usual description of the "three
waves" of school-finance litigation. The effort to promote finance equalization under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ending disastrously in the Rodriguez decision, is
the first wave. Below we address the other two waves-state equal protection claims and
"adequate education" claims. See infra notes 80-107 and accompanying text. For more compre-
hensive treatments of this history, see William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in
School Finance, 8 EDUC. POL'Y 376 (1994); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151 (1995);
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Developments in the state funding equity cases paralleled those in the
federal desegregation cases. Judges in many jurisdictions advanced confidently
as long as there appeared to be a straightforward remedy for any offensive
disparity in the deployment of public resources. They broke stride, however,
once further analysis revealed unexpected complexities in goals and remedies.
The chief difference was the somewhat larger set of state courts that responded
to the complexity along the lines of the multi-district school desegregation courts
just noted 78-by mobilizing novel combinations of social actors to address
problems they could not resolve themselves.79  ,l
The equalization claims that at least nominally succeeded in state courts
relied on one or a combination of two legal theories. The first is grounded in
state equal protection provisions and is typified by California's, Connecticut's
and all but the most recent stages of New Jersey's experiences. 80 It issued in a
series of judicial directives to equalize per-pupil expenditures across districts,
which most states eventually satisfied by vastly expanding their role in school
funding. 81 The second theory is grounded in provisions found in nearly all state
constitutions requiring that the state provide an "adequate public education," 82 a
"thorough and efficient system of free schools,''83 or "an educational program of
high quality." 84 Typified by Texas's and Kentucky's as well as the recent stages
of New Jersey's experience, this second theory resulted in orders to provide
levels of funding that were educationally "sufficient" or "adequate," regardless
of whether they were equal.85 The earlier cases tended to invoke equality
theories, while the later ones chiefly advanced adequacy theories. 86 Adequacy
theories arguably found somewhat greater favor with courts, 87 perhaps because
courts were more willing to criticize an existing regime for being inadequate
than to affirmatively replace one regime with another, certifiably equal one. 88
McUsic, supra note 6; Deborah A. Verstegen, Judicial Analysis During the New Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The New Adequacy in Education, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 51 (1998).
78. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. See sources cited supra note 76.
80. See Heise, supra note 77, at 1155-63.
81. See G. Alan Hickrod et al., The Effect of Constitutional Litigation on Education Finance:
A Preliminary Analysis, 18 J. EDUC. FN. 180, 181-89 (1986); McUsic, supra note 6, at 108-15.
82. GA. CONST. art. VII1, § 1, para. 1.
83. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
84. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. See Heise, supra note 77, at 1158-59 & n.64; Rebell, supra
note 6, at 228.
85. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 6, at 226-28 & n.31.
86. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 77, at 1157-65.
87. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 6, at 228.
88. See, e.g., Clune, supra note 77 (explaining the switch from equity to adequacy as aimed
at finding new "tools which are more firmly grounded on the constitutional base, more closely
matched to the task at hand, and less threatening in their reach and power"); McUsic, supra note 6,
at 105-08, 115-19 (explaining the switch as providing a more bounded and targeted focus of
judicial activity than notions of "equality" and "equal protection"). Likewise, the focus on
"sufficient school funding rather than the consequences of local property tax revenue suggests that
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Or, the shift from equality to adequacy theories may simply have coincided with
a perception of increasing deterioration of American schools, enhancing the
urgency of a remedy.
89
Doctrinal nuances aside, all but the most recent outcomes of finance equity
litigation tended to have crucial features in common. First, they reduced the
inequality of per pupil spending across districts. 90 Second, they increased the
funding of at least some poorly financed schools and districts. 91 Third, they
increased the state's share of total funding for schools and reduced the local
share. This shift centralized control over all aspects of the educational system at
the expense of the American tradition of local autonomy in education.92 But,
local property tax revenue is more likely to remain an important source of school funds, thus
helping to preserve local control." Heise, supra note 77, at 1175. Although "indeterminacy of the
measure of an adequate education poses a... challenge to efforts to deploy adequacy arguments in
the courts" that is at least as "daunting" as the challenge posed by indeterminate equality measures,
Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 101, 172 (1995), litigants and judges partially obscured the problem, at least initially, by
defining "educational adequacy" in terms of adequate (but not necessarily equalized) funding. In
the logic of this approach, "all children are entitled to an education of at least a certain quality
and... more money is necessary to bring the worst school districts up to the minimum level
mandated by the state education clause." William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third
Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597,
603 (1994). See also Heise, supra note 77, at 1176 (measuring the success of educational adequacy
lawsuits by their "impact on school finance systems.").
89. See McUsic, supra note 6, at 117.
90. For example, by the mid-1980s, there was less than a $200 difference in the amount
California spent each year on ninety percent of the state's public school children. See, e.g., William
N. Evans, Sheila E. Murray & Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of Court-Mandated Finance
Reform, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 72, 74-75
(Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999); Joseph T. Henke, Financing Public Schools in California: The
Aftermath of Serrano v. Priest and Proposition 13, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1986); Bradley W.
Joondeph, The Good, the Bad and The Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation Prompted School
Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 793-97 (1995). This forced equalization was an
astounding feat, given the huge differences among districts that were typical before the California
suit was filed.
Equalization was a mixed blessing, however. Although it usually provided more money to
poor districts, it potentially turned equal funding into a cap on how much. See, e.g., Patricia F. First
& Louis F. Miron, The Social Construction of Adequacy, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 421, 428 (1991)
("Research has shown undesirable consequences of improving measures of equity (i.e., fairness in
distribution resources) without, at the same time, improving on those resources. The result is an
undesirable 'leveling-down' of the acceptable minimum of educational offerings."). Another
problem is that "[s]tudents from different backgrounds and possessing varying educational needs
and learning styles impose varying costs on school systems constitutionally charged with a duty to
educate them." Heise, supra note 77, at 1169. See also McUsic, supra note 6, at 106.
91. See, e.g., Evans, Murray & Schwab, supra note 90, at 78-79; Joondeph, supra note 90, at
789-808.
92. See, e.g., Evans, Murray & Schwab, supra note 90, at 81; Hickrod, supra note 81, at 189;
Robert C. Johnston & Jessica L. Sandham, States Increasingly Flexing Their Policy Muscles,
EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 14, 1999, at 1; Joondeph, supra note 90, at 820-22; McUsic, supra note 6, at
111 ("[S]tate legislative response to school finance suits almost always involves some shift from
local to state financing."); Neil D. Theobald & Faith Hann, Ample Provision for Whom? The
Evolution of State Control Over School Finance in Washington, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 7, 15-17 (1991);
Neil D. Theobald & Lawrence 0. Picus, Living with Equal Amounts of Less: Experiences of States
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fourth, where these effects were most pronounced, overall expenditures on
education stagnated or declined, so that equalization of spending within the state
did not improve the state's place in the national table of state education spen-
ding. 93 Finally, even in poor districts where finance equity suits increased per
pupil spending, no or disappointingly little educational improvement occurred.9 4
The evolution of litigation efforts in the Connecticut and New Jersey cases
starkly documents this failure. In Connecticut, the father of the named plaintiff
in the successful finance-equity suit filed a second major suit several years later
challenging the adequacy of the education provided poor and African-American
children by the state's financially equalized school districts.95 In New Jersey, the
same thing happened within the confines of a single, continuing lawsuit. More
than 25 years after their original filings, the plaintiffs went back to court. They
argued that improved educational funding had not improved educational
outcomes in poor and urban districts and asked the court to supplement the
orders setting spending levels with additional orders detailing what the expen-
ditures should be for.96
with Primarily State-Funded School Systems, 17 J. EDUC. FiN 1 (1991). In regard to the American
tradition of local control over education, see, for example, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,469
(1972).
93. See, e.g., First & Miron, supra note 90, at 428; Joondeph, supra note 90, at 810-13;
Theobald & Picus, supra note 92.
94. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reorganiza-
tion, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VIR. L. REv. 349, 392-
93 (1990); McUsic, supra note 6, at 105-15; Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies
and State Courts, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1072, 1075-78 (1994). In the standard account, this one
focusing on the New Jersey case as of 1998, the suit was
not enough to induce the development of a constitutionally acceptable school finance
system. That such legislative measures were not adequate, particularly in light of the
almost three decades of effort, fuels unflattering debates over judicial efficacy. By
struggling to achieve what it sets out to achieve, the New Jersey Supreme Court risks
eroding precious capital relating to its legitimacy as a political institution.
Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational Finance, Constitutional
Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 281, 322 (1998).
95. See James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
529, 537 (1999) ("Plaintiffs thus did not file Sheff because earlier school finance litigation had
been unsuccessful in equalizing resources; rather, plaintiffs filed Sheff because equalizing
resources was not enough."). Compare Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (granting
finance-equity relief to class represented by children of Wesley Horton) with Sheff v. O'Neill, 678
A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (permitting adequacy-based lawsuit brought by Wesley Horton and other
lawyers to proceed to trial). On the failure of the "successful" Horton suit to improve the education
of poor children in the states, see, for example, Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1273, 1296-97 n.2, 1334
(Borden, J., dissenting); McUsic, supra note 6, at 111 ("Despite the millions of dollars in state
resources spent on the Hartford schools, students attending them had the lowest test scores and the
highest dropout rates in the state."); George P. Richardson & Robert E. Lamitie, Improving
Connecticut School Aid: A Case Study with Model-Based Policy Analysis, 15 J. EDUC. FrN. 169,
170-71 (1988) (concluding that much of increased state aid prompted by a successful finance-
equity suit did not go into improved educational programs but to tax relief in high-tax urban areas).
96. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 366 (N.J. 1990) (describing lack of any
apparent increase in student achievement despite years of increased spending on public schools
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The developments ii these cases reveal a doctrinal broadening and insti-
tutional opening of school reform litigation generally. The doctrinal broadening
has meant that adequacy no longer connotes financial adequacy. Instead, an
adequate education is one that meets the demands of contemporary society. What
counts is the adequacy of the outcome, not the cross-district equality of the
inputs. 97 This broadening has gone hand in hand with an institutional opening.
Because the meaning of an adequate outcome and the means for achieving it are
hard to define, courts have begun to propose workable but open-ended defini-
tions of adequacy and to establish measures of progress in attaining it.
This opening to outside institutions has taken various forms, the variety of
which reveals the courts' uncertainty about the link between a finding of
constitutional inadequacy in schooling and the corresponding remedy. In some
cases the courts extract standards specifying very general goals for the states'
schools from expert accounts of well-functioning schools. It may then fall to the
legislature to translate these goals into a workable plan for educational reform. In
a second group of cases, courts select one or more detailed models of success-
fully reformed schools. School districts found to be violating their constitutional
obligations then are required to choose a model or an unlisted alternative that
delivers superior results. In a third category, the court issues a sibylline rejection
of solutions that do not meet its adequacy standard, while remaining silent as to
the specifics of that standard or how to comply with it.
In the first category is Kentucky. In 1990, its supreme court declared not
only the state's educational financing mechanism but its entire "system of com-
mon schools" constitutionally deficient and ordered the state to replace it with a
system enabling Kentucky students to graduate with seven educational skills and
categories of knowledge. 98 (These were derived from a catalogue of essential
competencies for citizens of a democracy compiled and widely circulated by a
prompted by ongoing school-finance litigation); Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and
Implementation of Educational Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS
L.J. 827, 925-31 (1998) (giving account, by school children's lawyer in the New Jersey finance
equity lawsuit, of the failure of the early rounds of the suit to improve the education of poor
children, and more recent efforts to secure orders prescribing "whole school" and other substantive
reforms). As Professor McUsic points out, "the plaintiffs' [own] position" in the latest Connecticut
lawsuit and in the later stages of the New Jersey litigation support the following conclusion:
"Unfortunately, after decades of lobbying and litigating for every dollar they could find in
increased funding and special programs, advocates on behalf of... high-poverty districts acknowl-
edged that students still receive[d] inadequate education." McUsic, supra note 6, at 129.
97. For legal observers, there is irony in the fact that although adequacy appealed to courts
because of the simplicity of the demands it placed on legal institutions and because it seemed
legally more tractable and less ambitious, it turned out to embroil them more deeply in complex
and novel collaborations with outside institutions. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 77, at 1163-76;
McUsic, supra note 6, at 115-20, 134-37.
98. Illustrating the seven required skills and knowledge are the first and sixth: "sufficient oral
and written communication skills to enable [the] student[] to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization" and "sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either aca-
demic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently."
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
2003]
N. Y U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
statewide movement for educational reform that we discuss in detail below.)99 In
response, the Kentucky General Assembly adopted the Kentucky Education Re-
form Act in 1990,100 one of the "most far-reaching" state educational reform
efforts in the nation, which not only increased revenues for all school districts in
the state by 8 to 25 percent10' but also "reshaped the curriculum [and] gover-
nance... of Kentucky schools." 10
2
The second category of reforms is exemplified by New Jersey. In 1998, after
years of failed finance-equalization efforts, the New Jersey Supreme Court gave
the state three years to implement "whole school" reform programs (or,ipossibly,
alternative programs of the districts' own choosing) in several hundred urban
schools. 10 3 Broadly speaking these involved a bottom-up needs assessment in
the poorest districts culminating in the elaboration of comprehensive school- and
district-wide reform plans. 104
Texas typifies the third category. The state's high court thrice ordered the
state legislature to develop a new mechanism for funding schools sufficient, in
the language of the state constitution, to permit an "'efficient"' public school
system and "'a general diffusion of knowledge"' to its students. 10 5 The Texas
Supreme Court's combination of self-assertion and deference to the political
branches was so bewildering that one frustrated state legislator, summoned to yet
another special legislative session, complained that he was ready to "surrender"
to the Texas Supreme Court if it would only tell him where to turn himself in. 106
We tell the tortuous story of the back-and-forth between the Texas courts and
legislature below. It culminated in 1995 in the revision of the entire Texas Edu-
cation Code, removing many regulatory constraints on individual districts and
replacing them with a two-pronged program of local control over curriculum,
educational materials, and instructional philosophy coupled with a powerful
rating system for districts and schools based on scores on criterion-referenced
achievement tests of the state's own design. 107
As these examples suggest, school reform litigation has recently come to
engage a much broader range of actors and to spawn a variety of new institutions
that, until they developed, would have been impossible for the courts or the legal
system to imagine, much less to embody in a court order or legal rule. In so
99. Compare id. with THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE FOR ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE, GAINING
GROUND: HARD WORK AND HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR KENTUCKY SCHOOLS 24-25 (Nov. 1999),
available at www.prichardcommittee.org/pubs/gground.pdf [hereinafter GAINING GROUND].
100. Kentucky Education Reform Act, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as amended at
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 156-163 and scattered sections (Michie 1999)).
101. Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in
Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 497-98 (1999).
102. McUsic, supra note 6, at 136.
103. Caroline Hendrie, NJ. Schools Put Reform to the Test, EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 21, 1999, at 1.
104. See Tractenberg, supra note 96, at 923-27.
105. See, e.g., Clune, supra note 6, at 738-40, 747.
106. See id. at 754.
107. See, e.g., infra notes 215-64 and accompanying text.
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doing, we conclude below, the courts are creating a public forum in which to
discuss comprehensive reforms of American education that draw on linked
innovations in school governance, performance measurement, and the re-
conceptualization of the teaching profession and pedagogy. In some limited and
thus far poorly understood way, they are also coordinating the debate they
instigate and enable. This raises at least the possibility that the courts will break
out of the cycle of courageous efforts to improve existing institutions, followed
by the disheartening recognition of the limits of doctrinally directed interven-
tions and a retreat to caution that preserves the judiciary by sacrificing its
original ameliorative ambitions. To make sense of this possibility, it is necessary
to step outside the boundaries of the school reform debate as it is posed within
the judicial system and to look directly at the broader and convergent develop-
ments on which that debate increasingly has drawn.
We do this in four steps. The first focuses on what might be called top-down
reforms-innovations in educational standards that allow measurement of school
performance and thus ultimately put pressure on school administrators to under-
take meaningful reform. The second focuses on what can be thought of as reform
from the bottom up-innovations in classroom practice and school organization
that lead in the best cases to the creation of "learning communities" capable of
serving the most disparate school populations. In the third, we show how these
two developments intersect and transform one another. The result is the "New
Accountability"-a synthesis in which standards are used to diagnose problems
in the performance of individual students, teachers and schools and in which the
clinical practice of the "master teacher" is informed and disciplined by sys-
tematic comparisons to peer performance that standards enable. Fourth, we show
how this synthesis creates the context within which new forms of judicial
activism are proving successful.
It.
STANDARDS, LEARNING COMMUNITIES AND THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Top-Down Reform: Standards, State and Federal
The innovations in standards that form the framework for the New
Accountability system were the late flower of a series of linked reform move-
ments at the state and national levels that date to the early 1980s. These
movements were motivated by the recognition that American educational sys-
tems ranked miserably in international comparisons. At the national level, these
concerns crystallized in numerous reports on the parlous state of U.S. education.
Among these, the most influential was A Nation at Risk, by the President's
National Commission on Excellence in Education. 10 8 At the state level, where
108. In 1983, the President's National Commission on Excellence in Education galvanized
the so-called "Excellence Movement" with its conclusions that a "rising tide of mediocrity"
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early reform partly antedated and partly responded to this report, the nearly
uniform response to the perceived crisis was legislation imposing standards of
minimum competency on students and teachers. Within a few years of A Nation
at Risk, nearly all fifty states had adopted some version of comprehensive
standards. 109
threatens public education in this country and that "[o]ur Nation is at risk." NAT'L COMM'N ON
EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983)
[hereinafter A NATION AT RISK]. The Commission's report noted, inter alia, an increase in the
number of functional illiterates, a decline in SAT and other achievement scores, and th increasing
demand for remedial education. Id. at 8-9; accord CARNEGIE TASK FORCE ON TEACHING AS A
PROFESSION, A NATION PREPARED: TEACHERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1986) [hereinafter
CARNEGIE TASK FORCE] (finding a decline in teacher salaries, autonomy, status, and competency);
NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASS'N CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, TIME FOR RESULTS: THE
GOVERNORS' 1991 REPORT ON EDUCATION 97-109 (1986) [hereinafter TIME FOR RESULTS]
(documenting the sorely inadequate education available to at-risk children); TASK FORCE ON EDUC.
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, EDUC. COMM'N OF THE STATES, ACTION FOR EXCELLENCE: A COM-
PREHENSIVE PLAN TO IMPROVE OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS 10-11, 30 (1983) (detailing damage to
personal and national economic prospects caused by inadequate educational development of vast
amounts of human resources); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FED. ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUC. POLICY, MAKING THE GRADE 4-5, 15 (1983) [hereinafter MAKING THE GRADE]
(concluding that demands on schools are complicated by increase in truancy, dropout rates, and
violent crimes); see Harry A. Passow, Tackling the Reform Reports of the 1980's, 65 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 674 (1984); see also Edward B. Fiske, Impending U.S. Jobs "Disaster": Work Force
Unqualified to Work-Schools Lagging Far Behind Needs of Employers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1989, at Al (reporting consensus in business community that American schools are graduating
students without the skills needed for sophisticated new jobs); Mark Walsh, In Poll, College
Faculty Say Students Are Unprepared in Basic Skills, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 8, 1989, at 5 (citing poll
of 5000 college faculty members revealing overwhelming consensus that entering freshmen are
seriously ill-prepared for college in terms of their basic skills); Bernard Weinraub, Bush and
Governors Set Education Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1989, at A1O (noting "consensus with[in]
the Government and the education establishment that American schools [are] in turmoil and that
the education system [is] increasingly lagging behind those of other industrial democracies").
These nationally focused reports, see, e.g., A NATION AT RISK, supra, at 32; TIME FOR
RESULTS, supra, at 97-109; MAKING THE GRADE, supra, at 8-20, and a separate set of more
targeted studies particularly documented the dismal educational prospects of poor, minority, and
limited English proficiency children. See, e.g., COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BD., EQUALITY
AND EXCELLENCE: THE EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF BLACK AMERICANS (1985); W. VANCE GRANT &
THOMAS D. SNYDER, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 1983-84 (1984); HAROLD HODGKINSON,
ALL IN ONE SYSTEM: DEMOGRAPHICS OF EDUCATION-KINDERGARTEN THROUGH GRADUATE
SCHOOL (1985); HAROLD HODGKINSON, THE SAME CLIENT: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EDUCATION
AND SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS (1989); NAT'L COALITION OF ADVOCATES FOR STUDENTS,
BARRIERS TO EXCELLENCE: OUR CHILDREN AT RISK (1985) [hereinafter BARRIERS TO EXCELLENCE];
NAT'L COMM'N ON SECONDARY EDUC. FOR HISPANICS, 2 "MAKE SOMETHING HAPPEN": HISPANICS
AND URBAN HIGH SCHOOL REFORM (1984) [hereinafter MAKE SOMETHING HAPPEN]; OFFICE OF
EDUC. RESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., POVERTY, ACHIEVEMENT AND THE DISTRI-
BUTION OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION SERVICES 11-30 (1986).
109. See, e.g., Changing Course: A 50-State Survey of Reform Measures, EDUC. WEEK, Feb.
6, 1985, at 11 (noting, as of the mid-1980s, that nearly all fifty states had responded to the reports
by adopting some sort of statewide assessment program to measure student achievement); Chris
Pipho, Tracking the Reforms, Part 5: Testing-Can it Measure the Success of the Reform
Movement?, EDUC. WEEK, May 22, 1985, at 19 (pointing out that "[njearly every large education
reform effort of the past few years has either mandated a new form of testing or expanded uses of
existing testing"). See generally THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1980s:
PERSPECTIVES AND CASES (Joseph Murphy ed., 1989) (collecting articles addressing numerous
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Conceived as a sincere effort to list the indispensable building-blocks of an
effective modem education, this combination of national and state-level reforms
was initially misdirected. Above all, the resulting standards and tests focused on
individual teachers and pupils, 110 with the aim of creating incentives, mainly
negative, for them to do what was needed to provide and profit from an effective
education.'Il Students who failed the tests could lose their right to matriculate,
graduate or attend state colleges; teachers who did so could lose their jobs. 112
Schools-which presumedly had a profound impact on the performance of both
teachers and students-were not themselves assessed in any way.113 Still less
could the assessments guide improvement of school performance. To the extent
that the minimum competency standards had any immediate practical con-
sequence, it was to narrow the range of what was teachable or even discussable
by focusing attention obsessively on whatever was defined as a "minimum
competency."114
aspects of the educational reform movement of the 1980s).
110. See, e.g., Heubert, supra note 17, at 179.
111. Among the negative or exclusionary consequences that minimum-standards legislation
initially imposed on students falling below standard were placement in lower tracks and denial of
eligibility for promotion to a higher grade and to matriculate to another school, to take part in
extracurricular activities, to receive a diploma or graduate, to receive a driver's license, and to
attend a state university. See, e.g., MARGARET E. GOERTZ, STATE EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS: A 50-
STATE SURVEY 10, 27-134 (1986); cf Birmingham Drops Skills Test as Requirement for
Promotion, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 1, 1989, at 3 (test scores eliminated as decisive basis for deter-
mining promotion to second through eighth grades because their principle effect was to prevent
hundreds of students who passed all their courses from passing to the next grade).
112. Most of the national reports advocated performance standards for students and teachers.
See, e.g., CARNEGIE TASK FORCE, supra note 108, at 55-103; A NATION AT RISK, supra note 108, at
20-31. The vast majority of the programs that were adopted in response relied primarily upon
mandatory minimum competency tests in reading, writing, and mathematics and, somewhat less
frequently, citizenship, social studies, and science. See GOERTZ, supra note 111, at 9 (as of 1985, at
least forty-two states required local school districts to administer some sort of basic skills test to
students at some time during their school careers). In addition to test-based performance standards,
most modem legislative reforms included curriculum-based performance standards that increased
the number and difficulty of courses students had to complete satisfactorily before receiving
diplomas or other benefits. See WILLIAM CLUNE ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS: FIRST STEPS TOWARD CURRICULAR REFORM (Consor-
tium for Pol'y Research in Educ., Report No. RR-01 1, 1989); GOERTZ, supra note 111, at 13-16.
113. See Liebman, supra note 94, at 375-77. See also the discussion of diagnostic standards
infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. As it turned out, the tests did not even serve the goal of
individual assessment, because they typically were valid only in the aggregate for populations of
school size or larger. They were not valid as measurements of individual competency. See HIGH
STAKES, supra note 19, at 30; other authority cited supra note 19.
114. See, e.g., HIGH STAKES, supra note 19, at 38-39; Jones, supra note 19, at 200-02; KOHN,
supra note 19, at 28-31; McNeil & Valenzuela, supra note 19, at 132-38; Kathleen Kennedy
Manzo, NAEP Drops Long-Term Writing Data: 'Trend' Test Unreliable Governing Board Says,
EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 15, 2000, at 1. From the beginning, critics of minimum competency tests have
argued that they are of dubious reliability and validity, are premised on meaningless and
incompatible scales and reference points, and can measure only a single day's performance with
regard to a limited range of testable skills that are not actually important to students and adults.
See, e.g., Gerald W. Bracey, The $150 Million Redundancy, 70 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 698 (1989);
Cannell, supra note 19; Linda Darling-Hammond, Mad-Hatter Tests of Good Teaching, in THE
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For all these reasons, minimum-competency standards had only a marginal
impact on American education as of the early 1990s. 115 At their worst, these
standards were exploited as a politically expeditious way of demonstrating the
moral depravity of American youth-and minority communities-and the way
self-serving educational bureaucracies contributed to their condition. 116 Even
today, this understanding of standards as nothing more nor less than
incentivizing rewards and penalties continues to inform high-stakes testing in the
many states that have not replaced it with diagnostic accountability schemes.
Notwithstanding these flaws, the early standards movement was profoundly
transformative both politically and institutionally in ways that eventually
transformed the standards themselves. Politically, educational standards were
perturbing because they lay outside the spectrum of familiar remedies pursued
by the usual constituencies. As such, the standards movement distressed
advocates of school reform on the left and the right, bringing to light deep
ambiguities in their respective positions. Opponents of public schooling saw in
standards a regressive reassertion of state control over education. 117 Advocates
of poor and minority children saw a dangerous legitimization of a system of
GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: WHICH WAY FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION? 247 (Beatrice Gross & Ronald
Gross eds., 1985) [hereinafter GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE]; Walt Haney, Validity, Vaudeville, and
Values: A Short History of Social Concerns over Standardized Testing, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1021, 1029-32 (1981); Richard Mumane, Improving Education Indicators and Economic
Indicators: The Same Problems?, 9 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 101 (1987); Neill &
Medina, supra note 19, at 689-92.
115. This was largely out of concern that the state-level reforms had not succeeded. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM A. FIRESTONE, SUSAN F. FUHRMAN & MICHAEL KIRST, THE PROGRESS OF REFORM: AN
APPRAISAL OF STATE EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES 23-26 (Consortium for Pol'y Research in Educ.,
Report No. RR-014, 1989) (stating that school reforms of the 1980s have had only "modest"
beneficial impact); Julie Johnson, Bush Will Back National Goals on Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 1989, at 24 (quoting statement by Roger Porter, domestic policy advisor to President George
Bush, that, recent reforms notwithstanding, "we have seen little if any improvement"); Julie A.
Miller, Bennett: Despite Reform, "We Are Still at Risk" EDUC. WEEK, May 4, 1988, at 15.
President Bush and the governors of all fifty states unanimously adopted a "Jeffersonian Compact
on Education" calling for development and implementation in the 1990s of "an ambitious, realistic
set of [national] performance goals" that provides "a common understanding and a common
mission" for all schools in the nation. "A Jeffersonian Compact": The Statement by the President
and Governors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, at E22 [hereinafter Jeffersonian Compact].
116. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 16, at 408-15.
117. See, e.g., CHUB & MOE, supra note 12, at 197-98. Among the effects attributed to high-
stakes minimum-competency tests were numbing constraints imposed on curriculum and teaching
methods by the need to enable children above all else to pass tests; the devaluation of such
untestable subjects and goals as writing, graphic and performing arts, critical thought, problem
solving, creativity, and leadership; repression of bright students; de-emphasis on learning for its
own sake and trivialization of knowledge and thinking into matters of multiple choice; and the
devolution of control over education from the local to the state level of government. See, e.g.,
COMM. OF CORRESPONDENCE, Education for a Democratic Future, in GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE,
supra note 114 at 374, 381-83; BARRIERS TO EXCELLENCE, supra note 108, at 47; Graham Down,
Assassins of Excellence, in GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE, supra note 114 at 273, 278 (characterizing
minimum competency testing as a "new version of mediocrity masquerading as excellence");
Walter Haney & George Madaus, Searching for Alternatives to Standardized Tests: Whys, Whats,
and Whithers, 70 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 683 (1989).
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evaluation that, intentionally or not, lent official weight to, and thereby aggra-
vated, the consequences of deprivation and racism. 
1 18
But conversely and crucially, the standards movement created an implicit
alliance among, and allowed the mutual recognition of, those for whom the
battle for improved school performance was a goal in itself, and not primarily an
occasion to demonstrate the superiority of market over plan, or vice versa. For
many in the pragmatic middle, the new arrangements suggested the broad outline
of a more effective system of governance that increased possibilities for system-
wide learning while heightening accountability.
The emergent consensus took early form in monographs prepared by
university-based educational research centers funded by the federal government
beginning in the mid-1980s. 119 It was further articulated in meetings orches-
trated by the National Governors Association and then between the Governors
and the first President Bush in Charlottesville in 1990.120 The clearest expression
of the consensus was Raising Standards for American Education, a report by the
National Council on Education Standards and Testing. 121
According to this report, standard-setting should be by mechanisms that are
nonfederal ("To maintain the Nation's tradition of state and local authority over
education, any new oversight entity should be part of a cooperative national
118. See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 19, at 199-203; Liebman, supra note 94, at 374-77 &
nn.98, 100, 104 (citing sources); McNeil & Valenzuela, supra note 19; HIGH STAKES, supra note
19. According to this critique, performance standards were used to mark poor and minority
children as failures and thereby deprive them of higher educational and employment opportunities.
See, e.g., BARRIERS TO EXCELLENCE, supra note 108, at 46; Edward L. McDill, Gary Natriello &
Aaron M. Pallas, A Population at Risk: Potential Consequences of Tougher School Standards for
Student Dropouts, 94 AM. J. EDUC. 135 (1986) (expressing concern about the negative self-concept
caused by the failure to satisfy performance standards and the anticipated denial of the only
tangible benefit disadvantaged students have to gain from competing in school will "push" those
students out of school); Robert C. Serow, Effects of Minimum Competency Testing for Minority
Students, 16 URB. REV. 67, 73-74 (1984) (finding that African-Americans have a substantially
lower pass rate than other groups on minimum competency tests and are disproportionately likely
to be sanctioned by loss of diploma for failure to pass tests).
119. See, e.g., Jennifer A. O'Day & Marshall S. Smith, Systemic Reform and Educational
Opportunity, in DESIGNING COHERENT EDUCATION POLICY 251 (Susan H. Fuhrman ed., 1993);
Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall S. Smith, School Reform: The District Policy Implications of the
Effective Schools Literature, 85 ELEM. SCH. J. 353 (1985); Marshall S. Smith & Jennifer O'Day,
Systemic School Reform, in THE POLITICS OF CURRICULUM AND TESTING, 1990 Yearbook Pol.
Educ. Ass'n 234 (Susan H. Fuhrman & Barbara Malem eds., 1991); Marshall S. Smith, Jennifer
O'Day & David K. Cohen, A National Curriculum in the United States, 49 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 74
(1991); Michael S. Smith, Selecting Students and Services for Chapter I, in FEDERAL AID TO THE
DISADVANTAGED: WHAT FUTURE FOR CHAPTER 1? 119 (Denis P. Doyle & Bruce S. Cooper eds.,
1998); see generally Maris A. Vinovskis, An Analysis of the Concept and Uses of Systemic
Education Reform, 33 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 53, 56-61 (1996).
120. See Vinovskis, supra note 119, at 56; sources cited supra note 115.
121. NAT'L COUNCIL ON EDUC. STANDARDS AND TESTING, RAISING STANDARDS FOR AMERI-
CAN EDUCATION 34 (1992) [hereinafter RAISING STANDARDS FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION]. The ad
hoc council was chaired by two governors, Roy Romer of Colorado and Carol Campbell, Jr. of
South Carolina. Its membership was a high-level microcosm of the ideological and professional
diversity that would characterize the broad state-level reform movements we will examine below.
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effort") and broad-based ("The coordinating structure should be bipartisan, en-
gage government at all levels, and involve the many constituencies that have an
interest in improving education"). 122 Subject to these principles, the Council
urged the development of nationally applicable standards for content, student
performance, school delivery, and system performance. Particularly with respect
to school delivery standards--criteria for measuring whether a school provides
the services students need to meet substantive performance standards-the
authors of the report contemplated peer reviews, thus anticipating some of the
most important later developments. 12 3
The upshot was a partial shift from global performance measures to internal,
strategic, or diagnostic standards that assess both student and institutional
performance, and prompt debate about their improvement. 124 The former focus
on outcomes; the latter focus on the practices that together are expected to im-
prove overall performance. Performance measures tend to be low-dimensional,
using one aspect of a competence as a proxy for the others: The right answer to a
multiple choice question indicates mastery of the body of knowledge the ques-
tion tests. Diagnostic standards are high-dimensional, using a portfolio of diverse
tests and other demonstrations to measure the various components of a particular
competence. Students of trigonometry might be asked in distinct steps to resolve
the structure of a roof into a series of triangles, to explain how in general to
calculate the unknown length of one side of one of these triangles given the
length and angles of intersection of the others, and finally to make the
calculation by inserting the actual value of the variables into the formal equation
describing the abstract relations. A business analogue to performance standards
122. Id.
123. In regard to the simultaneously state and national status of the standards, consider the
following testimony about the Raising Standards for American Education report:
The school delivery standards, on the other hand, would be developed collectively by
the States. Now, what is something that's developed collectively by the States? That
certainly seems to be national to me. It's a different form of national. It is collectively
by the States and then used by the States themselves to oversee, to audit the kinds of
schools, to ensure the kinds of opportunities to learn that's called for in the report.
Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educ.: Oversight Hearings on the Report of
the Nat'l Council on Educ. Standards and Testing, 102d Cong. 102-105, at 50 (1992) (testimony
of Marshall S. Smith, Dean, School of Educ., Stanford Univ., Member, Nat'l Council on Educ.
Standards and Testing).
124. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 94, at 376 n.102; Diane Massell et al., Persistence and
Change: Standards-Based System Reform in Nine States, CPRE POL'Y BRIEFS (Consortium for
Pol'y Research in Educ., RB-21, March 1997). For a thoughtful criticism of performance standards
used in isolation and a guide to their use as diagnostic assessments, see COMM'N ON TITLE I
TESTING AND ASSESSMENT, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TESTING, TEACHING AND LEARNING: A
GUIDE FOR STATES AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS 22-101 (Richard F. Elmore & Robert Rothman eds.,
1999). For a review of the different accountability systems that distinguishes sharply between the
use of standards for punitive high-stakes evaluation of individual students and for diagnosis of
possibilities for school reform and professional development, see Linda Darling-Hammond,
Transforming Urban Public Schools: The Role of Standards and Accountability, at http://
www.ksg.harvard.edu/urbanpoverty/SitepagesfUrbanSeminar/UrbanEd/standards.pdf (last visited
Nov. 22, 2003).
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is the price-earnings ratio of a corporation's equity, or its year-over-year
quarterly earnings. Business analogues to strategic or diagnostic measures are
the number of times a firm turns over its inventory each year, the time it takes to
get a product from development to market, and the error or scrap rates of its
manufacturing facilities. 1
25
Both performance and diagnostic standards can be either keyed to the
particularities of small groups-local-or applicable to encompassing groups-
general. By the early 1990s, a number of influential educators had come to see
general, diagnostic standards-elaborated, in the most thoughtful versions,
through federal-state collaboration 126-as the key to "systemic reform," mean-
ing the comprehensive restructuring of school systems. 127
When it first came into circulation, "systemic reform" was no more than an
informed intuition that for most schools and states was a distant goal, not an
imminent reality. 128 For standards-based reform to become truly systemic, stan-
dards not only had to be generalized among states and nationally. In addition,
they had to be complemented by changes in classroom instruction, teaching as a
profession and the organization of schools and districts. Under some circum-
stances, these coordinate changes might have developed as implications of the
standards themselves. But in the event, the changes in the practice and
profession of teaching and in the organization of the institutions most directly
associated with them resulted from the complex interaction between changes in
the movement for standards-based reform and a sustained ground-level protest
against the status quo led largely by American teachers themselves.
B. Bottom-Up Reform: From the School as Teachers' Cooperative
to the District as Accountable Learning Community
1. Networks and Small Schools: The Professional Collegium
Just as evidence that schools were short-changing students gave rise to the
standards movement at the state and national levels, the lived experience of
failure in classrooms and schools triggered a ground-level movement of pro-
125. In theory, improvement on the strategic measures leads to improvement on global
outcomes, even though there is no robust theory of the connection between the two before the link
is actually established. For an account of how apparently isolated strategic improvements can
produce an encompassing change in organization, see FREDERICK H. ABERNATHY ET AL., A STITCH
IN TIME: LEAN RETAILING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MANUFACTURING-LESSONS FROM THE
APPAREL AND TEXTILE INDUSTRIES (1999).
126. See Vinovskis, supra note 119; Smith, supra note 123.
127. See Vinovskis, supra note 119.
128. Such systemic reform as occurred in the 1990s took place at the state level, with few
demonstrable results. Exchanges among states were facilitated by the federally-funded research
institutes and by grants from the U.S. Department of Education to develop and support standards-
based reforms. Fitful efforts were also made to align federal programs with state reforms. See infra
note 201 and accompanying text.
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fessional protest. This movement took as its starting point three assumptions
familiar to American education since the days of John Dewey. The first is that
"human beings," teachers no less than children, "are by nature social, interactive
learners. We observe how others do it and see if it works for us." 129 Second, and
consequently, the role of teachers is to learn from one another how these general
propensities are manifested in the inclinations and aptitudes of every single
student and to discover thereby a means of connecting each individual to the
community of learners that is the school. Third, the existing school hierarchy,
which imposed a uniform curriculum and a uniform rule-bound method for
propagating it, was the enemy of both the natural inclination to learn coopera-
tively from life and the teacher's obligation to personalize instruction as the
precondition for this social-worldly education.
Understood this way, teaching is a craft. Just as apprentices eventually learn
to solve novel problems on their own by watching master craftsmen use their
tools and materials, so the novice teacher learns to teach a class that attends to
the individuality of all its pupils by emulating those who have already mastered
this particular art. Just as the only authority that craftspeople truly respect is the
community of people who have mastered their trade, so the only authority that
the master teacher acknowledges is the collegium of her peers.
Given this understanding of teaching, and the manifest failure of the then-
current system, the program of reform was simply and urgently to free class-
rooms from the tyranny of educational hierarchies, affording the talented and
dedicated teachers still in the system the collegial discretion they needed to
fulfill their professional responsibilities to their pupils and society. In practice,
this reform program took one of two explicitly anti-hierarchical forms.
The first was the network of geographically dispersed schools whose faculty
and administration committed themselves to the core principles of reform and
acknowledged a collegial obligation to learn from each other's successes and
failures. A leading example of such a network was the Coalition of Essential
Schools that grew largely out of the work of Theodore Sizer. Sizer had been
headmaster of Philips Academy, then dean of the Harvard Graduate School of
Education. His Horace's Compromise, published in 1984, depicts a world of
talented but frustrated teachers who fitfully satisfy deep passions-reading
Shakespeare, exploring etymology, building stage sets-at the cost of
conformity to a standardized education that was indifferent to the increasingly
diverse needs of the student body. This compromise was possible for the same
reason that no alternative seemed feasible: Students and the wider public
acquiesced in current arrangements. Horace, the eponymous every-teacher who
inspires the book, knows that, whatever happens, "[n]o one seems upset. Just let
it all continue, a conspiracy, a toleration of a chasm between the necessary and
the provided and acceptance of big rhetoric and little reality."' 130
129. DEBORAH MEIER, THE POWER OF THEIR IDEAS 153 (1995).
130. THEODORE R. SIZER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE 21 (3d ed. 1992).
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To rally the nation's Horaces, the network of "essential schools" "focused
on the 'triangle' of students, teachers, and the subjects of their study."' 13 ' Affili-
ated schools followed imperatives such as: "Give room to teachers and students
to work and learn in their own, appropriate ways"; "Focus the students' work on
the use of their minds"; "Keep the structure simple and thus flexible." 132
The second organizational expression of the movement of professional
protest was the small, humanly-scaled schools. Here professional collegiality
could be taken to its institutional limit. The school was to be no bigger than the
collegium of reform-minded teachers who constituted and ideally governed it.
The best known and most influential example of this line of development was
the small group of Central Park East schools, together going from kindergarten
through twelfth grade, created under the leadership of Deborah Meier in East
Harlem beginning in 1974.133 Meier started teaching in kindergarten and for her,
like many inspired by Dewey's thought, the caring kindergarten teacher is the
model of the successful pedagogue: 134
Kindergarten is the one place-maybe the last place-where teachers
are expected to know children well, even if they don't hand in their
homework, finish their Friday tests, or pay attention. Kindergarten
teachers know children by looking and listening. They know that
learning must be personalized because kids are incorrigibly idio-
syncratic .... Catering to children's growing independence is a natural
part of a kindergarten teacher's classroom life. 135
As the failures of the New York City public school system became
notorious in the 1970s and 1980s, Meier used the system's growing toleration of
"alternative" or "choice" schools, particularly in poor and poorly-served areas, to
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 214. See COALITION OF ESSENTIAL SCHOOLS, ABOUT THE COALITION OF ESSENTIAL
SCHOOLS, at http://www.essentialschools.org/pub/cesdocs/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2003) ("The Coalition of Essential Schools is a national network of schools, regionalized centers,
and a national office, working to create schools where intellectual excitement animates every
child's face, where teachers work together to get better at their craft, and where all children
flourish, regardless of their gender, race, or class." "[C]ommon principles," promoted by the Coali-
tion's publication, Horace, include "[p]ersonalized instruction to address individual needs and
interests," "[s]mall schools and classrooms, where students and teachers know each other well and
work in an atmosphere of trust and high expectations," and "[m]ultiple assessments based on
performance of authentic tasks").
133. MEIER, supra note 129.
134. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY AND THE CHILD AND THE CURRI-
CULuM 116-31 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1990) (1899) ("[I]n a certain sense, the school endeavors
throughout its whole course-now including children from ages four to thirteen-to carry into
effect certain principles which [Fredrich] Froebel was perhaps the first consciously to set forth";
Froebel is regarded as the intellectual progenitor of the modem kindergarten); JOHN DEWEY,
DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916). For Dewey's different view towards the end of his life, see
JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938), discussed infra notes 196 and 197 and accom-
panying text.
135. MEIER, supra note 129, at 48.
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establish first elementary and middle schools and then a high school that applied
the core principle of collegial attention to individual student needs. Within the
limits set by citywide rules, the staff in Meier's school hired and assessed their
own colleagues. They also took responsibility for developing and evaluating the
curriculum and students' progress with it. 13 6
Ideally, Meier's collegium would have been a "principal-less collective."
But in time, as Meier's activities in the classroom decreased and her admini-
strative responsibilities grew, the "staff-run" school acquired a principal. 137 With
respect to other stakeholders in the new small schools, Meier and the staff were
careful to maintain their autonomy:
Our experience suggested that a strong school culture requires that most
decisions be struggled over and made by those directly responsible for
implementing them, not by representative bodies handing down dictates
for others to follow. We felt the same way whether the representative
bodies were composed of kids, parents, or fellow teachers. 138
The idea of the collegial school also found expression in a distinctive form
of evaluation of student work: the portfolio. As evidence that they had mastered
the curriculum and become independent learners, and as a condition of
graduation, students were expected to present and defend before a committee of
teachers an elaborate project largely of their own choosing. This method of
evaluation was shaped by the experience of the Coalition of Essential Schools,
and in this regard as well as others, Meier recognizes in Sizer a kindred spirit. 139
This preference for an individualized form of evaluation goes hand in hand with
a vehement rejection of standardized tests in almost any form. 140
2. Towards the District as an Accountable Learning Community: Community
School District 2
Had the professional protest movement stopped with these initiatives, it
might have produced at best a few archipelagoes of successful reform in a sea of
pedagogic drudgery and despair. But the ideas that shaped the Coalition for
Essential Schools and Meier's staff-run schools in East Harlem inspired more
encompassing reforms that redefined the role of the teacher and principal, as
well as the utility of educational standards and the corresponding tests. One
result is innovative classroom practices that institutionalize attention to indivi-
dual students. Another is a novel conception of professional development that
makes continuing mutual education for teachers a lever for reorganizing schools
136. See id. at 56.
137. Id. at 25.
138. Id. at 24.
139. Id. at 29, 57. Compare Meier's views to those of the Sizer-inspired Coalition of
Essential Schools, which are summarized supra note 132.
140. See DEBORAH MEIER, WILL STANDARDS SAVE PUBLIC EDUCATION? (2000). See also
SIZER, supra note 130, at 215.
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and districts in response to (ever more refined) diagnoses of their shortcomings.
As we will see, these apparently local developments can provide an invaluable
ground-level complement to systemic, standards-based reform when governance
changes: Typically, the implementation of sophisticated, diagnostically focused
accountability systems makes better educational outcomes an urgent imperative
for school districts and states across the nation.
The most influential and carefully studied instance of this transformation of
professional protest is Community School District 2 in Manhattan. At the
southern boundary of Deborah Meier's District 4, District 2 includes fifty
elementary, intermediate, junior high, and option (theme) schools in some of
New York's richest and poorest neighborhoods. As of 1997, 29% of its 22,000
students were white, 14% African-American, 22% Hispanic, 34% Asian, and
less than 1% Native American. About half the District's students are from
families with incomes below the poverty level; about 20% speak English as a
second language. 141
The key link between District 2 and the reform movement was Anthony
Alvarado. After serving ten years as superintendent of District 4 (starting almost
from the inception of Meier's reform efforts), Alvarado was briefly chancellor of
the entire New York City school system, then became superintendent of District
2. His aspiration was to apply at the district level the ideas that had seemed to
work well, but only in isolated schools, in District 4. "If change is scattershot,
and primarily bottom-up," Alvarado would later say, "it will involve only those
who perceive a need, and it will yield only small, separate successes."' 142
Alvarado also recognized, however, that "[i]f change is mandated from the top,
without substantive input from those who must carry it out, it will meet
resistance and resentment." 143 His solution was to create a collegium of like-
minded principals, each accountable for improving instruction in his or her own
school and able to guide and learn from the others. The goal became to create "a
learning community" that connected, and thus opened up to each other, the
classroom, the school and the district. 144
141. See RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, SCHOOL VARIATION AND SYSTEMIC
INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 2, NEW YORK CITY 3 (1997)
(hereinafter SCHOOL VARIATION).
142. KATE MALOY, BUILDING A LEARNING COMMUNITY: THE STORY OF NEW YORK CITY
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, at 3 (May 1998), available at
http://www.lrdc.pitt.edu/hplc/publications/building%20portrait.pdf See also SCHOOL VARIATION,
supra note 141, at 10 (describing District 2's assumption "[t]hat big effects on student
performance, in the aggregate, can be achieved only by a concerted, system-wide effort at
instructional improvement organized around common principles of learning, and not by 'random
innovation' in semi-autonomous schools.").
143. MALOY, supra note 142, at 5.
144. Id.; see also Anthony Alvarado, Professional Development Is the Job, AMERICAN
EDUCATOR, Winter 1998, available at http://www.aft.org/americaneducator/winter98/
professional-development.html; MARY KAY STEIN ET AL., UNIV. OF PTTrSBURGH, OBSERVATIONS,
CONVERSATIONS, AND NEGOTIATIONS: ADMINISTRATOR SUPPORT OF LITERACY PRACTICE 6-7
(1998).
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The work of this collegium was deeply influenced by approaches such as
"Balanced Literacy," developed at Ohio State University and Leslie College. 145
These methods begin with the observation that a complex task, such as the
mastery of literacy, requires the combination of different cognitive strategies: for
example, the ability to decode words and sentences from sequences of letters
(phonics) and to grasp the meaning of words and sentences from their respective
contexts (the "whole language" concept). Individual students are typically better
at some of these strategies than others. Because each student is achieving
mastery by applying an idiosyncratic bundle of skills, the teacher's job is to find
ways of continuously assessing each student's assembly of strategies and to
suggest new ones for overcoming the weaknesses. 146 To do this, the teacher
must, to continue the literacy example, select books demanding enough to reveal
difficulties in individual learning strategies, but not so demanding as to crush the
pupil's hope of progress. Balanced Literacy calls the selection of such "graded"
materials "Guided Reading."' 147
The orientation towards the collegium of principals and the improvement of
instruction through close attention to and guidance of the students' own learning
strategies eventually resulted in three interlocking changes that distinguished
District 2 from the more isolated professional collegia advocated by Sizer and
Meier. The first, most obvious change was organizational. In the traditional
school, the principal enforces the district-wide rules and policies in the school.
Order, not high academic achievement, is proof of good management. This puts
the teacher at the bottom of a pyramid at the apex of which sits the super-
intendent. 1
4 8
In District 2, the pyramid is inverted. The teacher gets better at classroom
instruction. The principal makes it possible for teachers to achieve these
improvements and holds them accountable if they do not. The superintendent,
acting through the district, holds the principals in their turn accountable for
providing the right kind of enabling infrastructure and professional discipline. 149
145. See, e.g., IRENE C. FOUNTAS & GAY SU PINNELL, GUIDED READING: GOOD FIRST
TEACHING FOR ALL CHILDREN 1 (1996). See also Tucson Unified School District website, at
http://instech.tusd.kl2.az.us/balancedlit/handbook/bloverview.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003)
(summarizing the District's Balanced Literacy Program).
146. See KATE MALOY, THE HEART OF THE MATTER: PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW
YORK COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, at 8-10 (1998) (summarizing the components of
Balanced Literacy).
147. See id. at 11-20; FOUNTAS & PINNELL, supra note 145; SHARON TABERSKI, ON SOLID
GROUND: STRATEGIES FOR TEACHING READING, K-3, at 2-8 (2000); Shelley Harwayne, Foreword
to TABERSKI, supra, at xi-xii.
148. See RICHARD F. ELMORE, BUILDING A NEW STRUCTURE FOR SCHOOL LEADERSHIP 5-8
(2000), available at http://www.shankerinstitute.org/Downloads/building.pdf [hereinafter SCHOOL
LEADERSHIP]; INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, SCHOOL LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY INITIATIVE TASK FORCE ON THE PRINCIPALSHIP, LEADERSHIP FOR STUDENT LEARNING:
REINVENTING THE PRINCIPALSHIP 2-3 (2000).
149. See, e.g., RICHARD F. ELMORE, INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING: STAFF DEVELOPMENT
AND INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 22-25
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A new understanding of professional development-continuing education
for teachers-and the recruitment and training of principals reinforced this
inversion of traditional organization. Professional development typically is a
form of intellectual or cultural enhancement for practicing teachers. It takes
place off the school site in a seminar that exposes the teacher to new thinking in
his or her field, or about some aspect of contemporary education or contem-
porary life in general. Its relevance to current practice in the classroom is not
clear. In fact, to teachers bored or frustrated by what they experience in the
classroom, professional development is often interesting precisely to the extent
that it does not address everyday affairs. Even if the subject presented were
palpably relevant to reform, it is unclear how the teacher could put it to actual
use given the organizational constraints that normally inhibit classroom-level
change.15
0
Professional development in District 2, in contrast, focuses on improving
classroom practice as exemplified in the detection and correction of weaknesses
in students' reading strategies central to the program in Balanced Literacy.
Professional development accordingly usually takes place on site, at the school.
It is regular and frequent, not episodic. 151 In District 2, professional development
is much more likely to be guided by a master teacher, peer mentor or on-site or
district-based specialist than an outsider whose expertise is in the popularization
of advanced professional knowledge for frontline colleagues. 152 Indeed, current
observation of professional development in District 2 suggests that the proto-
typical developer is becoming less a master teacher or educational expert than a
facilitator who matches and makes interactions administratively possible bet-
ween teachers within and across schools who can learn from each other.
153
Because professional development in District 2 is so tightly connected to
classroom practice and so woven into the fabric of professional association, it
changes not only what teachers do in the classroom but also the nature of
collegiality and the organization of the school and district themselves. Take col-
legiality first. Teachers visit each other's classes in turn. In some programs,
visits can be for as long as three weeks at a stretch. If the key to professional
success in Horace's world is decorous conformity, 154 and in the Sizer-Meier
(1997) [hereinafter INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING]; SCHOOL LEADERSHIP, supra note 148, at
20-21.
150. See, e.g., RICHARD F. ELMORE, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN STANDARDS AND ACHIEVE-
MENT: THE IMPERATIVE FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION 28-33 (2000); MALOY,
supra note 146, at 3-4.
151. See INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING, supra note 149, at 12-21; MALOY, supra note
146, at 5-8.
152. See INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING, supra note 149, at 15-21.
153. Tony Fong, Professional Development in District #2 (Nov. 12, 2002) (paper on file with
NYU Review of Law & Social Change).
154. See MALOY, supra note 146, at 5-6; INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING, supra note 149,
at 13-18; SIZER, supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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reform collegium is responsiveness to the individual needs of all the students, 155
in District 2 it is assessment of the work of others and open response to such
assessments of oneself. 156
This new collegiality reshuffles organizational roles immediately, and more
and more profoundly as time goes on. In the traditional school, teachers teach;
supervisors evaluate their work. By traditional standards, therefore, teachers
evaluating each other are exercising a crucial supervisory task. In the longer
term, this mutual scrutiny uncovers and proposes remedies for defects in the
school's organization. 157 Many of the obstacles that teachers encounter when
trying to improve their classroom practices originate in what other teachers have
taught students previously, or in the way the school day is organized. When the
new professional development produces a consensus in a school or district about
the need for changes in these areas, the further education of teachers has become
a mainspring of institutional reform, and teachers have become institutional
designers, rather than compromised subordinates. 158
Because principals participate in the same kinds of mutual visits and peer
review as teachers, District 2's new professional development transforms the
district as it transforms the district's constituent classrooms and schools. 159
Recognizing the connection between new career paths and new structures, Dis-
trict 2 makes persistent efforts to establish programs for training new principals
in the skills they need to build schools that learn from classroom reform and vice
versa. 160 Thus, as current District 2 superintendent Shelley Harwayne writes,
"this is a district that asks principals to get good at teaching," while insisting, as
we have just seen, that teaching includes serious attention to organizing schools
to make for still better teaching. 16 1
155. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING, supra note 149, at 9-11.
157. See id. at 22 (discussing "the intentional blurring" in District 2 "of the boundaries
between management of the system and the activities of staff development").
158. As Elmore notes,
the lines between traditional management functions (oversight, accountability, resource
allocation, for example) and professional development are blurred in District 2. Much
of what would be regarded in many systems as routine management has been folded
into District 2's professional development strategy, and much of what would be
regarded as professional development in many systems has been folded into manage-
ment. So it is impossible to disentangle professional development from general manage-
ment in District 2 because the two are, for all practical purposes, synonymous....
[P]rofessional development permeates the work of the organization, and the
organization of the work.
Id. at 12. See also SCHOOL VARIATION, supra note 141, at 20-21.
159. See RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, LEADERSHIP AND LEARNING: PRINCIPAL
RECRUITMENT, INDUCTION AND INSTRUCTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2,
NEWYORK CITY 16-21 (2000).
160. See INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING, supra note 149, at 17-21; MALOY, supra note
146, at 6-8.
161. SHELLEY HARWAYNE, GOING PUBLIC: PRIORITIES AND PRACTICE AT THE MANHATTAN
NEW SCHOOL 35 (1999).
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The second interlocking development in District 2 that pushed it beyond
existing professional collegia concerns standards. In the traditional school, no
less than in the teachers' collegium and District 2 in Alvarado's early years,
good teaching was what teachers recognized as good said it was. This was the
natural extension of a craft understanding of teaching: 162 In a craft, only a master
can judge mastery. But an outsider might ask if reformers could be sure they
were improving teaching if they were not simultaneously inquiring whether
students were learning more from the instructional improvements. By the mid-
1990s, Alvarado concluded that the "only way you can answer that question is
by getting agreement on what kids should know and be able to do and starting to
assess their learning in some systematic way." 163 His chief concern was "'that
we had just about reached the limits of our previous focus ... and I felt we
weren't pushing hard enough on what students were actually learning and
whether we were reaching the hardest-to-teach.,,,1 64
District 2 hesitantly began, therefore, to embrace explicit performance
standards measuring student learning. 165 In the 1995-1996 school year,
Alvarado held principals accountable for ensuring that all students read at least
twenty-five books a year. The next year the focus was on the creation and
assessment of portfolios. 166 While these developments were in some large sense
compatible with the kinds of standards embraced by Sizer and Meier, 167 in the
more open setting of District 2 they quickly led to adoption of diagnostic
standardized tests that allow detailed comparison of the performance of schools,
teachers and students in literacy and mathematics. 16
8
The third major change in District 2's orientation, the creation of a network
of "Focused Literacy" schools, was an emphatic extension of the first two. In a
direct effort to improve test scores at low-performing schools, the Focused
Literacy program explicitly reorganized the school and reapportioned the
teachers' time budgets according to the principles of the previously adopted
Balanced Literacy program. 16 9 Seven schools started with Focused Literacy in
162, See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
163. INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING, supra note 149, at 24 (quoting interview with
Anthony Alvarado, Superintendent, November 15, 1995). See MALOY, supra note 142, at 15-16.
164. RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNITY
DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 9 (1998) [hereinafter CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT] (quoting
Alvarado).
165. See SCHOOL VARIATION, supra note 141, at 10 ("The central tenet of [District 2's]
standards-based instructional improvement is that entire systems of schools can move collectively
in the direction of more ambitious teaching and learning through a focus on common principles of
instructional practice, explicit standards for student learning, and assessments that accurately
capture instruction and learning.").
166. CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT, supra note 164, at 13.
167. See MEIER, supra note 140, at 5-6, 17, 19-29; SIZER, supra note 130, at 215-16, 226-
27; supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
168. See New Standards website, at www.hemweb.com/trophy/perfermn/newstan.htm
(summarizing New Standards Reference Examination).
169. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing Balanced Literacy).
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1996-1997. By 1998-1999, there were thirteen (out of fifty) schools in the
network, all with a high proportion of low-performing students. These schools
devoted at least two and one-half hours per day to literacy instruction, compared
to an hour per day in other District 2 schools. 170 Teachers in these schools
receive especially intensive professional development in using the Balanced
Literacy approach. Their schools and classrooms are monitored more closely and
visited more frequently by district-level officials. Their principals are expected
to organize professional development and the school generally to accommodate
this intensity. 171 Given the goal of improving the test scores of the low-
performers, the daily monitoring of individual student reading came to be
meshed well with periodic review of teacher performance by principals and of
principals by district personnel, all in the light of scores on various tests. 172
The Focused Literacy program is controversial in District 2 because of this
intensity of teacher involvement. 173 In Balanced Literacy, the teacher is a
facilitator who helps the student discover shortcomings in her learning strategy
and ways to overcome these. 174 Teaching can still be thought of as the craft of
responding to the naturally inquiring child. 175 But the more structured the
teacher's scrutiny of the child's strategic shortcomings, and the more explicit the
discussion between teacher and student of strategies for improvement, the
greater the risk that the teacher becomes domineering and instruction becomes
invasive. Learning becomes "teacher-centered" rather than child-centered as the
pupil responds to tasks and pursues goals over which she has no control. 176
With regard to both teaching and professional development, however, the
closest outside observers of the district have concluded that the new network of
Focused Literacy schools is best understood as having intensified the district's
170. See CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT, supra note 164, at 18.
171. See id.
172. Deputy Superintendent Elaine Fink championed the introduction of Focused Literacy
Schools and became Superintendent when Alvarado left. She recalls telling those principals in her
Focused Literacy working group with a majority of students testing in the lowest two score
categories: "Figure out who those kids are by name, which classrooms they're in with which
teachers, the practices that the teacher is engaged in, and which staff development their involved
in. And you need to meet with those teachers regularly to talk about the movement of those kids-
and keep your hands on it." ELAINE FINK & LAUREN B. RESNICK, DEVELOPING PRINCIPALS AS
INSTRUCTIONAL LEADERS (2000).
173. Seeid. at 17-18.
174. See Tucson Unified School District website, supra note 145:
" The teacher acts as a facilitator who sets the scene, arouses interest, and
engages students in discussion that will enable them to unfold the story line
and feel confident and capable of reading the text themselves.
" Guided reading is reading by students. The students are responsible for the
first reading of the text.
175. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
176. See CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT, supra note 164 at 20 (discussing some District 2
teachers' skeptical view of Focused Literacy as "a discernible shift in emphasis in the district's
literacy strategy, away from the less teacher-centered and prescriptive parts of Balanced Literacy
to the more teacher-centered and prescriptive parts.").
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general strategy for the benefit of the lowest-performing students. 177 Certainly,
District 2's insistence upon maintaining the classroom as the fundamental unit of
instruction in Focused Literacy schools strongly suggests continuing commit-
ment to the ideal of education as a social activity best fostered in a community of
learners. 178
Even if Focused Literacy does not mark a shift in general strategy, the
project does bring to light a fundamental ambiguity in the craft conception of
teaching. From the craft perspective, systematic attention to students' learning
strategies can be understood as a heightening of just that attentiveness to indivi-
dual students at the center of the Sizer-Meier project of professional reform. 179
But it can also be interpreted as a self-defeating effort to formalize what cannot
be formalized and make explicit what must remain tacit. Thus seen, the shift to
Balanced and especially Focused Literacy makes the school and the teacher into
instruments of ruthless public control over the inquisitiveness and life chances of
defenseless children.
In extending the boundaries of the professional protest movement, officials
in District 2 have taken great pains to reconcile the increasingly explicit, indeed
formalized, discussion of standards and learning strategies with the craft view
that still shapes the district's self-conception. Alvarado himself constantly
emphasized that a shared vision of standards-based reform required continuous
exercise of teacher autonomy to adapt the general principles to particular
circumstances:
In this new world of standards-based learning, there are no uniform
answers .... You have to ask yourself, what is the right answer for a
particular situation and school. That decision has to be made in a
context of standards-based education, and you can't think usefully
unless every teacher, every principal, every district office member, and,
most important, every student, has a focused, coherent, and common
vision of what is expected of them in standards-based classrooms. 180
177. See id. at 21.
178. In this regard, Focused Literacy may be compared to "Reading Recovery," another
adjunct to Balanced Literacy, which instead uses tailored "pull-out" workshops for low-performing
readers. See FOUNTAS & PINNELL, supra note 145, at 194-98 (describing Reading Recovery).
179. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
180. Alvarado, supra note 144, at 2. Another illustration is Shelley Harwayne's forward to
Sharon Taberski's Balanced Literacy teacher's guide. Harwayne, supra note 147. Taberski's guide
is nothing if not systematic. Among its many detailed charts and forms, for example, is a diagram
specifying how a teacher can rotate students from seat to seat around a small table to sample the
reading of each in the class period. TABERSKI, supra note 147, at 43. Another develops a notation
scheme for categorizing revealing reading episodes, such as a child's "repetitions" or "skips and
returns." Id. at 48. In her introduction, however, Harwayne-whose office as principal of the
Manhattan New School (before Harwayne became the district's third reform superintendent) was
right across from Taberski's classroom---emphasizes not the detailed techniques but rather the
extraordinary attentiveness to the process of teaching that they demonstrate and enable. Harwayne
writes:
When I think about Sharon Taberski, and what I've learned from her over the last
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Richard Elmore and Deanna Burney, two of the most astute and sustained
academic observers of District 2, also elide these two interpretations of develop-
ments in District 2. On the one side they are persuasive in underscoring the
district's organizational innovations and especially its institutionally transfor-
mative use of professional development. 181 On the other, they have consistently
conceptualized the changes they have observed in terms of a literature closely
analyzing professionals-architects, lawyers and doctors-who solve problems
by reflecting acutely on the mismatches between their habitual practices and the
demands of the situation.182 This literature is closely related to the Sizer-Meier
school of reform through self-aware professional collegia, and like those two
reformers (but unlike District 2) sees the small informal group-essentially an
anti-organization-as the ideal setting for the "reflective practitioner." 1
83
Recent evaluations of the effect of reform on student performance support
the view that it is the routine, organized attention to individual learning, not the
culture of attentiveness, that accounts for improvement in District 2. In a series
of studies, 184 Professor Resnick and colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh
several years, I am reminded of the difference between doing things on automatic pilot
and pausing to examine our practice, searching for the better way. Sharon Taberski
eloquently reminds us that there is no room for automatic pilot in the teaching of read-
ing. We can no longer blindly follow steps in a manual or dish out prescribed dialogue
from a teacher's edition. Nor can we simply fill our classrooms with the best children's
literature and believe children will magically learn to read.
Harwayne, supra note 147, at xi. While Harwayne observes that Taberski's emphasis on helping
the student integrate his or her own bundle of reading strategies should allow teachers and schools
to avoid controversies over the relative merits of "phonics" as against "whole language," see id. at
xii, she is understandably more reticent about her own reading of the book as an effort to reconcile
partisans of child-centered learning and advocates of more systematic reform. Harwayne's own
book on her experience of the Manhattan New School, which she founded, has thoughtful chapters
on "Turning the Schools into Centers for Professional Study" and "Reaching Out to Families," but
little on organizational detail-and nothing like the model charts and forms found throughout On
Solid Ground. See HARWAYNE, supra note 161, at 153-198, 239-272.
181. See, e.g., CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT, supra note 164, at 12-21; SCHOOL VARIATION,
supra note 141, at 6-32.
182. For Elmore and Burney's elaboration of the work of Donald Schon and Chris Argyris,
see id. at 16 & n.2 (citing CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD SCHON, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING II:
THEORY, METHOD AND PRACTICE (1996)).
183. See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN
ACTION (1983). Elmore and Burney are not alone. Lauren Resnick, a prominent cognitive
psychologist and consultant to District 2, and Elaine Fink, the district's architect of Focused
Literacy and its second reform superintendent, couch their joint analysis of professional develop-
ment in District 2 in a theoretical vocabulary explicitly derived from the study of the master-
apprentice relationship in traditional crafts. RESNICK & FINK, supra note 172, at 7 (citing JEAN
LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION (1991)
and James G. Greeno et al., Cognition and Learning, in HANDBOOK OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
15 (D. C. Berliner & R. C. Calfee eds., 1996)). In summarizing this background literature, Resnick
and Fink are even more explicit about the connection between the movement for professional
reform and the traditional crafts than Sizer and Meier.
184. See LAURA D'AMICO ET AL., EXAMINING THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF A
DISTRICT-WIDE INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT EFFORT (April 14, 2001) [hereinafter EXAMINING
THE IMPLEMENTATION] (paper presented at annual meeting of American Educational Research
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hypothesized that successful professional development would lead to improved
student outcomes. They assumed that the (reformed) professional culture was the
(reformed) pedagogy. 185 But the expected relation proved to be weak at best. 186
In contrast, good classroom practices did lead to better outcomes: In those
schools that principals and teachers rated as having most comprehensively
implemented the Balanced Literacy program, classes did better on standardized
tests than would have been predicted by the mean socioeconomic backgrounds
of the students in the classrooms. 187
These results are consistent with Harold Wenglinsky's recent methodo-
logically innovative study of the effects of the current educational reforms. 188
Association); LAURA D'AMICO ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT IN
LITERACY AND MATHEMATICS (2000) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVE-
MENT]; MICHAEL HARWELL ET AL., PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP IN
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2 (2000); LAUREN RESNICK & MICHAEL HARWELL, HIGH
PERFORMANCE LEARNING COMMUNITIES: DISTRICT 2 ACHIEVEMENT (1998); MARY KAY STEIN ET
AL., TOWARD CLOSING THE GAP IN LITERACY ACHIEVEMENT (1999).
185. See, e.g., HARWELL ET AL., supra note 184, at 23 (discussed infra note 187); RESNICK &
HARWELL, supra note 184, at 18-19 (finding relatively high literacy achievement levels in District
2 schools and hypothesizing a link between that performance and "the effort in professional
development").
186. See D'AMICO ET AL., EXAMINING THE IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 184, at 22-25
(finding that various measures of the quality of professional community and professional
development had no significant relationship to higher mean classroom achievement in literacy, nor
any demonstrated capacity to overcome the predicted effects of student socioeconomic status
(SES) on mean classroom achievement in literacy; disconcertingly, favorable assessments of
school professional community were significantly related to an increase in the effect of student
SES on mean classroom achievement in both literacy and mathematics); HARWELL ET AL., supra
note 184, at 23 (puzzling over fact that administrator and teacher assessments of the quality of
"professional development [did] not show more powerful effects in reducing the achievement
gaps" between high- and low-SES students).
187. See D'AMICO ET AL., EXAMINING THE IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 184, at 22-25, 30,
tbl.6 ("Basically, the findings suggest that the alignment of instructional practice to the Balanced
Literacy program is associated with improved student outcomes. This is evidenced by the strong
predictive power of principals' judgments of alignment of instruction on mean classroom student
achievement and by the finding that the link between students' socio-economic status and their
achievement is significantly weakened in those cases in which teachers report that Balanced
Literacy plays an important role in their day-to-day professional lives."); STEIN ET AL., supra note
184, at 22 ("In addition, the thirteen schools that comprise the Focused Literacy Network made
larger gains in achievement than did the other schools in the district, implying a trend that, if
continued, would point to the specific success of the district's approach to identifying, monitoring,
and assisting low-performing schools."). Acculturation did, however, contribute indirectly to the
outcome in that schools rated by their teachers as having high quality professional development
were disproportionately likely to have comprehensively implemented the Balanced Literacy
program. See D'AMIco, supra note 184, at 30 (concluding that "high quality professional develop-
ment appears to be associated with both high quality and highly aligned instructional practice-
and when instructional practice is highly aligned to the principles of the Balanced Literacy
framework it appears to significantly weaken the links between student achievement and their
socio-economic status (a nontrivial accomplishment).").
188. Harold Wenglinsky, How Schools Matter: The Link Between Teacher Classroom
Practices and Student Academic Performance, 10 EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 12 (February
13, 2002), at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/vl0nl2/. See also JOHN F. KArN & DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
BLACK SUBURBANIZATION IN TEXAS METROPOLITAN AREAS AND ITS IMPACT ON STUDENT ACHIEVE-
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Work in this area has traditionally assessed the effectiveness of schools by
measuring the effect on student test scores of changes in educational inputs such
as improvement in teacher qualification, reduction in class size, or additional
days of instruction. 189 But because the new reforms focus on classroom
practices-especially students' ability to conceptualize problem-solving tech-
niques-Wenglinsky studied the relation between those practices and student
achievement. 190 He found that students who had practice applying general
problem-solving techniques to unique problems perform markedly better on the
eighth grade mathematics portion of the National Assessment of Educational
Progress ("NAEP"), widely acknowledged as the gold standard of standardized
tests, than students of a comparable socioeconomic status who have had no
similar practice. 191 He further found that the combined effects of the relevant
reforms in teaching and the professional development of teachers is greater than
the contribution to performance of the students' social and economic status. 192
This is an extraordinary result given forty years of studies repeatedly finding that
the effects of social and economic status on school performance dwarf any
contribution of the school itself. 193
MENT (2000) (concluding that, everything else equal, placing African-American children in higher
quality public schools in the Dallas area, measured by the schools' average achievement levels on
standardized tests, diminished the gap between the scores of African-American and white children
by twelve to thirty percent).
189. See Wenglinsky, supra note 188.
190. See id.
191. See id. In addition, and in keeping with the findings of Resnick and her colleagues,
Wenglinsky found that some kinds of professional development tend to be associated with the
adoption of these effective classroom practices and have a small independent effect on student
achievement. Id.
192. See id.
193. See H. M. Levin & C. R. Belfield, Families as Contractual Partners in Education, 49
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1799, 1801-1802 (2002) (summarizing the traditional findings).
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In sum, developments in District 2 suggest a possibility not contemplated in
the craft conception of teaching or openly allowed in the reform program based
on it: Organization and formalization are not necessarily the enemies of sus-
tained reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of learning by colleagues and
students. Certain ways of formalizing inquiry into the problem-solving strategies
of students and teachers and of explicating the results can do better by students
than even the most attentive and reflective emulation of master teachers by
apprentices. Likewise, certain forms of organization can facilitate this forma-
lization.
Ironically, it was Leo Tolstoy, the Russian Romantic, not John Dewey, the
American pragmatist and patron saint of progressive education, who relentlessly
applied to teaching and teachers the pragmatist insight that the same contextual
features of knowledge that make all methods imperfect also allow for their
correction. In Dewey's later writings on education, he, too, edged towards this
view. But he never entirely embraced it because of continuing attachments to the
assumptions that defined his earlier work on education.
In the 1899 lectures The School and Society, Dewey had presented the pro-
gressive school as "a miniature community, an embryonic society." 194 By
engaging the students with "occupations"-cotton ginning, spinning, weaving-
the progressive school would recreate the experience of the family farm (then of
recent memory), where "instead of pressing a button and flooding the whole
house with electric light, the whole process of getting illumination was followed
in its toilsome length from the killing of the animal and the trying of fat to the
making of wicks and the dipping of candles."
19 5
To many, including some of Dewey's own most ardent followers, this
identification of school and community seemed to limit the teacher's role to set-
ting the stage for learning: Once the students were grouped around the artifacts
of an occupation, the teacher exited the scene, leaving natural curiosity and the
bonds of sociability to guide inquiry. Much of Experience and Education,
published in 1938, is devoted to refuting this conclusion, principally by showing
that teacher passivity, far from being logically entailed by his original view, is a
non sequitur. "Since freedom resides in the operations of intelligent observation
and judgment by which a purpose is developed," Dewey wrote,
guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupils' intelligence
is an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it.... [T]he suggestion upon
which pupils act must in any case come from somewhere. It is
194. DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY, supra note 134, at 10.
195. Id. It is sometimes argued that the deep aim of Dewey's pedagogic reform was the
creation of a potentially revolutionary counterculture that would ultimately reverse the deleterious
effects of the Industrial Revolution on American democracy. From the point of view of this
marxisant reading of Dewey, the relation of student to teacher is almost self-evidently less impor-
tant than the relation of the students as producers to one another and to the tools and materials of
production. See, e.g., David K. Cohen, Dewey's Problem, 98 ELEM. SCHOOL J. 427 (1998).
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impossible to understand why a suggestion from one who has a larger
experience and a wider horizon should not be at least as valid as a
suggestion arising from some more or less accidental source. 196
At times Dewey went so far as to contemplate the possibility of what we
might, adopting a term from District 2's debates, call the teacher-centric, pro-
gressive school. For instance, he argued that it followed from the failure of tradi-
tional, lock-step educational planning only that the "planning must be flexible
enough to permit free play for individuality or experience and yet firm enough to
give direction towards continuous development of power."' 197 Beyond this
glimpse of the possibility of formalizing the teacher's attention to students'
learning strategies, however, his abiding conception of the community of learn-
ers never carried him.
Tolstoy wrote a half-century before Dewey, and on the basis of his
experience running a school for peasants on his estate at Yasno-Polyana. As a
Slavophil, Tolstoy believed that only through the intellectual and economic
emancipation of the peasants could Russia regain its due and distinctive place in
the community of cultivated nations. Of the aptitude and natural curiosity of the
uneducated he, like Dewey, had no doubt. But he knew from first hand obser-
vation that daily experience did not push the peasant youths towards school
learning. Nor did the prospect of knowledge of the great books of Russian and
world literature attract them to it. So, like the architects of the Balanced Literacy
program, he went to great lengths to find texts that engaged his pupils' natural
interests without overtaxing their ability to master the alien skill of reading. 198
This attention to "graded" texts anticipates the Guided Reading emphasis in
Balanced Literacy. 19 9 Moreover, in surveying the "advanced" literacy programs
in use in Western European countries, Tolstoy quickly realized that there was no
single, scientifically validated method for teaching reading. What he found
instead was a clutch of partial, even contradictory techniques (many, it turns out,
close analogues to familiar positions in today's "phonics"/"whole language"
battles). From this profusion of methods Tolstoy drew conclusions regarding the
role of the teacher that directly anticipate the approach of programs like
Balanced Literacy:
Every individual must, in order to acquire the art of reading in the
shortest possible time, be taught quite apart from any other .... One
pupil has a good memory, and it is easier for him to memorize the
syllables than to comprehend the vowellessness of the consonants;
another reflects calmly and will comprehend a most rational sound
method; another has a fine instinct, and he grasps the law of word
196. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION, supra note 134, at 71.
197. Id. at 58.
198. LEO TOLSTOY, TOLSTOY ON EDUCATION 269-79 (Leo Wiener trans., 1967) (discussing
"graded reading").
199. See supra notes 146-47, 174-77 and accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 28:183
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL REFORM
combinations by reading whole words at a time.
The best teacher will be he who has at his tongue's end the
explanation of what it is that is bothering the pupil. These explanations
give the teacher the knowledge of the greatest possible number of
methods, the ability of inventing new methods, and, above all, not a
blind adherence to one method ....
... Every teacher must know that every method invented is only a
step, on which he must stand in order to go farther .... 200
Although Tolstoy anticipated the fluid formalization of method charac-
teristic of the innovations in District 2, he had nothing to say about the problem
that ariser when the setting changes from the one-room rural school to the urban
school district and the method must be institutionized on a large scale. That
problem is the central concern of the current of school reform to which we turn
next. By focusing on the practical aspects of linking analogous systems of
governance at the school, district and state levels, this literature escapes the
limits of the top-down and bottom-up movements for reform while fore-
shadowing the way school districts around the country are actually synthesizing
innovative features of both.
C. Synthesis: The New Accountability
The literature on innovations in school governance is called, bluntly enough,
"The New Accountability." Prompted in part by Congress' 1994 reauthorization
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, states came during the
1990s to reconsider the way they held their districts and schools accountable for
performance. 20 1 As they contemplated reforms in their accountability systems,
they began willy-nilly to reconcile the pressure for school reform emanating
from the national "minimum standards" debate with the pressure for new
instructional practices emanating from the Sizer-Meier professional revolt. 20 2
The literature that reflects and stylizes these early attempts at synthesis is at once
a rough sketch of comprehensive reform of the sub-national levels of the school
system and a crude map of a possible path from the old to the new. Although
incomplete, it is proving to be prescient.
The New Accountability shifts emphasis from regulatory compliance to
contextualized judgments about the capacity of school systems to produce ever
200. TOLSTOY, supra note 198, at 58.
201. See infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Susan H. Fuhrman, The New Accountability, CPRE POL'Y BRIEFS (Consortium
for Pol'y Research in Educ., RB-27, Jan. 1999); DIANE MASSELL, STATE STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING
CAPACITY 1N EDUCATION: PROGRESS AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES (Consortium for Pol'y Re-
search in Educ., RR-41 (1998)); Massell et al., supra note 124; New American Schools, Standard
of Quality for Design-Based Assistance (Nov. 1999) (draft manuscript, on file with NYU Review
of Law & Social Change); The Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence, supra note 99.
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better educational outcomes. Accreditation is made less dependent on achieving
mandated pupil-teacher ratios and the like and more on evaluation of student
performance. 20 3 School districts are evaluated less on their capacity to im-
plement state directives than on their ability to foster schools that in turn produce
good educational outcomes. 20 4 Whereas under the standard regime, the fate of
the school or district depends on meeting a fixed standard, the emphasis now is
on "continuous improvement strategies involving school-level planning around
specific performance targets" that measure rates of improvement against locally
defined goals. 20 5 Judgments about accreditation are no longer limited to pass or
fail. Rather, schools and districts earn ratings that vary along a continuum. 20 6 At
the level of the school or the classroom, paper reviews and visits from the central
office are giving way to "lengthy peer visits that ... involve feedback and
extensive discussions about practice." 20 7 Test scores and other indicators of
educational performance, such as attendance and dropout rates, are typically
reported by school and district, and there are more and more consequences,
formal and informal, attached to the levels of performance thus revealed.2 ° 8
Realizing these principles requires extensive institutional reform. The
investment required to enable schools and districts to fulfill their new
responsibilities is called "capacity building." Commentators identify four
interlocking strategies for building capacity. 20 9 First, educators in a number of
states have created a public-private infrastructure for professional development
and technical assistance that is at least partly independent of the state department
of education. 2 10 Second, some states are changing the standards for professional
development and the requirements for certifying and licensing teachers to require
more and novel kinds of professional preparation. 2 1 1 Third, states are developing
curriculum frameworks that describe generally and illustrate with precise
examples how the new standards can be applied in the classroom.2 12 Fourth,
states that have associated themselves with the New Accountability typically
require some periodic school improvement planning, "and several states view[]
school improvement planning as a way of linking bottom-up decision-making
with the top-down goals of standards-based reform."
2 13
The New Accountability abstracts from and to an extent idealizes the
experiences of states that are leading this educational reform movement. In the
203. See Fuhrman, supra note 202, at 1.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 1, 2.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 2.
208. See id. at 1, 2.
209. MASSELL, supra note 202, at iv-vi.
210. See id. at iv.
211. See id. at v.
212. See id.
213. Id. at v-vi.
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next Part, we look at the experience of two of these leaders, Texas and
Kentucky, to show how the general mechanisms just described work in practice
and to gauge, however crudely, the gap between idealization and reality.
III.
Two CASE STUDIES OF THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE:
TEXAS AND KENTUCKY
Given the complexity of the changes in course, progress towards edu-
cational reform is inevitably uneven. We present two cases to suggest how
problems that look intractable in one setting are overcome in another, and how
questions open for all admit of different solutions. 214 We focus on Texas and
214. There is, for example, the question of the proper directiveness of the framework pro-
vided by standards. If the framework is too intrusive, it suffocates local innovation. If it is merely
indicative, local action is uncoordinated, and parents, teachers and students are left guessing about
what they need to do to please the authorities. See DAVID K. COHEN & DEBORAH LOEWENBERG
BALL, INSTRUCTION, CAPACITY, AND IMPROVEMENT 15-16 (Consortium for Pol'y Research in
Educ., Research Report Series, RR-43, June 1999).
Our choice of Texas and Kentucky should not be understood to denigrate similar strides
made elsewhere. Consider, for example, two recent reports of the North Carolina State Board of
Education and Department of Public Instruction. Both reports evaluate events in North Carolina
schools and districts in the wake of the state's adoption of an accountability system similar to
Texas's. Under that system, the state rates schools by comparing the pace of improvement in their
pupils' scores on periodic tests to the pace of improvement at other schools with similar
socioeconomic profiles, then uses the ratings to trigger rewards or state-assisted, peer-guided
improvement planning. See Setting Annual Growth Standards: "The Formula", Public Schools of
North Carolina Accountability Brief, Jan. 2002, at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/vol2/
settingannuagrowthstandards.html. State-level monitoring and evaluation, see North Carolina's
Assistance to Low-Performing and At-Risk Schools (June 2001), available at http://
www.ncpublicschools.org/school_improvement/ncassistance.pdf, has linked surprising gains in
student test scores in certain poor and minority schools and districts to those institutions' adoption
of New Accountability techniques very like those used in Texas and Kentucky (discussed below)
and in New York City's District 2 (discussed above). See Public Schools of North Carolina,
Evaluation Brief: Defining Proficiency as High-Quality Work, June 2000, at 1-4, available at
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/Accountability/evaluation/evalbriefs/vol2n5-quality.pdf (provid-
ing a "diverse" "collection of... exemplars" of methods used by rapidly improving schools and
districts, which are premised on "discussing goals, defining criteria for judging work, and agreeing
on standards of excellence" and which rely on multiple iterations of goal-setting and planning by
small teams of teachers, implementation of plans and the evaluation of results to generate im-
proved outcomes for students and classrooms); Public Schools of North Carolina, Evaluation
Brief: Improving Student Performance: The Role of District-Level Staff, March 2000, at 1-5,
available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/Accountability/evaluation/evalbriefs/vol2n4-role.htm
(identifying "districts where clusters of schools" had "minority students... performing at a high
level [or making] large gains over several years, or where the black-white achievement gap had
been reduced" and other "districts where both white and black students have made the highest
gains in the state, regardless of percent of poor and minority students in the district" and com-
paring conditions there to those observed in "low performing schools by the State's Assistance
Teams and the School Improvement Division"; concluding that the difference between the two sets
of institutions is a set of "strategies" and "practices" "for direction and support of schools
[emanating] from the district level," including: sustained "present[ation of] compelling reasons
why change is needed"; a "coherent vision of school improvement"; evaluation and monitoring by
"[c]entral office staff... , including superintendents, ... [who are] in the schools each week";
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Kentucky because, among the states leading in school reform, these are two in
which courts played active-but interestingly different-roles. In both cases, we
entwine the account of the operation of the new reform mechanisms with the
story of the emergence of new coalitions and institutional arrangements that
made the move from the old system to the new politically feasible. In the sec-
tions that follow, we then reflect more systematically on innovations in the role
of the courts and in forms of collective action that arose in Texas and Kentucky
and help explain what in the light of standard theories appear to be improbable,
even impossible, outcomes.
A. Texas
The standard legal account of the history of school reform in Texas is
preoccupied with concerns about the equitable distribution of public monies for
education. 215 From this point of view, the fact that some reformers and members
of the Texas Supreme Court gave weight to adequacy considerations in legal
proceedings seems at best a successful technical ploy, at worst a self-limiting
distraction from the main issues of the reform movement. 2 16 As ploy, the
advantage of the adequacy argument was simply to allow the court to approve
additional redistribution through educational programs that could not have been
achieved had poor plaintiffs simply demanded the straightforward redistribution
"high expectations"; "a sense [on the part of district personnel as well as principals, teachers and
parents] of personal accountability for their students and a belief that everyone has a part to play
[and that n]o one is 'off the hook'; "eliminat[ion of] fragmented approaches to school
improvement" and use of "[d]istrict goals and plans [to] provide a framework for school
improvement plans, which in turn are carried to the department and the classroom level"; and
assumption that such "plans are 'living documents' ... and are continuously refined"; "alignment"
of the "'written, taught, and tested' curricula" based on the state's own North Carolina Standard
Course of Study (NCSCS); "[f]requent and diagnostic use of assessment data (state and local
assessments) ... [ulsing item banks [and] district-level diagnostic tests" while also encouraging
"teachers to develop their own diagnostic classroom assessments [that]... are not limited to
multiple choice tests" and rely as well on "portfolios of student work"; "[d]isaggregation of data
across various subgroups and levels of achievement"; "focused and sustained professional
development consistent with the district's overall vision of learning, the NCSCS, and the type of
instructional strategies desired"; and, most generally, the districts' vision of themselves as a
"technical assistance team" that is continuously "present in the schools" to "problem-solve with
schools," "identify research and resources," "help schools use time creatively to allow for
collaborative planning among teachers," and "observe in classrooms and give formative (not
performance appraisal) feedback to principals."). For studies concluding that the North Carolina
accountability system has had a combination of "many positive" effects ("consistent with state
goals") and some unfortunate effects on the behavior of school principals, see Helen Ladd, School-
Based Educational Accountability sSystems: The Promise and the Pitfalls, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 385,
398 (2001); Helen Ladd & Arnaldo Zelli, School-Based Accountability in North Carolina: The
Responses of School Principals, 38 EDUC. ADM1N. Q. 494 (2002).
215. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for
Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607 (1999). For discussions of the early stages of the
Texas reform, see William P. Hobby, Jr. & Billy D. Walker, Legislative Reform of the Texas
Public School Finance System, 1973-1991, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 379 (1991); Levine, supra note
6.
216. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 215, at 670.
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of resources in their favor. As self-limiting distraction, adequacy arguments
blinded the courts and some reformers themselves to remaining inequalities of
endowments and in so doing obstructed further reform through the grandiloquent
overvaluation of half-measures. 2 17
The account of the reform we give here is different in two crucial regards.
First, it is less centered on legal actors; in important respects, it is not centered
on them at all. Although they remain an indispensable part of the story, it is more
as facilitators of relations among others than as protagonists. Second, our ac-
count sees adequacy arguments not as a makeweight or mistake, but rather as a
doctrinal innovation that clears the way for institutionalizing these new forms of
collaboration between protagonists in civil society under the authority of the
courts.
1. History
Texas came late to the progressive school centralization that dominated
school administration during most of the twentieth century, and like many late
converts, was particularly zealous in applying its new orthodoxy: The Texas
Education Agency ("TEA") created a thicket of rules almost without regard to
the performance of pupils or schools.218 By the 1980s, the gap between the
modem economy's demands for an educated workforce and the state education
system's inability to produce one was alarming enough to prompt formation of a
reform coalition of business leaders and citizens' groups. The reform coalition,
chaired by H. Ross Perot, a pioneer in the computer-services industry, first
wanted to use the central bureaucracy of the TEA to impose high-stakes
minimum performance standards and to discipline day-to-day school operations
in an effort to achieve them.219 The high stakes included a controversial "no
pass, no play" rule forbidding students who failed school exams to take part in
high school football or other extracurricular activities. The operating discipline
took the form of enthusiastic efforts to enforce previously ignored directives and
217. See id.
218. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tex. 1992); Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 215, at 613 (discussing reforms of
the late 1940s). Much of the history of Texas school reform in this section was obtained from
Julissa Reynoso & Tiffany Wong, Education Reform: A Case Study of Texas (March 27, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU Review of Law & Social Change) and from interviews
conducted by the authors of that paper, Columbia Law School student researchers Julissa Reynoso
and Tiffany Wong. Notes of these interviews are on file with NYU Review of Law & Social
Change. See Interview by Julissa Reynoso & Tiffany Wong with David Anderson, Chief Counsel,
Texas Education Agency, Austin, Tex. (Apr. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Anderson interview]; Interview
by Julissa Reynoso & Tiffany Wong with Lionel "Skip" Meno, former Tex. Commissioner of Edu-
cation, Austin, Tex. (Apr. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Meno interview]; Interview by Julissa Reynoso &
Tiffany Wong with William R. Ratliff, then Chairman, Finance Committee, Texas State Senate,
Austin, Tex. (Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Ratliff interview].
219. See Hobby & Walker, supra note 215, at 387-88; Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 215,
at 628-29.
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adopt new ones relating to everything from light bulbs to distribution of
teachers' instruction manuals. A small army of state educational inspectors was
loosed upon the districts and schools to check compliance with the old and new
regulations.
These changes produced counter-movements at both the local and state
levels. At the local level, school officials realized that they would be subject to
heightened scrutiny. But they also realized that the data on poor student perfor-
mance and school conditions gathered by the Perot Commission and its admini-
strative heirs could be used to shift responsibility from themselves to the state for
underfunding schools. The upshot was the Edgewood lawsuit, which a group of
poor school districts and civil rights plaintiffs filed in the same year that "no
pass, no play" became the rule.220
At the state level, the effort at improvement by directive quickly proved
self-defeating. There was next to no chance that a central office could recon-
struct a school system as vast, faulty and impoverished as Texas's. As these
limits became manifest, the central reformers looked for ways to impose accoun-
tability without controlling day-to-day operations. Their instrument was an
elaborate testing program. The subsequent reform of the education system in
Texas is the story of how accountability came to focus on the now-familiar
division of labor between local initiative and central elaboration of standards,
which in part provoked, and in part was the result of, a shift in the emphasis of
the Edgewood lawsuit from equity to adequacy.
Events in 1989 advanced this transformation and illustrate the interactions
that produced it. The Texas Supreme Court declared the state's public school
finance system in violation of the state constitution. It ordered that state funding
of public schools cease six months later unless the legislature conformed the
system to constitutional requirements. 221 This decision came soon after Texas's
Lieutenant Governor (commonly said to have more power than the state gover-
nor) created a quasi-public consortium, directed by a Houston lawyer and Dallas
investment banker, to inquire into school finance and accountability. 222 The state
education administration created a parallel committee to propose accountability
reforms. 223
The two study groups came to contrary conclusions. Following in the
footsteps of the Perot Commission, the public-private consortium advocated
fixed performance standards and corresponding tests geared to levels of com-
petence achieved in the world's best educational systems. The administrative
committee, in contrast, preferred diagnostic tests and other measures designed
220. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) ("Edgewoodl');
Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 215, at 631.
221. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 493-94 (Tex. 1991)
("Edgewoodll") (describing history of case).
222. See Reynoso & Wong, supra note 218, at 1-2; Ratliff interview, supra note 218.
223. See Reynoso & Wong, supra note 218, at 2-3.
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more to reveal institutional problems and indicate progress in solving them than
to change the incentive structures of the key actors.
224
"Skip" Meno, appointed Texas Commissioner of Education in 1991, recon-
ciled the two views of standards by linking the dispute to the new division of
responsibilities between the central administration and districts and schools.
225
Meno's formative experience was the reorganization of a school for unruly
youths, where the key to success had been to involve the pupils themselves in
designing the reforms. 226 The institutional extension of this experience was the
conviction that school reform would be effective only if local districts and
schools were given substantial responsibility for self-improvement. The key
organizing principle, which flatly repudiated the centralizing tendencies that had
prevailed in Texas and elsewhere throughout the 1980s, was that "the state shall
determine what the students will be taught, and the local districts and teachers
should determine how they are going to be taught."227 To maximize the local
incentives for change without threatening the central administration's capacity to
respond to distress, thresholds had to be sufficiently rigorous and diagnostic to
give informed urgency to district and school reforms, but not so difficult that the
number of substandard performers would overwhelm the system.
228
While Meno was forging this compromise, the state legislature was evading
reform of school finance, either by superficially manipulating the current flow of
funds to appear to satisfy constitutional niceties or by shifting responsibility for
raising additional monies to local entities. 229 Having none of it, the state
supreme court (joined in the later stages by the state electorate) rejected the
legislature's efforts because of their "overall failure to restructure the
system." 230 By 1993, the Texas Supreme Court was threatening to shut down the
224. For the difference between performance and diagnostic standards, see supra notes 124-
28 and accompanying text.




229. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 215, at 646-51.
230. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991). As described in
a later Texas Supreme Court decision:
The Legislature responded [to the Texas Supreme Court's 1989 order requiring a new
funding scheme] by passing Senate Bill 1 in June 1990. The school districts renewed
their challenges in the district court, which held that the school finance system remained
unconstitutional. On direct appeal, we also held that the system remained inefficient,
noting the "overall failure to restructure the system." Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood I1). We therefore directed the
district court to reinstate its original injunction, but again postponed the effective date to
give the Legislature time to respond. Id. at 498-99.
The Legislature then passed Senate Bill 351, which created 188 county education
districts (CEDS) to carry out taxing functions. Numerous school districts and indivi-
duals challenged the constitutionality of the new finance structures. This Court sus-
tained two of those challenges, holding that Senate Bill 351 levied a state ad valorem
tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e of the Texas Constitution, and that it levied
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school system or take it over. The legislators were close to "panic. ' 23 1 Their way
out was Senate Bill 7.232
The legislation (whose particulars we describe in a moment) was inspired by
and extended the compromise that Meno achieved between the public-private
research consortium and the TEA's administrative reform committee. 23 3 It
unblocked the logjam by allowing the legislature to increase funding substan-
tially but on the condition that districts and schools be held accountable for their
performance. Put another way, the bill established a relation between the legis-
lature and the school system like the one between the central school adminis-
tration and the individual districts and schools. In both cases, accountability was
key. As the bill's sponsor, Senator William Ratliff, put it in an interview, the
"major selling point for [the finance reform was that,] 'We're not just going to
give them more money, we're going to hold them accountable for it."'
234
The bill also unblocked a second logjam, between the legislature and the
judiciary. As long as the lawsuit and the court remained focused on finance
equity, the legislature kept trying to guess the smallest redistribution that the
court would find acceptable, and the court had to guess whether the legislature's
guess would in fact improve the conditions of the schools. 23 5 Not surprisingly,
the result of this testy game was the legislature's successive efforts at appease-
ment and the courts' repeated rejection of them. For a time the contest between
the two branches of government seemed as inevitable as it was futile: Until
reforms were well under way it would be impossible to say what level of redis-
tribution-or, indeed, if money by itself-would lead to significant improvement
in education. But in order to defer definitive resolution of the funding question,
the court would have to inaugurate reform with a provisional, open-textured
finding of the sort that much judicial experience with desegregation had dis-
credited. Thus, the trial judge repeatedly rejected gestures in the direction of an
open-ended decree that the state provide children with an adequate education.2 36
an ad valorem tax without an election in violation of article VII, section 3 of the Texas
Constitution. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992) (Edgewood III). Once again, we directed the
district court to reissue its injunction, as modified to give the Legislature time to act. Id.
at 523 & n. 42, 524.
The Legislature's first response to Edgewood II was to propose a constitutional
amendment that would have authorized the creation of CEDS with limited authority to
levy, collect, and distribute ad valorem taxes. See Tex. S.J.Res. 7, 73rd Leg., R.S., 1993
Tex.Gen. Laws 5560.... [T]he voters rejected that measure[.]
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 726-27 (Tex. 1995) ("Edgewood IV').
231. See Meno interview, supra note 218; Ratliff interview, supra note 218.
232. Act of May 28, 1993, ch. 347, 1993 TEXAS GEN. LAWS 1479.
233. See Meno interview, supra note 218; Ratliff interview, supra note 218.
234. Ratliff interview, supra note 218.
235. See Meno interview, supra note 218; Ratliff interview, supra note 218.
236. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, No 362514A (Travis County Dist. Ct., 250th
J.D. Dist. of Tex., Aug 7, 1991), rev'd sub nom. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 215, at
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The judge pronounced himself incompetent to establish a substantive definition
of constitutionally acceptable education and in any case unwilling to assume the
impossible burden of perpetually monitoring the schools' achievement of such of
a standard. 2 37 Prior to 1993, therefore, judicial advocacy of an adequacy-based
approach to resolving the lawsuit was confined to a single opinion by then-
Justice (now United States Senator) John Comyn concurring in part in and
dissenting in part from the Texas Supreme Court's rejection of the legislature's
second of three successive proposals.
23 8
Senate Bill 7 ("SB 7") enabled the court to adopt an adequacy standard by
establishing a monitoring relation between itself and the legislature like the one
the bill established between the legislature and the school system. 2 39 Just as the
legislature would be able to monitor schools' progress in achieving reform
through a combination of outcome and diagnostic standards, so the court would
be able to determine whether the legislature was making acceptable use of its
discretion under the open-ended adequacy decree by observing the lawmakers'
response to progress on these same standards. With these new mechanisms for
setting standards and monitoring compliance in place, Justice Comyn was able
in his opinion for the Texas Supreme Court in its fourth major decision in the
litigation ("Edgewood IV') to command majority support for an opinion
affirming the legislation.
In Edgewood IV, Cornyn moved from equity to adequacy arguments,
redefining both, in three steps. First, he rehearsed the familiar practical and
theoretical objections to a requirement of equity strictly construed. As a practical
matter, it is impossible (and the court itself previously had declined) to prevent
rich districts from supplementing expenditures on their schools beyond whatever
levels are determined to be fair for all districts. Wealthy districts thus would be
allowed to regain some of the advantage that equalization was supposed to deny
689-90 ("[The trial judge] reserved his harshest criticism for some of the [school] districts that ...
argued that equity was not necessary as long as the state provided a minimum adequate edu-
cation .... [The judge] allowed some testimony regarding 'adequacy' issues related to this debate,
but emphasized that he would not get involved in defining an adequate education.").
237. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 215, at 690 n.465 (quoting the trial judge in
unpublished remarks saying, "'I don't want to sit here and listen for weeks and weeks and weeks to
experts from all over the country. I don't know how to figure adequacy anyway."').
238. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489, 525-27 (Tex. 1992) (Comyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("An
'efficient' education [as required by the Texas Constitution] requires more than elimination of
gross disparities in funding; it requires the inculcation of an essential level of learning by which
each child in Texas is enabled to live a full and productive life in an increasingly complex
world.... [The court's prior opinions] require.., the legislature to articulate the requirements of
an efficient school system in terms of educational results, not just in terms of funding.").
239. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 730 (Tex. 1995) (concluding
that "the accountability regime set forth in Chapter 35 [of SB 7] ... meets the legislature's
constitutional obligation to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide"). The court
expressly allowed the broadest possible delegation of authority for the actual administration of the
new accountability regime, including to entities not affiliated with the State Board of Education or,
indeed, any state agency. See id. at 730 n.8.
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them.240 Theoretically, equity at all levels could also be undercut by a legislature
malignly determined to level down spending. In a pointed warning to advocates
of a simple equality-based approach, Comyn noted that if the court followed
their lead, "[lit would be constitutional for the Legislature to limit all districts to
a funding level of $500 per student as long as there was equal access to this $500
per student, even if $3500 per student were required for [the] general diffusion of
knowledge [required by the state Constitution]." 24'
Second, Comyn endorsed the legislature's equation of "the provision of a
'general diffusion of knowledge' [as required by the Texas Constitution] with
the provision of an accredited education" and the achievement of accreditation
with the "accountability regime set forth in Chapter 35" of SB 7:
In this Chapter, the Legislature defines the contours of its constitutional
duty to provide a "general diffusion of knowledge" by articulating
seven public education goals. These goals emphasize academic achieve-
ment. Most notably, the Legislature envisions that all students will have
access to a high quality education and that the achievement gap bet-
ween property-rich and property-poor districts will be closed. The
Legislature has established a system of student assessment and school
district accreditation to measure each district's progress toward meeting
these goals .... Districts that chronically fail to maintain accreditation
standards are subject to penalties, including dissolution of the offending
school district and its annexation to another district. 242
The seven goals to which the court referred establish benchmarks for school
performance, equality of access, effective management, and accountability. For
example, "Goal B" is that "[t]he achievement gap between educationally
disadvantaged students and other populations will be closed. Through enhanced
dropout prevention efforts, the graduation rate will be raised to 95 percent of
students who enter the seventh grade." 243
In step three, Cornyn argued that, with the passage of SB 7, redistribution of
school funding had proceeded far enough to allow school districts (1) to
undertake initial reforms, although not necessarily (2) to take all the steps
necessary to meet their periodically adjusted constitutional obligations as defined
by the act's accountability regime. In the former regard, Cornyn noted that
whereas before the passage of SB 7, the richest school districts had 700 times
more taxable property wealth per student than the poorest ones, after its passage,
the ratio was reduced to 28-to-1. More particularly, he pointed to Commissioner
Meno's testimony at trial suggesting that "a general diffusion of knowledge"
requires about $3500 per weighted student. Under the act's various refunding
240. See id at 731.
241. Id. at 729-30.
242. Id. at 728-29 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 35.021-121, .041, .062, .121).
243. Id. at 728 n.7 (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE § 35.001).
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mechanisms, an amount slightly in excess of this would be generally available.
"Thus, the district court found that every district can provide an accredited
education with funding provided" by these mechanisms. 244
The court's construction plainly invited reexamination of funding mechan-
isms in the light of information revealed by the new accountability system. As
Cornyn emphasized in the second paragraph of his lengthy opinion, "[o]ur
judgment in this case should not be interpreted as a signal that the school finance
crisis in Texas has ended., 245 Comyn later underscored the provisionality of the
court's finding that SB 7 satisfied the constitutional requirement of a general
diffusion of knowledge: "Obviously, future legal challenges may be brought if a
general diffusion of knowledge can no longer be provided within the equalized
system because of changed legal or factual circumstances." 246
The principal dissent attacked the majority decision as a retreat from the
court's commitment to equity in school finance. It reiterated the logic of the prior
Edgewood holdings that the school system was not constitutionally "efficient"
because it "failed to provide rich and poor districts with substantially-similar
access to revenues." 247 Dissenting Justice Spector dismissed Comyn's equation
of the state's obligation to provide for the "general diffusion of knowledge" with
the provision of an accredited education as defined in SB 7 as an apology for the
existing regime, with all its limitations. 248 Justice Spector noted with incredulity
that for the new standard to be more than a pretext for the sacrifice of con-
stitutional responsibility, the court would have to continually reevaluate the
constitutionality of the state's accreditation standard.249
Spector's dissent rightly focused attention on the details of the accounta-
bility scheme. In order to be more than an elaborate justification for inaction, the
accreditation system had to demonstrate the need for improvement, especially in
the provision of education to poor and minority students; suggest how this
improvement could be achieved; and demonstrate to the public and thus to the
court that conditions were in fact improving at an acceptable rate. A closer look
at the scheme established by SB 7 suggests that these were precisely its goals.
2. Operation
The Texas Public School Accountability System that resulted from the
244. Id. at 730 n.10.
245. Id. at 725.
246. Id. at 731 n.10.
247. Id. at 766 (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex.
1989) (Spector, J., dissenting)).
248. See id. at 768.
249. Id. at 768 (quoting id. at 732 n.14 (majority opinion)). Justice Spector cited Commis-
sioner Meno's testimony in the lower court "in regard to Senate Bill 7, that Iour present accredi-
tation criteria at the acceptable level ... does [sic] not match up with [i.e., falls below] what the
real world requirements are."' id. at 768.
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process described above is outlined in Chapter 39 of the Education Code.250 The
system uses an intricate division of labor among specialized government entities
to generate data on the performance of individual students and ethnic and socio-
economic school sub-populations such as Hispanics or students qualified for a
federal lunch subsidy on the basis of their parents' low income. These data are
then combined into metrics that permit comparison of the performance of
demographically similar schools and districts on many dimensions. In turn, those
comparisons enable the state to reward good performers and also to attend to
poor ones by providing help in formulating and implementing improvement
strategies and, in extremis, by withdrawing accreditation and putting the district
in receivership. In the leading schools and districts these data inform classroom
practices and school- and district-based professional development and reorgani-
zation, fostering the kind of organized attentiveness to the needs of individual
students that emerged as the result of professional self-searching in New York's
District 2.
The raw material for assessment of districts and schools is data from two
sources. The first is a series of tests of pupil performance known as the Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills ("TAAS"). 251 Reading and mathematics are
assessed at grade levels three to ten inclusive; other subjects such as writing,
science, social studies, algebra, biology, and English and U.S. history are
assessed on a more limited basis. 252 The second source is a variety of measures
of institutional performance, exclusive of individual test scores, including the
passing rate on end-of-course examinations, attendance and dropout rates, rates
of improvement in scores on reading and mathematics tests compared to peer
institutions, and, for districts and high schools, high school completion rates,
percent of high school students completing an advanced course, and SAT and
ACT examination participation levels and results. 253 Via the Academic Excel-
lence Indicator System ("AEIS"), the Texas Education Agency compiles infor-
mation about performance on each of these metrics at the school, district and
250. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.022 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2003) (establishing obligation
of State Board of Education to create a statewide assessment program to ensure school accounta-
bility for student outcomes).
251. The TAAS tests became publicly available in 1995. In the 1998-1999 school year,
TAAS was aligned with state-mandated curriculum requirements. See TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, TEXAS
STUDENT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM TECHNICAL DIGEST FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR 2000-2001 ch. 1,
available at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.assessment/resources/techdig/index.html (last modi-
fied Dec. 19, 2002) [hereinafter 2000-2001 STUDENT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM TECHNICAL DIGEST];
infra notes 288-89 and accompanying text (discussing the recent replacment of TAAS with a more
sophisticated and more difficult test that is better aligned with the state's updated curriculum).
252. See Tex. Educ. Agency, 1999 Interim Report 1 (Dec. 1999). For specifics on student
assessment and test development, see 2000-2001 Student Assessment Program Technical Digest,
supra note 251.
253. For a full list of categories included in annual report cards for schools and districts, see
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 39.051-052 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2003). See also Tex. Educ. Agency,
2000 Accountability Manual § 3 (April 2000), at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/account/
2000/manual/[hereinafter 2000 Accountability Manual].
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statewide level and reports these results to the public through the TEA's website
and publications.
254
These same data are further used to create performance ratings for each
school and district. The Accountability Rating System ("ARS") uses a subset of
information on the AEIS-principally, TAAS performance in reading, mathema-
tics, and writing, as well as dropout and attendance rates-to rank individual
districts and schools as "exemplary," "recognized," "academically acceptable"
and "academically unacceptable." 255 In 1999, a campus was "exemplary" if at
least 90% of students in each reported sub-population passed the TAAS in each
subject area, the dropout rate was 1% or less, and the attendance rate was at least
~ 25694%.
25
Schools' rates of improvement in reading and mathematics are further
ranked by comparison to the improvement rates of the forty other schools in the
entire state of Texas that are most like themselves. The comparison group is
defined by the ethnic composition and social and economic status of their res-
pective student bodies. Campuses that otherwise would be ranked in the category
of "academically unacceptable" count as "acceptable" if, despite their low
absolute performance, their scores are improving at least at a minimum requisite
rate.2
57
Districts and schools that rank high on these ratings are rewarded. Under the
Texas Successful Schools Award System, schools in the top quartile of their
forty-school comparison group based on their ARS scores and/or rates of
improvement in reading and mathematics receive an award of $500 to $5000,
depending on the number of students in the school. The state distributed $5
million in the 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 school years.
258
Districts and schools with low ratings face special scrutiny by state
accreditation teams, school improvement obligations and possible sanctions.
Low ARS ranking and poor performance on specified AEIS indicators trigger an
accreditation review by a team consisting of one or more TEA staff members
254. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. and Educ. Coalition, Evaluating the Performance of Texas Public
Schools, A Guide to the Academic Excellence Indicator System Reports (2001-2002), available at
http://pipe.triand.com/Marketing/AEIS.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
255. For the precise designated rankings, see 2000 Accountability Manual, supra note 253, at
§3.
256. See Tex. Educ. Agency, 1999 Accountability Manual § 7, available at http://www.tea.
state.tx.us/perfreport/account/99/manual/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2003); Fuhrman, supra note 202, at
27. For a comparison of the Texas and Kentucky testing systems, see David K. Cohen & Deborah
Loewenberg Ball, Instruction, Capacity and Improvement 15 (Consortium for Pol'y Research in
Educ., Research Report Series, RR-43, June 1999).
257. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 39.05 1(c) (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2003); 2000 ACCOUNTA-
BILITY MANUAL, supra note 253, § 3.
258. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 39.091-096 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2003); TEX. EDUC.
AGENCY, TEXAS SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS AWARD SYSTEM: 1999-2000 METHODOLOGY, at http://
www.tea.state.tx.us/tssas/9900method.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003); TEX. EDUC. AGENCY,
TEXAS SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS AWARD SYSTEM: 1999-2000 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/tssas/9900faq.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
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and graduates of the Texas School Improvement Initiative ("TSII"). TSII is a
professional development program that brings public and private school teach-
ers, counselors, specialists in bilingual, gifted and other similar programs,
professional association staff members, principals, central office personnel, and
superintendents from different areas together to exchange best practices,
including best practices in evaluation. Characteristically, TSII advertises itself in
a way that combines professional development and training in peer assess-
ment.259 Graduates of the program therefore are typically professionals who
have broad knowledge of effective use of assessment tools in classroom activity,
school organization and institutional restructuring. Accreditation reviews con-
ducted by teams composed largely of TSII graduates therefore amount to-and
indeed are explicitly conceived as-"peer evaluations." 260
The products of the investigation are a report and immediate feedback to the
school or district concerning the findings of the on-site evaluation team and its
recommendations for achieving better outcomes. These in effect correct, up or
down, the ranking scores and allow for a customized response by the central
authority to local problems and achievements. Rankings are supplemented by
on-site investigations of many different types that may raise or lower the perfor-
mance rating assigned to a school or district according to the findings of the on-
site evaluation team.26 1
Districts whose performance, thus corrected, is rated academically
unacceptable, low-performing, or otherwise noncompliant with state and federal
requirements are subject to complex, multi-year state interventions and sanc-
tions. 262 Many of these, including hearings conducted by the board of trustees or
the commissioner, the preparation of student achievement improvement plans,
and the assignment of management intervention teams, oblige the district to
scrutinize itself carefully and make deliberate plans for improvement.263 Goals
set in this way become additional, more customized performance standards
against which the district is subsequently judged. Note also, that while the AEIS
and ARS focus on schools and districts as the unit of accountability, the
259. On the Texas Education Agency's website, http://www.tea.state.tx.us/tsii/ (last visited
Nov. 22, 2003), TSII is defined as four things: (1) "A statewide educational leadership network."
(2) "A cadre of school district representatives trained in effective school practices." (3) "Prac-
titioners with expertise in analyzing student outcomes, planning, decision making and program
evaluation." (4) "Practitioners who participate in on-site peer review evaluations."
260. 2000 ACCOUNTABILITY MANUAL, supra note 253, at 1 ("Annually, more than one
thousand of these local professionals attend summer academies to be trained as peer review team
members.").
261. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.074 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2003). For discussion of
the many different types of on-site evaluations, see TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY
PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR ON-SITE EVALUATIONS 1999-2000, at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/
account.eval/apm9900v3.doc (last visited Nov. 22, 2003) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY
PROCEDURES MANUAL].
262. See ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 261, at 74-80.
263. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.131 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2003).
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accountability system has also been extended to assess the efficacy of capacity-
building mechanisms such as teacher professional development and teacher
training and certification courses. 26 4
The emergence of the accountability system has gone hand in hand with the
development of public-private partnerships that help districts and schools meet
their performance obligations-and help the public see whether they are doing
so-while pressing the state to refine both its standards and assessment tools.
They do this by reassembling the TEA's own data in formats carefully keyed to
the needs of the public and educators; characterizing and presenting for public
scrutiny the practices of successful schools and districts; and proposing curri-
cular reforms growing from their own investigations. Two such intermediary
institutions are Just for the Kids and the Charles A. Dana Center, both affiliated
with the University of Texas at Austin. Organizational-chart formalities aside,
both are key elements of the accountability system, and likely to become more
important in time.
Just for the Kids (which more recently has spun off the National Center for
Educational Accountability) was founded by Tom Luce, a Dallas lawyer who
served as the staff director to the Perot Commission and continued to work for
adoption of minimum standards. 265 Once TASS results were being reported, Just
for the Kids began to re-aggregate the data to show parents at a click the
"'opportunity gap'-the gap between its current level of performance and the
average level of performance of the highest-performing schools with similar
student populations in the state." 266 Recently it has begun to identify consistently
improving schools and districts and to articulate, together with the educators
responsible for the results, the best practices that produce the successes. 267
The Dana Center grew largely out of the work of Uri Treisman, a
mathematician. While working toward his doctorate at the University of
California at Berkeley in the 1970s, Treisman became fascinated by the dif-
ferences in the study habits of Asian-American and African-American students
of calculus at the university. The Asian-Americans, who did well in the classes,
formed study groups that continuously reviewed the teachers' expectations and
the strengths and weaknesses of the problem-solving strategies of each group
264. See TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, PDAS MANUAL AND FORMS, at http/www.tea.state.tx.us/
PDAS (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). For discussion of the Texas Education Agency's Professional
Development and Appraisal System (PDAS) and Accountability System for Educator Preparation
(ASEP), see Reynoso & Wong, supra note 219, at 10-12. For discussion of the linkage of
professional development to the assessment program, see TEX. STATE BD. FOR EDUCATOR
CERTIFICATION, ABOUT SBEC: THE AGENCY AND ITS WORK, at www.sbec.state.tx.us/SBECOnline/
about/agencywork.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
265. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. ACCOUNTABILITY, ABOUT Us: BOARD OF DIRECTORS, at
http://www.measuretolearn.org/index.cfm?pg=about-us&subp=bod (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
266. See JUST FOR THE KIDS, TEXAS SCHOOL DATA, at http://www.just4kids.org/TX/TX_
schooldata.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
267. See JUST FOR THE KIDS, U.S. BEST PRACTICES, at http://www.just4kids.org/US/US_
bestpractices.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
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member. The African-American students did none of these things, and did
poorly, even though many had been high school valedictorians and were plainly
motivated to succeed. Acting on this observation, Treisman transformed the
remedial program into which the African-Americans with difficulties were being
shunted into a successful honors program based on collaborative work on
challenging, conceptually-framed problems-an institutionalized variant of the
Asian-American study groups. 268 Treisman's focus on collaborative attention to
the learning strategies of individual students converged with, and influenced, the
work on Balanced Literacy that is described above.269 Through the activities of
the Dana Center, Triesman's work also shaped the Texas mathematics curri-
culum.
Once Texas's accountability system was in place, the Dana Center com-
plemented its work on new curricula with professional development programs
designed to help teachers master the collaborative practices the new curricula
demand and organizational development programs that help districts build the
capacity needed to make pervasive professional development part of everyday
school operation. In particular, the Center's Education Improvement Network
("EIN") facilitates detailed exchanges among ten leading districts in the state.
Separately and together, these districts work to implement new classroom prac-
tices, new forms of school- and district-based professional development, and
new career paths in which growing expertise in, for instance, peer review, is a
precondition for greater administrative responsibility as well as teach-the-teacher
positions with no managerial responsibilities. 270
The efforts to ascertain and publicize best practices by both Just for the Kids
and the Dana Center converge on two general findings. The first is the emer-
gence of the district as a key actor in reform. This might seem obvious.
Restructuring schools need services they cannot provide themselves; neither the
state nor private firms can meet much of the demand; the district has resources,
and is accountable for school performance; so the district becomes a key supplier
of services-the infrastructure of reform-to its component schools. Never-
theless, a decade ago the district was widely, and probably correctly, regarded as
yet another bureaucratic hindrance in the education system, draining resources
from the schools while promulgating rules restricting teachers' ability to use
their talents in the classroom. The fact that, for both Just for the Kids and the
Dana Center, the district has become a key interlocutor and is seen by both as
268. See Phillip Michael (Uri) Treisman, A Study of the Mathematics Performance of Black
Students at the University of California, Berkeley (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley) (on file with authors).
269. See supra notes 145-47, 174-77 and accompanying text.
270. See Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Education Improvement Network website, at
http://www.utdanacenter.org/ein/. The authors are currently collaborating with EIN on a research
project designed to determine whether effective implementation of classroom- and district-level
reform strategies is linked to improved student outcomes.
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central to school reform suggests the kind of deep, broad organizational shift that
could make reform truly "systemic." 271
The second finding is that schools and districts are fusing top-down and
bottom-up reforms, granting autonomy in return for accountability in the way
that we have repeatedly encountered. Each district apparently has its own
method of doing this, borrowing techniques wherever they can be found. At all
events both the Dana Center and Just for the Kids are intent upon providing tools
that connect the actors at different levels to each other. The resulting structure, as
reflected in their lists of best practices, might be called (New York City) District
2 without the professional-cultural angst, or simply Tolstoy in Texas.272 Here,
for example, is Just for the Kids' set of best practices for all levels of the Texas
system below the TEA:
DISTRICT PRACTICES
* Define Clear and Specific Academic Objectives in the
District's Written Curriculum
* Provide Leaders, Resources and Support to Achieve
Academic Objectives
* Monitor School Performance
" Reward, Intervene or Adjust Based on School Performance
SCHOOL PRACTICES
" Prepare a School Plan to Ensure All Students Achieve
Academic Objectives
* Align Programs, Resources and Personnel to Achieve
Academic Goals
* Ensure the Use of Data-Driven, Research-Based
Instructional Practices and Arrangements
" Monitor Student and Teacher Performance
* Reward, Intervene or Adjust Based on Teacher
Performance
CLASSROOM PRACTICES
* Collaborate in Effective Grade/Subject-Level Teams
271. AMY H. HIGHTOWER, SAN DIEGO'S BIG BOOM: DISTRICT BUREAUCRACY SUPPORTS
CULTURE OF LEARNING 1 (Ctr. for the Study of Teaching and Pol'y, Research Report R-02-2, 2002)
("[T]he existing literature on school districts now stands divided into two divergent
characterizations-districts as bureaucratic and districts as learning-centric-with the research
community largely viewing these two portrayals as distinct."). For additional evidence, in this case
from North Carolina, of the key role districts can play in systemic reform, see supra note 214.
272. See supra notes 173-83, 198-200 and accompanying text.
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* Teach to Specified Academic Objectives Using Best
Instructional Practices and Arrangements
• Monitor the Progress of Every Student
" Intervene or Adjust Instruction Based on Individual
Student Performance
School-level accounts confirm that the classroom practices being meshed
with accountability systems are indeed the ones the earlier discussion would lead
us to expect. Teaching methods at the Margo Elementary School in the Weslaco
District, for example, are immediately familiar from the earlier discussion of
Balanced Literacy and District 2. One thousand three hundred and fifty-one of
the school's nearly 2000 overwhelmingly Hispanic students are from families
poor enough to qualify for federal lunch subsidies. But 97% passed and 80%
were proficient on the 2001 fourth grade reading test-in math, 99% passed and
71% were proficient. The principal attributes much of the success to "our
individual reading program. We ensure that every child in kindergarten through
second grade reads with a teacher, one-on-one, every day." Daily progress is
carefully monitored, and where there are problems, "I have to find resources
quickly," a first-grade teacher says. 273
A recent study by the EIN project of rapidly-improving high-poverty school
districts in Texas tells a convergent story. The EIN researchers identified seven,
and investigated four, large (at least 5000 students) and robustly improving
districts that met demanding selection criteria.274 At least one-third of each
district's high-poverty schools (where 50% or more of the students qualify for
free or reduced-price lunches) had to be rated "recognized" or "exemplary" in
the state accountability system, including at least two middle or high schools;
rates of exclusion from the TAAS test for limited English proficiency students,
dropout and absence rates, and ninth grade retention rates all had to be below the
state averages; and, crucially, district scores on demanding academic tests such
as the SAT and Advanced Placement exams had to show significant gains. The
four districts chosen for study "represent[ed] the greatest diversity (geographic,
district size, and racial/ethnic composition) possible." 275 In the poorest district,
87% of the students were low income, and 3% were white. In the next poorest,
71% were low income and 14% were white. Because only 15% of all Texas
schools were rated as "exemplary" in 1997-1998, and an additional twenty-five
rated as "recognized," the districts in the study thus managed to get at least a
273. See S. C. Gwynne, How Good Is Your Kid's School?, TEX. MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at
123; see supra notes 145-47, 173-76, 180 and accompanying text.
274. See LINDA SKRLA ET AL., UNIV. OF TEX. AT AusTIN, EQUITY-DRIVEN ACHIEVEMENT-
FOCUSED SCHOOL DISTRICTS: A REPORT ON SYSTEM SCHOOL SUCCESS IN FOUR TEXAS SCHOOL
DISTRICTS SERVING DIVERSE STUDENT POPULATIONS (2000).
275. Id. at 3.
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third of their high-poverty schools to outperform 60% of the schools
statewide.
2 76
The EIN report attributes the districts' success to causal clusters that reflect
the key aspects of the reform architecture under discussion here: changes in the
accountability system; local use of information disclosed by the accountability
system to pressure districts into improving; the emergence of new reform
leaders; the transformation, as a result of all this, of district organization; and,
ultimately, changes in educators' understanding of equity and excellence. 277
These outcomes cannot be attributed simply to the introduction of new
testing regimes alone. Many states have introduced high-stakes tests but have not
reported gains like those in Texas. 278 Whatever their exact explanation,
however, the best available research from Texas and elsewhere suggests that
these favorable outcomes are the result at least in part of a combination of
educational reforms, including increased spending on schooling, particularly for
poor areas, large investments in teacher training, and holding schools explicitly
accountable for the achievement of children in each minority group with
corresponding attention to questions of equity.
2 79
It is too soon for a comprehensive evaluation of the student outcomes in
Texas, as long lead times are required before changes become manifest and
stable. Above all, we have no direct test of the effect of the new classroom
practices that uses the methods Wenglinsky applied to the NAEP results. Early
indications are, however, that test scores are moving in the right direction, 280
276. See id. at 2-3.
277. Id. at 6-7.
278. See, e.g., Monty Neill & K. Gayler, Do High School Graduation Tests Improve Learn-
ing Outcomes? in RAISING STANDARDS OR RAISING BARRIERS?, supra note 17, at 107.
279. See DAVID W. GRISSMER ET AL., IMPROVING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: WHAT NAEP
STATE TEST SCORES TELL Us 58-73 & n.4 (2000) (discussed infra note 284); Gary Orfield &
Elizabeth DeBray, Education for the Poor: Lessons from New Research on the U.S. Program to
Aid Concentrated Poverty Schools 23 (May 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU
Review of Law & Social Change); sources cited supra note 214 (reporting results of a study of
high-performing North Carolina districts and schools with substantial minority populations and
linking success to district and classroom practices very like those discovered in the EIN study of
rapidly improving Texas districts and also to that state's sophisticated accountability scheme);
supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text. See also Tammi J. Chun & Margaret E. Goertz, Title I
and State Educational Policy: High Standards for All Students, in HARD WORK FOR GOOD
SCHOOLS: FACTS NOT FADS IN TITLE I REFORM 120-29 (Gary Orfield & Elizabeth H. DeBray eds.,
1999) [hereinafter HARD WORK].
280. See GRISSMER ET AL., supra note 279, at 58-73; Walt Haney, The Myth of the Texas
Miracle in Education, 8 EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, No. 8 §§ 3.4, 3.5 (2000), at http://epaa.
asu.edu/epaa/v8n41/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003) (noting "considerable publicity for the
apparent success of reform in [Texas]" based on test score data); Jonathan Fox, Old-Style Tests
May Hamper School Reform, Experts Say, EDUC. DAILY, Apr. 14, 1999 at 2 (noting that advocates
of "criterion-referenced" tests claim that the tests, along with accountability, "helped produce the
highest score gains of this decade on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP),
catapulting [Texas] from lower-than-average NAEP standards to near the national average"). Cf
Orfield & Debray, supra note 279 (Texas had the largest increase on fourth grade mathematics
scores between 1992 and 1996 of the thirty-five states participating in the NAEP, although prog-
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although controversy surrounds their interpretation. 281
This much, however, can be said with confidence. Texas students in all
grades have made substantial gains on the TAAS. 282 They also have made gains
on the NAEP, an independent and highly regarded measure of student perfor-
mance. 283 Indeed, Texas, along with North Carolina, made the largest gains on
ress in reading has been roughly average for the country and has not accelerated since 1992); supra
notes 188-92 and accompanying text (discussing Wenglinsky study).
For an up-to-the-minute report on educational outcomes in Texas and elsewhere from the
standpoint of a national comparison of states, see Quality Counts 2003: "If I Can't Learn From
You, " EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 9, 2003, at http://www.edweek.org/sreports/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
281. See, e.g., Haney, supra note 280, at § 4.0 ("The problem with TAAS and the way it is
being used in Texas may be summarized under five sub-headings: 1) the TAAS is having a
continuing adverse impact on Black and Hispanic students; 2) the use of the TAAS test in isolation
to control award of high school diplomas is contrary to professional standards concerning test use;
3) the passing score on TAAS is arbitrary and discriminatory; 4) a variety of evidence casts doubt
on the validity of TAAS scores; and 5) more appropriate use of test results would have more
validity and less adverse impact."); Eric A. Hanushek, Deconstructing RAND, EDUC. MATTERS,
Spring 2001, at 65, available at http://www.educationnext.org/2001sp/65.html (criticizing main
study touting Texas gains for relying on insufficiently detailed family backgrounds of Texas
students who took the NAEP and doubting conclusions that smaller class size and higher teacher
salaries connected with Texas reforms contributed to increases in NAEP test scores); McNeil &
Valenzuela, supra note 19, at 15 ("In conclusion, the TAAS is a ticket to nowhere. It is harmful to
instruction by its rigid format, its artificial treatment, its embodiment of discredited learning
theories, its ignoring of children's cultures and languages, and its emphasis on the accounting of
prescribed learning. The test itself, and the system of testing and test preparation, have in poor and
minority schools come to usurp instructional resources and supplant the opportunity for high
quality, meaningful learning."). Cf Stephen P. Klein et al., What Do Test Scores in Texas Tell Us?,
8 EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 49 (Oct. 26, 2000), at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n49 ("[W]e
found that the reading and math skills of Texas students improved since the full implementation of
the TAAS program in 1994. However, the answers to the questions of how much improvement
occurred, whether the improvement in reading was comparable to what it was in math, and
whether Texas reduced the gap in scores among racial and ethnic groups depend on whether you
believe the NAEP or TAAS results. They tell very different stories."). But cf MARTIN CARNOY ET
AL., Do HIGHER TEST SCORES IN TEXAS MAKE FOR BETTER HIGH SCHOOL OUTCOMES? (Consortium
for Pol'y Research in Educ., Research Report Series, RR-047, 2001) (reporting study results
indicating that TAAS has not produced the perverse effects typically associated with high-stakes
testing: increased rates of exclusion of vulnerable populations from the test-taking pool, increased
retention rates and dropout rates, and a focus on the test to the detriment of other learning
opportunities).
282. See, e.g., CARNOY ET AL., supra note 281, at 6-8; TEXAS' RESPONSE TO THE 1999
SUMMIT ACTION PLAN 2-4 (Mar. 24, 2000), available at http://frodo.mindseye.com/achieve/
achievestart.nsf/4f501 eb8b49a0782852568be003a5439/b920d64be42b626c852568bd005506e0/$F
ILE/Texas.PDF.
283. GRISSMER ET AL., supra note 279, at 55-63 (discussed infra note 284); EVALUATING THE
PERFORMANCE OF TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 254, at 1 ("The academic achievement of
Texas students as measured by the TAAS exam have been confirmed by their high scores on the
National Assessment of Educational Progress ("NAEP") .... In the scores released on September
28, 1999, Texas eighth grade students' results were at or near the top of the nation on the 1998
writing tests. Overall, Texas students' scale score of 154 ranked fourth behind Connecticut (165),
Maine (155) and Massachusetts (155). The national average was 148. The results by individual
student group look even better for Texas. The scores of African-American students led the nation.
Hispanic student scores ranked number two behind Virginia, Asian student scores number two
behind Maryland, and white student scores number two behind Connecticut."); supra note 214
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the NAEP of all states from 1990 to 1997.284 It is true, as critics of the Texas
system have asserted, that high school graduation rates are relatively low in
Texas: about 65% of African American and Latino eighth graders graduate four
years later, whereas 78% of their white classmates receive high school diplomas.
It is also true that high proportions of African American and Latino students are
retained at grade at some point during their high school careers. 285 But it is not
true that the introduction of TAAS accounts for these last-mentioned outcomes.
On the contrary, the rising retention rates date to the implementation of the
earlier Texas educational reforms beginning in 1984, and the evidence does not
support claims that statewide dropout rates increased after the adoption of SB
7.286 If anything, the relationship between TAAS and dropout rates is the
reverse: High schools with the largest increases in the pass rates on the tenth
grade TAAS had the largest declines in dropout rates. And this relation is most
pronounced in urban high schools attended by low-income students. 287
In any case, the Texans themselves seem committed to extending the state's
educational standards and the assessment regime associated with it in ways that
emphasize just those capacities for critical conceptual thinking that, in the eyes
of critics, the TAAS-based system slights. The key innovation here is the
introduction, already well under way, of the Texas Essential Knowledge and
Skills curriculum ("TEKS") and its companion assessment tool the Texas
Assessment of Knowledge and Skills ("TAKS").288 Both have been developed
with massive collaboration from teachers statewide and with the help of the
Dana Center. The TEKS explicitly marks a shift away from algorithmic or rule-
based pedagogy to a focus on concepts. Under TAAS, students learning to
distinguish area from perimeter might have been taught that area is "about
multiplication" and perimeter is "about addition." Under TEKS, students learn
that area is about coverage and is measured by multiplying the length of the
sides of the area covered, and perimeter is about framing and is measured by
addition of the length of the sides of a frame. This shift requires teachers to
(discussing North Carolina's reformed accountability system); supra note 191 and accompanying
text (discussing the NAEP test).
284. See GRISSMER ET AL., supra note 279, at 59 & n.4 (concluding that "Texas and North
Carolina [were] the states showing the highest rate of improvement" and linking those improve-
ments to "systemic reform policies implemented in both states in the late 1980s and early 1990s"
that "originated in the business community" and "generat[ed] the agenda for reform and its passage
in the legislature").
285. See CARNOY ET AL., supra note 281, at 23; Orfield & DeBray, supra note 279, at 32. See
also Darling-Hammond, supra note 124, at 19-20 (noting that Texas's dropout and retention rates
remain very high, especially for African-American and Latino students).
286. See CARNOY ET AL. supra note 281, at 14-23 (producing data that systematically refutes
any linkage between the TAAS program and Texas retention and dropout rates).
287. See id. at 23.
288. On TEKS, see TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, TEX. ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS (TEKS),
at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/teks/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). On TAKS, see TEX. EDUC. AGENCY,
TAKS IMPLEMENTATION, at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.assessment/taks/ (last visited Nov.
22, 2003).
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design individual class lessons and grade-by-grade class sequences that com-
municate and deepen understanding of the relevant concepts rather than simply
"4covering" a list of required substantive themes. Preparation for the statewide
transition to the TEKS, which is to be completed by the 2003-2004 school year,
has become a focal point for discussion and pooling of "better" curricular and
assessment practices, especially among rapidly improving districts such as those
associated with EIN and the Dana Center.
289
An optimistic reading is thus that the Texas public school system is on the
verge of a substantial improvement in performance. Better showings on TAAS,
especially by members of minority groups, may be starting to decrease retention
rates and increase graduation rates, and these gains may eventually result in
increased propensity and ability to pursue higher education. All this may be
reinforced and accelerated by the shift to TEKS. But if retention and attrition
rates remain high, if (despite first indications to the contrary) rates of college
attendance do not increase even in the best performing districts, or if there is no
statewide correlation between increasing tenth-grade TAAS scores and the parti-
cipation rates and scores of high-school students taking national college entrance
exams such as the SAT 29 0 -if there is none of this, the Texas system and the
general accountability regime of which it is a leading example will have failed
by their own standards, and ours.
B. Kentucky
1. History
If the trajectory of reform in Texas was largely top-down and inside-out,
emanating from the TEA and allied quasi-governmental institutions, the trajec-
tory in Kentucky was more nearly the reverse: grassroots and almost anti-
institutional. 291 Reform began in a statewide citizens committee that excluded
289. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text. For criticisms of the earlier TAAS test
that the TEKS and TAKS are designed to avoid, see supra note 281.
290. See CARNOY ET AL., supra note 281, at 23.
291. Much of the description of events that follows is taken from a comprehensive and
insightful article by Molly A. Hunter, see Hunter, supra note 101. Hunter is Director of Legal
Research at the Campaign for Fiscal Equity in New York. See also Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School
Finance Reform and Systemic School Change: Reconstituting Kentucky's Public Schools, 18 J.
EDUC. FIN. 318 (1993); Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance, in
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Helen F. Ladd et al.
eds., 1999); Bert T. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School Reform Law, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367 (1991); Ronald G. Dove, Jr., Acorns in a Mountain Pool: The Role of
Litigation, Law and Lawyers in Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 83 (1991); Michael
Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: Lessons from School Finance Litigation in
Kentucky, 1984-95, 26 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 631 (2001); C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith,
Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 599 (1995);
Jonathan Shafter & Alexander Greenawalt, Education Reform in Kentucky (April 13, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU Review of Law and Social Change).
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the educational bureaucracy and other entrenched educational interests and in
offshoots from that committee in the cities and towns and other parts of
Kentucky's civil society.292 Within a few years participants at both levels came
to support a legal challenge to the state's school system. 293 The state supreme
court found in their favor, declaring the state's entire school system unconsti-
tutional in a decision that began with adequacy arguments much like those that
eventually ended the institutional logjam in Texas.294 The Kentucky legislature
followed the high court's lead. Looking at national experience as well as the
court's decision, the legislature enacted a comprehensive reform of the state's
educational system, emphasizing both augmented local initiative and statewide
accountability. 295
In doing so, however, the state legislature came to exercise such active over-
sight on educational reform that it began in effect to co-manage the reorgani-
zation of the state's school system, emarginating the educational bureaucracy
without, however, providing public schools with the support services that the
new reforms require. Thus, having succeeded in its revolt against the entrenched
educational interests, and having rallied the courts and political classes, civil
society in Kentucky has so far failed either to construct a new administrative
center at the service of decentralized reform, as in District 2, or to leave a void in
which new actors outside the government could provide such services on their
own, as in Texas. Nonetheless, there are some first encouraging signs that the
Kentucky system does afford opportunities for both official actors and new
entrants to correct existing blockages.
The stirrings of Kentucky's civil society date to the early 1980s, when
political, civic, and business communities acknowledged the catastrophic eco-
nomic and social costs of a school system that ranked nationally near the bottom
on all significant criteria.296 The state Council of Higher Education appointed a
blue-ribbon commission in 1980 to study the problem of educational quality in
Kentucky and formulate recommendations to the governor.297 The commission
quickly concluded that serious reform was needed but highly unlikely given the
292. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 489-94.
293. Id. at 494-95.
294. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989) ("The General
Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide each child in Kentucky an adequate
education.... An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the seven
capacities recited previously."); see supra notes 222-49 and accompanying text (discussing the
evolution of Texas judicial reforms from an exclusive focus on funding to an emphasis on educa-
tional adequacy).
295. See Kentucky Education Reform Act, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as
amended at KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 156-163 and scattered sections (Michie 1999)).
296. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 486-87, 488-89.
297. Shafter & Greenawalt, supra note 291, at 2-3 (discussing the authors' interview with
Robert F. Sexton, Executive Director of The Prichard Committee, April 13, 2000). See THE
PRICHARD COMMITrEE, THE PATH TO A LARGER LIFE: CREATING KENTUCKY'S EDUCATIONAL
FUTURE xiii (2d ed. 1990).
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state's deadlocked political system. Frustrated commission members decided to
force the hand of the governor and state legislature by reconstituting the com-
mission in 1983 as a not-for-profit, independent, volunteer citizens' advocacy
organization to publicize the need for school improvements and build public
support for school reform legislation. 2
98
This "Prichard Committee" was an assembly of outsiders to Kentucky
education. Its membership included a carefully balanced mixture of concerned
citizens ranging from former governors to business leaders and involved
parents. 299 Active state officials and educators were not invited to participate,
evidently to prevent capture by insiders. 300 Funding for the committee's work
came from private donations, including a substantial sum from Ashland Oil, the
third largest employer in the state, which, like many leading firms in Kentucky,
was convinced that education reform was a precondition to attracting and retain-
ing high quality employees. 30 1
In November 1984, the Prichard Committee-with the help of local PTAs,
chambers of commerce, chapters of the League of Women Voters and similar
organizations--organized a statewide meeting. Nearly 20,000 participants in
"town forums" at 178 school districts observed a brief introductory broadcast by
satellite on the state's educational television channel, then proceeded to discuss
their own situation.30 2 The upshot was that fifty sites formed organizations to
urge reform of their home school districts. 30 3 The parent body continued to
support these county Prichard Committees, as they were often called, hiring a
consulting firm to assist the local committees in designing and conducting six
regional workshops on themes such as running meetings and organizing support
for school reform. 30 4 Both the statewide and local committees disseminated data
298. See Shafter & Greenawalt, supra note 291, at 3 (discussing interview with Sexton). See
THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE, supra note 297, at xiii.
299. See THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE, supra note 297, at viii.
300. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 489-90.
301. See id. at 490-91 ("The business community offered a quid pro quo: if Kentucky policy
makers and educators would seriously and substantially reinvent schools and make public educa-
tion accountable for its results, business would support them and pay the resulting higher taxes.");
THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE, supra note 297, at xi (listing contributors).
302. Hunter, supra note 101, at 492. See Michael Jennings, Citizens' Group to Hold Forum
on Education Via Satellite, LOUISVILLE COURIER-i., Nov. 3, 1989, at B4.
303. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 492.
304. Molly Hunter writes:
The Prichard Committee viewed its role at the forum as listening, not promoting any
particular point of view. Local citizens were trained to facilitate participation at the
town forum sites. The forum revealed that Kentucky citizens placed a high priority on
education and provided an early step toward a grassroots mandate for change. Years
later, the Prichard Committee reflected on the forum as having set the pattern and
tone--"open citizen dialogue and active citizen involvement"-that characterized its
subsequent work.
Id. Robert Sexton, Executive Director of the Prichard Committee since its inception in 1983,
explained that early on the Committee realized that it would never have the resources to directly
influence the Kentucky political process and would have to leverage its position by encouraging
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to citizens who distrusted information supplied by the state department of
education. Thus was created a new forum for debate in communities where the
school board, often the county's largest employer, could be an intimidating
presence. 30 5
As these local discussions proceeded, subcommittees of the statewide body
(now expanded from thirty to sixty members) were studying specialized topics.
Their work culminated in the publication in 1985 of The Path to a Larger Life:
Creating Kentucky's Educational Future,306 a 150-page report discussing educa-
tional goals and curriculum, school governance and assessment, school finance,
vocational education, and the teaching profession. Its eighty-two recommen-
dations ranged from comprehensive professional development for teachers to
outcome measures of student learning.
The report is an extraordinary document. Drawing explicitly on contem-
porary management literature, 30 7 the report saw the central challenge for the
reform of schools in Kentucky as "the creation of a flexible institutional climate
in which creativity and innovation can flourish. 3°8 The difficulty, they realized,
was the tension between the need for local initiative and a potentially
contradictory need for uniformity and accountability at the state level. Their
formulation of the problem points the way towards the organizational solution
we have been discussing in this Article:
On one hand reformers agree that the key to long-term educational
change is in the active and informed engagement of local people with
their local schools. The quality of local schools reflects the value local
people place on education: a concerned an involved community can
have good schools; an apathetic community, where education is not
valued will not.
On the other hand, authority at the state level is increasing
dramatically. In Kentucky and across the nation a push for reform is
coming from governors, state legislators, and state superintendents. As
local activism. Schafter & Greenawalt, supra note 291, at 2-5 & n.9 (discussing interview with
Sexton).
305. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 494:
One of the keys to the Prichard Committee's success was broad dissemination of
information to interested people across the state, with the express purpose of enabling
recipients to speak up in their communities. The committee provided information to
local participants, who felt they could not rely on the state department of education
because it was too politicized. For citizens in school districts where school boards were
the largest employers in the county, the committee served as an important source of
"courage" to get involved. By offering information, training sessions, and a vision of
local citizen groups coming together to solve problems and improve their schools, the
committee, along with business, the media, and other groups, stimulated public
engagement about education throughout the state.
306. THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE, supra note 297.
307. See id. at 41, 47 n.1 (citing ROSABETH Moss KANTER, THE CHANGE MASTERS (1983)).
308. Id. at 41.
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the public demands "accountability" and as state leadership responds,
the authority of the state increases. This leadership at the state level is
essential, but where does it lead? Will it ultimately weaken or
strengthen the interest of local people in the quality of their own
schools?
We believe that the state has a clear responsibility to establish
expectations and goals. It also has a clear responsibility to protect the
public, to ensure quality and to initiate reforms which cannot, or will
not, be completed at the local level. But we also believe that state
reforms should be judged by their ultimate effects on local students and
schools and school districts. Likewise, all state-level reform should, as
its ultimate goal, encourage responsibility and accountability at the
district and school levels. To accomplish this, state policies must help
local taxpayers, parents, and students make sound judgments about
their schools; must encourage local interest in good schools; and must
give local school leadership the flexibility to seek state-defined goals
through creative and innovative means.30 9
Perhaps more surprising, in a period dominated by A Nation at Risk and the
corresponding bare-bones, often punitive measurement of minimal acceptable
performance, 310 the report insisted that measures of schools should be "designed
for use by people who are analyzing and evaluating their local schools," 311 and
suggested that the Prichard Committee might itself assist with the "dissemination
of reports from selected districts so that other districts might see how an
evaluation document is prepared.- 312 The report also urged the State Board of
Education and the State Department of Education to include indicators of school
performance in their annual reports. 3 13 A fifteen-page appendix listed measures
that registered the achievements of individual students as well as the capacities
of a school's organization, including the ability to evaluate itself on many
dimensions. 314 The State Board of Education was to take responsibility for
establishing measures, then collecting and analyzing data and reporting results to
the public. 315 Similarly, professional development (the topic with which A Path
to a Larger Life begins) was to be used to simultaneously encourage local
learning and broader exchanges of experience. 316 In its concluding chapter on
309. See id. at 42-43 (quoting AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL STUDIES ASS'N, PRIDE AND PROMISE:
SCHOOLS OF EXCELLENCE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE, quoted in EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 24, 1984).
310. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
311. THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE, supra note 297, at 67.
312. Id. at 68.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 119-35.
315. See id. at 134.
316. See id. at 1-20. Each local school district, the report suggested, should involve teachers,
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school finance, the report emphasized that its recommendations for improving
Kentucky education could not be implemented without a tax increase. 317
Also in 1985, sixty-six poor rural school districts incorporated the Council
for Better Education to bring a lawsuit seeking increased state financial support
for their schools. 318 A former governor and member of the Prichard Committee,
Bert Combs, became lead counsel to the new entity pro bono, and in November
of that year filed the suit that later became known as Rose v. Council for Better
Education.319 The Prichard Committee and the Council collaborated closely in
the presentation of the case. Committee staff testified at the 1987 trial, members
and staff reviewed the Council's briefs before they were filed, and the Prichard
Committee formally filed an amicus curiae brief focused on the need for edu-
cation and governance reform in addition to the finance reform demanded by the
plaintiffs.32 °
By 1988, even the educational insiders had rallied to the new movement. A
demonstration by a statewide teacher professional organization, the Kentucky
Education Association, insisting on more money for schools, attracted tens of
thousands. In that same year, the leading education interest groups in the state
joined with representatives of business, churches and advocacy groups to form
an Education Coalition to speak with one voice to the public and the state
legislature. 32 1
principals, administrative staff, support staff and school board members in developing a compre-
hensive plan for the "continuous professional growth for its teachers and staffs." Id. at 8. To help
implement these plans, districts were encouraged to create "professional development centers" or
"teacher centers" where teachers could share ideas or develop new curricula. See id. at 9, 34.
Teacher certification, promotion and evaluation were all to be linked to the proposed system of
continuous further education. See id. at 1-20. Professional development was deliberately
conceptualized as a mechanism for anticipating and avoiding the obvious political obstacles to
school reform by reducing the likelihood of what the report called "a divisive and destructive
confrontation" between entrenched professionals and a reform-minded public:
We are concerned about the possibility of a divisive and destructive confrontation
between the teaching profession and the public. This confrontation has occurred in
other states where legislators and teachers have battled over teacher evaluation, merit
pay, competency testing, and career ladders. In the most divisive cases, determined
elected officials confront equally determined, organized teachers who close their minds
to valid improvements. As a result, public attitudes in some states have become more
hardened and more negative. The profession of teaching, the children, and the public all
suffer from such confrontations.
Id. at 10-11.
317. The study allocated blame for insufficient funding of the state school system between
local governments that "abdicated their responsibility for financing local schools by their reliance
on state funding," and the state government which "provides too low a level of support to public
education." Id. at 112-13. The report set out a detailed plan to remedy both deficiencies by
providing more equal funding to school districts at a level compatible with the proposed reforms.
See id at 113-15.
318. See id.
319. See id.; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
320. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 494-95.
321. See id
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In a sense, the ensuing events-a sweeping state supreme court decision in
the Rose case declaring the state's entire school system unconstitutional,322 and
the state legislature's passage in record time of the Kentucky Educational
Reform Act ("KERA"), the most comprehensive reform of education in the
nation323-are anti-climactic. Having realigned the interest groups, reshaped
public opinion, mobilized local communities and experts from a variety of
professions and provided an extensive framework for reform, the Prichard
Committee's work set the course for the restructuring of Kentucky's schools.
Above all, the fusion of equity and adequacy arguments via accountability that
had emerged only at the end of the story in Texas but marked the work of the
Prichard Commission from the beginning, put a decisive stamp on the court's
decision in Rose324 and then on the reforms codified in KERA. 325
In Rose, the supreme court interpreted the Kentucky Constitution's directive
to the state legislature to provide an "efficient" public education 326 to require an
"adequate" one. By a chain of logic familiar from Texas, the court associated
adequacy with seven general but ambitious student outcomes or "capacities. '" 32
7
It then defined the level of funding the legislature was obliged to provide in
terms of its definition of adequacy: "The General Assembly shall provide
funding which is sufficient to provide each child in Kentucky an adequate
education.... An adequate education is one which has as its goal the develop-
ment of the seven capacities recited previously. '" 328
322. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186.
323. 1990 Ky. Acts 476 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 156.005-156.990 (Michie
1999)); Edward B. Fiske, Starting Over, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at 34 (KERA is "the most
comprehensive school reform package ever enacted by a state legislature.").
324. See Shafter & Greenawalt, supra note 291, at 9 (reporting view of Prichard Committee
director Sexton that by the time of the Rose decision, a statewide consensus existed on the
desirability of wholesale reform along the lines proposed by The Path to a Larger Life).
325. See infra notes 334-51 and accompanying text.
326. Ky. CONST. § 183 ("The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for
an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.").
327. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197, 212. According to the decision,
an efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every child
with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communi-
cation skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civi-
lization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable
the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her com-
munity, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student
to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or
preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable
each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of
academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably
with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Id.
328. Id.
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The legislature's swift translation of the Rose decision into a comprehensive
educational reform was a foregone conclusion. Both the statewide and local
Prichard Committees had lobbied the legislature for years. 329 Public opinion was
broadly sympathetic to the conclusions of The Path to a Larger Life, including
particularly a tax increase to support school improvement. 330 The court's
opinion in Rose in any case left little room for temporizing or evasion.
KERA proposed to meet the adequacy standard set out in Rose by
implementing the changes in governance, professional development, and accoun-
tability suggested by the Prichard Committee in The Path to a Larger Life. But
KERA also reinforced the alliance between outside educational reformers,
forward-thinking politicians, and the business community that had coalesced
around the Prichard Committee. For instance, in 1991, the CEOs of three major
Kentucky employers formed the Partnership for Kentucky Schools, a non-
partisan coalition dedicated to promoting public support for implementation of
the education reform and to providing technical expertise when necessary to fill
gaps left by other institutions. 33 1 As we will see next, however, through their
very assertiveness, reinforced no doubt by their lingering mistrust of public
bureaucracies, these new alliances and their flanking institutions stifled and
retarded the transformation of existing institutions, particularly the Kentucky
Department of Education, into an effective infrastructure for local school
initiatives and for periodic revision of the framework standards for the education
system as a whole.
2. Operation
Whatever the eventual limits of the reform design, the sheer audacity of the
Kentucky legislature in adopting KERA is impressive. KERA includes a list of
broad educational goals defining generally what graduates should know and be
able to do,332 an assessment process to determine if students achieve these goals,
a system for holding schools accountable for student success, a system of school-
based management by which parents, teachers and administrators can reshape
329. "Without exception, stakeholders credited the [Prichard] Committee with being the
catalyst for elementary and secondary school reform in the state." JACOB E. ADAMS, JR., THE
PRICHARD COMMITTEE FOR ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE: CREDIBLE ADVOCACY FOR KENTUCKY
SCHOOLS 30 (1993).
330. See Carol Marie Cropper, Business Group Calls for Higher Taxes, LOUiSVILLE
COURIER-J., Dec. 21, 1988; Dick Kaukas, Bluegrass State Poll; 2 Out of 3 Would Pay Higher State
Taxes for Better Schools, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Dec. 4, 1988; THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE, supra
note 297, at xxiv n.1 (noting that between 1983 and 1989, statewide polls registered a rise from
forty-nine percent to sixty-seven percent in public support for a tax increase "to raise money for
schools"); supra notes 303-305 and accompanying text.
331. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 501.
332. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.6451 (Michie 1999). For example, the Act requires that
schools develop their students' ability to "become self-sufficient individuals" and to "apply core
concepts and principles from mathematics, the sciences, the arts, the humanities, social studies, and
practical living studies to situations they will encounter throughout their lives." Id.
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schools to meet this responsibility, 333 a vast increase in funding for professional
development so educators can make corresponding efforts, a new system for
credentialing teachers to certify that they are meeting their responsibilities, early
childhood programs and special needs programs to assure that pupils can take
maximum advantage of the new educational opportunities, a system for
equalizing school funding among districts, and a design for transforming the
state's educational agency into a competent provider of technical services rather
than a rule-maker.334
But neither the system of school-based management, nor the new system of
testing and assessment, nor the reconstruction of the State Department of Edu-
cation functioned as hoped. And as difficulties with each of these endeavors
reverberated with problems in the others, the legislature-acting in part through
its own Office of Educational Accountability, which was created by KERA335 -
intensified its oversight, periodically changing the framework of the state's edu-
cation system in ways that obstructed the kind of mutually supportive reforms by
actors outside the government that emerged in Texas.
Consider first the local building blocks of KERA, the Site Based
Management Councils ("SMBCs"). These councils are composed of the school
principal, three teachers elected by their colleagues, and two parents elected by
their peers. Within broad guidelines set by the state, the councils can fix policies
concerning curriculum, textbooks, teaching practices, staff hiring and assign-
ments (including hiring of the principal when there is a vacancy), discipline,
extracurricular programs and the school budget. 336 All SBMC meetings are
public. As of October 1997, 1032 of Kentucky's roughly 1300 elementary and
secondary schools had established SBMCs, and many of the others (including a
number of high-performing schools) were exempt from the requirement.337
Studies of participation in and the effectiveness of Kentucky's SBMCs
suggest substantial difficulties in making the new institutions work. 338 Initial
333. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.345 (Michie 1999).
334. See THOMAS B. CORCORAN & BARBARA S. MATSON, A CASE STUDY OF KENTUCKY'S SSI
(PRISM), 1992-1997, 1-13 (1998); Hunter, supra note 101, at 499-504. The legislature sub-
sequently augmented this accountability scheme by requiring schools and districts to make and
report their progress on closing the gap in test scores between white and African-American chil-
dren. See infra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
335. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7.4 10 (Michie 1999) (establishing the Office of Educational
Accountability).
336. See Hunter, supra note 101, at 500. See also Bd. of Educ. v. Bushee, 889 S.W.2d 809,
812 (Ky. 1994) ("The essential strategic point of KERA is the decentralization of decision making
authority so as to involve all participants in the school system, affording each the opportunity to
contribute actively to the educational process. The remaining statutory provisions set out the
structural framework by which this decentralization of decision making authority is to occur.").
337. See ROGER PANKRATZ ET AL., THE KENTUCKY INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION RESEARCH: THE
1996 REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON KERA 5 (1997); Beverly M. Klecker et al., An In-Depth Analysis of
Decisions Made by Kentucky's School Based Decision-Making Councils, 120 EDuc. 655, 657
(2000).
338. See, e.g., Alison A. Carr, The Participation Race: Kentucky's Site Based Decision
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turnout rates for parents eligible to vote in the council elections were disas-
trously low (on the order of 4% in 1992) but increased quickly (to 22% by
1993).339 Participation by minority parents remained disproportionately low and
those minorities who have taken part have reported difficulties in making their
voices heard. 340 Lacking the budgetary expertise and general managerial skills to
deal with their new responsibilities, the SBMCs typically focused on secondary
matters such as questions of discipline or particular and restricted areas of the
budget.34 1 As the Prichard Committee bluntly put it, "[t]oo many school councils
have not recognized their independence or the expectation that they will redesign
curriculum and improve teaching to increase student learning."
342
There are some signs, however, that the SBMCs may prove capable of
improvement. The changes inaugurated by KERA have made decisions at the
local level dramatically more transparent, and some SBMCs are finding innova-
tive ways of using the possibilities for exercising influence that result.343 Public
disaggregation of budgets to the school and district level, for example, revealed
the incoherent, almost incomprehensible allocation of funds through countless
small decisions over the years and how much additional discussion and training
will therefore be required on all sides to get the situation in hand.344 In part the
new expertise is being supplied by the Kentucky Department of Education
("KDE"), and in part by entrepreneurial efforts of the school councils them-
selves, which in some places have joined together to form district-wide
"Councils of Councils" to pool information and to press their respective school
Teams, THE SCH. COMMUNITY J., Fall-Winter 1996, at 27; Jane L. David, School-Based Decision
Making: Kentucky's Test of Decentralization, 76 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 706-12 (1994); Klecker et
al., supra note 337, at 664-65; ALAN J. DEYOUNG, PARENT PARTICIPATION, SCHOOL ACCOUNTA-
BILITY AND RURAL EDUCATION: THE IMPACT OF KERA ON KENTUCKY SCHOOL FACILITIES POLICY
(1998), at http://www.ruraledu.org/keepleaming.cfm?record no= 135; GAINING GROUND, supra
note 99, at 9.
339. See David, supra note 338, at 707.
340. See Carr, supra note 338, at 36-38.
341. See David, supra note 338, at 707.
342. See GAINING GROUND, supra note 99, at 9. See also Klecker et al., supra note 337, at
664-65:
Summary of Findings
1. Most members of the Councils were relatively inexperienced as Council members.
Ninety-seven percent of the parents, 90% of the teachers, and 55% of the principals had
three or fewer years of Council experience.
2. Councils in this study made many more decisions in the categories of budget,
Council procedures, and personnel consultation than in the nine areas in which KRS
160.345 requires them to have policies.
3. Large differences in the number of decisions and in the number of meetings were
indicated by the minutes.
4. The number of curriculum decisions was statistically significantly lower in the
elementary schools than in the middle and high schools.
5. The mean number of decisions about discipline was statistically significantly higher
for high schools than for elementary schools....
343. See David, supra note 338, at 708.
344. Id. at 710.
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districts on questions of concern. 345 A statewide Association of School Councils
was also created to supplement the KDE's training and technical assistance for
local councils.346 In the same vein, a comparison of decisions to close small
rural schools for purposes of consolidation before and after the passage of
KERA found that post-KERA, a profusion of grass roots initiatives used both the
new institutional structures and the information on school performance that they
provided to challenge bureaucratic decisions that would have been unassailable
under the old regime. 347
These difficulties might have been compensated for or corrected had the
KDE been reorganized to provide substantial support to restructuring schools
and districts. But although something of this sort was contemplated in KERA,
there is little evidence that the legislative hope was realized. Traditionally, the
KDE, like the Texas Education Agency before reform there, had controlled the
minutiae of schooling, for example, imposing a rigid daily schedule for elemen-
tary schools that determined precisely how students would spend their hours in
school.348 As contemplated by KERA, the KDE was instead supposed to
coordinate evaluations of school performance and to help districts and schools
improve their standing in the light of this information. 349
Such at any rate is the legislative mandate. On the evidence available to
date, it is unclear whether the reconstituted KDE is in fact providing the new
services required of it. 350 Indeed, much of its activity seems directed towards
compiling manuals and other instructional aids telling the actors in the KERA
school system how to comply with their new responsibilities. Whether these
345. Id.
346. See Kentucky Association of School Councils website, at http://www.kasc.net/
what.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
347. DEYOUNG, supra note 338.
348. See Holly Holland, KERA: A Tale of One Teacher, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 265 (1997).
349. Thus, KERA explicitly assigns the KDE responsibility for providing "technical
assistance with curriculum design, school administration ... finance ... [and] professional
development," KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 156.010(1)(a) (Michie 1999); for conducting "research and
planning, which shall include, but shall not be limited to, a statewide research and development
effort to identify or develop the best education practices," § 156.010(1)(c); and for implementing a
school accountability system. Assistance in these areas is provided through eight regional service
centers. As in Texas, this shift from bureaucratic supervision to the disciplined coordination of
local initiative broadly conceived went hand in hand with a reduction in the size of the central
department's staff and a substantial trimming of the rule books. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
156.005-156.990 (Michie 1999); KYNA KOCH & TOM WILLIS, KENTUCKY DEP'T OF EDUC. &
KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, THE KENTUCKY EDUCATION REFORM ACT OF 1990: A
REVIEW OF THE FIRST BIENNIUM iv (1993); Hunter, supra note 101, at 500.
350. For relevant evaluations, see HILDA BORKO ET AL., PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A KEY
TO KENTUCKY'S REFORM EFFORT (Ctr. for the Study of Evaluation, Technical Rep. 512, 1999);
CORCORAN & MATSON, supra note 334; KENNETH J. HENRY ET AL., A STUDY OF PERCEPTIONS OF
THE KENTUCKY DISTINGUISHED EDUCATOR PROGRAM (Ky. Office of Educ. Accountability, 1997);
PANKRATZ ET AL., supra note 337; BRIAN M. STECHER & SHEILA I. BARRON, QUADRENNIAL
MILEPOST: ACCOUNTABILITY TESTING IN KENTUCKY (Ctr. for the Study of Evaluation, Technical
Rep. 505, 1999); Education Reform in Rural Kentucky, 7 NOTES FROM THE FIELD 1 (2000),
available at http://www.ael.org/rel/policy/note2OOO.htm.
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rules for exercising initiative amount in fact to a reversion to older authoritative
rulemaking or are simply beside the point remains to be seen. Moreover, as a
glance at the emergent accountability system shows, there are reasons to think
that the legislature's active oversight of the reformed system may be obstructing
an effective reconstitution of the KDE in its new facilitative role.
These problems locally and at the center have been compounded by the
vicissitudes of Kentucky's accountability system. As originally conceived, the
Kentucky Instructional Results Information System ("KIRIS") was distinctive,
perhaps unique, in the extent to which it used diagnostic standards connected to
portfolio assessments. 351 Under KIRIS, the aggregate results of these elaborate
student performance assessments, supplemented by data on attendance and
graduation rates, generated a composite School Quality Index for each school.
The best performing schools were eligible for monetary rewards. Schools with
index scores of less than 100 (the level obtained by students deemed "pro-
ficient") had to set improvement targets that would theoretically allow them to
close the gap in a fixed time. In addition, schools "in decline" (because less than
5% of the school's student body is improving at the desired rate) or "in crisis"
(because of their very low baseline scores) were exposed to yet more thorough-
going review.
KIRIS was criticized by the General Assembly's Office of Educational
Accountability, among others, because authentic tests did not allow the com-
petence of the state's pupils to be conveniently compared to that of students
nation- and worldwide. Moreover, the baseline index and improvement goals
under KIRIS were reset every two years so that each school would nominally
progress at an adequate rate toward (and beyond) the "proficient" score of 100.
This disrupted curricula and long-term institutional planning.
In response to these and related problems, the General Assembly decided in
1998 to establish a new accountability system, the Commonwealth Achievement
Testing System ("CATS"). Under CATS, performance-based assessment is
mixed with multiple choice tests that are easier to administer and allow better
comparison of Kentucky students to those elsewhere.352 The legislature ad-
dressed the problem of disrupted expectations by freezing the baseline index for
each school at a point derived from its test scores between 1998 and 2000 and
obliging each school to improve beyond this level at a constant annual rate that
enables it to reach a quality index score of at least 100 by the year 2014.353 The
351. See Massell et al., supra note 124, at 30-31 (discussing "performance-based" or
"authentic" assessments under KIRIS); supra note 139 and accompanying text and supra notes
132, 166, and 214 and accompanying text (discussing portfolio-based assessment techniques).
352. The move from KIRIS to CATS is discussed in Massell et al., supra note 124, at 27. In
the education literature, tests scored by reference to performance in relation to others in the same
testing pool, rather than in relation to an absolute standard of knowledge, are referred to as "norm-
referenced." Tests geared to an absolute standard of knowledge are "criterion referenced."
353. 703 Ky. ADMrN. REG. 5:020, 5:060 (2002). See also Strecher & Barron, supra note 350,
at 6 (CATS "uses milepost testing [testing at prescribed grades, rather than continuous evaluation]
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legislature also expanded the oversight mechanism. The legislature's own Office
of Educational Accountability continues as a monitor of the revised act. But it is
joined by a new permanent entity, the Education Assessment and Accountability
Review Subcommittee of the Legislative Research Committee,354 whose eight
members from the General Assembly review implementation of CATS for the
state Board of Education.3
55
It might be that with these reforms, the Kentucky legislature has struck the
right balance between local initiative, facilitative administrative coordination and
political oversight. In that case, active and informed SMBCs, together with
teachers and other educational professionals 356 working within the improved
assessment system could develop the improved curricula and individual school
reform projects. Low performing schools would benefit from consultation with
experienced practitioners through the "Distinguished Educators" program357-
Kentucky's version of Texas's School Improvement Initiative. 358 The result
would be just the kind of bottom-up comprehensive reform of the education
system within a broadly conceived and democratically certified framework that
was anticipated by KERA and before it by the Prichard Committee and the Rose
decision. 359 In giving priority to reform of assessment instruments, KERA and
CATS could be said to be creating just the kind of general background
to see how schools react to accountability pressures"). Under CATS, the best-performing schools
again are rewarded; schools improving at eighty percent or more of their projected rate are
essentially left to their own devices; and schools performing less well are exposed to heightened
scrutiny, including consultation with participants in the state's Highly Skilled Educators program
and/or a comprehensive audit by a team appointed by the State Board of Education and charged
with working with the troubled school to identify improvement strategies. See CORCORAN &
MATSON, supra note 334, at 5; THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE, A PARENT/CITIZEN GUIDE FOR 1999-
2000 6 (2000); Massell et al., supra note 124, at 6-8.
354. See KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF EDUCATION ACCOUNTABILITY, 1998
ANNUAL REP. 16-26 (1998).
355. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 156.029, 156.070, 156.148, 156.156-60 (Michie 1999).
356. In regard to professional development programs, see, for example, BORKO, supra note
350; PANKRATZ ET AL., supra note 337, at 5 ("Support for professional development has increased
from $1 per student in 1991 to $23 per student in 1996.").
357. See HENRY ET AL., supra note 350 (evaluating Distinguished Educators Program).
358. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
359. KERA prohibited the KDE from developing a statewide curriculum. Instead, individual
schools were expected to develop their own curricula based on six goals and seventy-five (later
reduced to fifty-seven) "valued outcomes." Schools found these outcome standards too general to
provide sufficient guidance, opening the way for development of a curricular framework in each of
the core areas by committees of teachers and college professors in 1992-1993. This integrated K-
12 framework was published as a two-volume document in 1993. See KY. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
TRANSFORMATIONS: KENTUCKY'S CURRICULUM FRAMEWORK (1993), available at
http://www.kde.state.ky.us/oapd/curric/Publications/Transformations/trans.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2003). But this document has not in fact provided much guidance for aligning classroom
practice to KIRIS assessments. See CORCORAN & MADSON, supra note 334, at 6. In sum, while
prohibiting the KDE from repeating old mistakes with rigid rules, KERA failed to build a new
state-level administration to facilitate local innovation and the realization of the legislature's
general goals and valued outcomes.
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conditions that encourage successful institutional innovation without pretending
to direct it.
Better still, in amassing expertise and continuously monitoring the behavior
of the primary reform actors, the Kentucky legislature might be coming to
resemble nothing so much as the ideal activist court, transforming American
institutions, schools included, through the dictates of the Constitution in the
manner imagined by litigation-minded reformers since Brown v. Board of
Education. Indeed, by identifying itself so thoroughly with the Rose court's
goals that it has itself become a court with respect to administering the remedy,
the legislature might be in the midst of developing an innovative solution to the
classic American Legal Process question: Which branch decides? 360 Instead of
forcing a choice between the deliberative advantages of the judiciary and the
democratic legitimacy of the legislature, the Kentucky solution suggests a way
of combining both in a democratically renewed assembly protected from the
everyday play of self-serving interests by virtue of association with the court and
constitutional principle.
But a contrary interpretation, at least as plausible, sees these developments
as an obstacle to reform, not its culmination. In increasing its oversight
capacities in response to each wave of difficulties in implementing its original
conception, the legislature might be thwarting itself. It might, in addition, be
revealing a hidden weakness in the original Prichard strategy for reform and,
beyond that, in the "activist court" strategy of institutional reform. The danger is
that the legislature through the Office of Educational Accountability, the Educa-
tion Assessment and Accountability Review Subcommittee, and the National
Technical Advisory Panel on Assessment and Accountability comes to use its
augmented oversight authority to itself make the kind of inflexible rules that
previously doomed the KDE and, on the other hand, that seem to be avoided by
the hybrid of court, legislature and administration that we observed in Texas. 361
From this perspective, the Kentucky reform may bear the marks and suffer
the limitations of the early 1980s emphasis, associated with A Nation at Risk, on
standards as necessary and sufficient incentive mechanisms. In this conception,
institutions--classrooms, schools, districts-are more a sideshow than places for
elaborating successful solutions to educational problems. What counts are
parents, pupils, teachers and school leaders, and the incentives and disincentives
for learning that systems of assessment and accountability create for them. The
paradox of this second perspective is that standards are of such central impor-
tance that defining and redefining them-as in the move from KIRIS to CATS
and the increasing legislative oversight associated with it-becomes a politically
charged exercise in something akin to old-style rulemaking: an effort by the
center to amass all the information and interests relevant to solving a problem
360. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; infra notes 410-11 and accompanying
text.
361. See SABEL & SIMON, supra note 23.
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and then, based on this apparently panoptic knowledge, to fix rules for local
actors.
In the current fluctuating situation, both interpretations of Kentucky's
experience are plausible. But recent developments weigh in favor of this latter,
more pessimistic interpretation, while also suggesting that the Kentucky system
may offer the means for remedying its own deficiencies. One indication of the
internal obstructions in the new institutional machinery is the inability, noted
above, of the SMBCs to take advantage of their possibilities to reorganize
schools. Another indication of organizational blockage is the halting progress of
the "Distinguished Educator" program. This program is intended to take highly
skilled teachers, provide them with intensive professional development, then find
a use for their expertise in helping turn around troubled schools in their home
districts. But a recent survey of 110 teachers who participated in the program
between 1994 and 2000 found that a majority of them could not find appropriate
jobs in their home districts. Many were frustrated enough to switch districts,
leave the public schools, or take teaching jobs in neighboring states. 362
According to alumni of the program, "the trouble often lies with administrators
who are unwilling to alter the school culture to make use of teachers' leadership
and expertise."3 63 The inability of Kentucky districts to make effective use of
teachers whom they themselves regard as extraordinary and in whom the state
has invested substantial resources strongly suggests a low upper bound on the
extent of classroom-level reform in the Kentucky system.
Perhaps the clearest sign of the shortcomings of the current system, but also
of its reformability, was the creation in 1999 of the Jefferson County Community
Accountability Team to look into the cause of and help correct the persistent
achievement gap between white and black, male and female, and rich and poor
students in Louisville and its suburbs.3 64 Founded with the help of the Prichard
362. See Julie Blair, In Kentucky, Master Teachers Find They Can't Go Home Again, EDUC.
WEEK, May 30, 2001, at 19. For a discussion of earlier difficulties encountered by the Distin-
guished Educator Program, see HENRY ET AL., supra note 350, at iv ("Many Distinguished
Educators were asked to serve too many schools, creating a situation in which the Distinguished
Educators may have had too little time to develop a full understanding of the unique characteristics
of the schools they served.").
In regard to outcomes, Kentucky is one of three states that shows statistically significant
progress on NAEP grade 4 reading assessments and grade 8 mathematics assessments. But there is
no robust evidence of sustained comprehensive district-level improvement of the sort seen in
Texas and North Carolina. Compare GAINING GROUND, supra note 99, at 16 with supra notes 215,
274-81 and accompanying text (discussing Texas and North Carolina).
363. See Blair, supra note 362, at 19.
364. See Anne T. Henderson & Beverly Raimondo, Citizens Tackle School District's
Achievement Gap, NAT'L MIDDLE SCH. Ass'N'S MIDDLE GROUND MAG., Feb. 2002, at 22; EVERY
CHILD COUNTS: RAISING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE GRADES, A REPORT FROM THE
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM (2001), available at http://www.cipl.org
/pubs/cat/everychild.pdf; Press Release, The Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence,
Every Child Counts: CAT Team Releases Report on Jefferson County Middle Schools (Jan. 18,
2001), available at http://www.prichardcommittee.org/news/010118catreport.html; THE PRICHARD
COMMITTEE FOR ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE, 2000-2001 BIENNIAL REPORT 6, available at
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Committee and with financial support from the Edna McConnell Clark Foun-
dation, the team was composed of parents, community volunteers, Prichard
Committee members and business leaders. Its core members were graduates of
the Commonwealth Institute for Parent Leadership, an institution created two
years earlier by the Prichard Committee to train selected parents and community
activists statewide in building partnerships with teachers and principals and
implementing educational reforms at the local level.
The Community Accountability Team used the accountability and assess-
ment framework created by KERA to undertake a sustained review of Jefferson
County middle schools. First, disaggregating the district's achievement data in a
way that is routine in high-performing Texas districts, the accountability team
discovered dramatic disparities in the performance of subpopulations that pre-
viously had gone little remarked in a district where aggregate achievement
compares favorably with that in other large urban school systems. Next, the
outside team undertook a shadowing study of five representative middle schools
(the level where the gaps were greatest) to uncover the reasons for the
differences in performance-again using a kind of comparative assessment of
school practices that is routine in robustly improving districts in New York City
and Texas. Their key recommendations were to refocus staff development so that
teachers can develop lessons linked to engaging standards and to provide more
individualized instruction-structures and principles, once again, that are
regarded as fundamental in New York City's District 2 and the successful Texas
districts. 365
An upshot of the committee's work was the passage in 2002 of a law
requiring the KDE to provide every school council in the state (or principal if
there is no council) data on student performance on statewide tests that is
disaggregated by race, sex, and economic status. 366 In turn, the school-based
councils (or principals) are required to involve parents, faculty and staff in
setting biennial targets for eliminating achievement gaps and to review and
adjust these plans as needed. This measure does Texas one better by making the
data-driven reduction of achievement gaps a central focus of school organization
and assessment.367
http://www.cipl.org/pubs/report2000-2001 .pdf.
365. For an evaluation of the Accountability Team's work, see ANNE C. LEWIS, THE
COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM IN LOUISVILLE: WAKING A SLEEPING GIANT (2002), available
at http://www.prichardcommittee.org/pubs/cat/sleepinggiant.pdf. This report was controversial
because, in the eyes of the Jefferson County School District, it unjustly accused officials of
tolerating disparate treatment in the past and did not credit them sufficiently for their extensive
collaboration with the outside accountability team. See Beverly Derington Moore & Sherry De
Marsh, Dissenting Commentary, in id app. 1 & app.2.
366. Act of April 9, 2002, ch. 302, 2002 Ky. Rev. Stat. R. Serv. 972 (Banks-Baldwin) (codi-
fied at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.649 (Michie Supp. 2002)).
367. Id. Leaders of the Prichard Committee had recognized the absence of racial
disaggregation of school outcomes within the Kentucky accountability system as a deficiency at
least since the late 1990s, based explicitly on a comparison with the Texas system. See Schafter &
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These developments are two-edged. On the one side, insofar as the KERA
framework was intended to create a self-sustaining mechanism of reform through
accountability, the formation of a citizen's committee to hold the Jefferson
County schools to account and to help them determine how to meet their
responsibilities is evidence that the reformed institutions are not working as
designed. On the other side, the extent to which the KERA framework
legitimated and facilitated sustained collaboration between a concerned public
and educational insiders suggests that the KERA framework could be in some
more extended sense self-correcting: It may encourage the formation of new
publics that can identify the deficiencies of current operations and equip them
with some of the tools for undertaking improvements. From this perspective, the
reorientation of the Prichard Commission from a state-level actor interested in
local affairs mainly to generate support for legislative reform to a catalyst of
truly local attempts at thoroughgoing reorganization may be a harbinger of a
fundamental redirection of the Kentucky model of reform from the outside in. As
we discuss below, this revised model might then provide a novel and effective
way to connect the professional movement for reform exemplified by New York
City's District 2 to the concerns of the broader public.
IV.
WHY THE NEW COLLECTIVE ACTION WORKS: SOME FIRST NOTES ON POLITICS
IN THE AGE OF NON-COURT-CENTRIC JUDICIAL REVIEW
The large reforms we have described in Texas and Kentucky affront deep-
seated assumptions about the possibilities of fundamental innovation in
advanced industrial societies. For many, skepticism about the possibility of
encompassing reform is rooted in convictions about the difficulties of collective
action: Under many circumstances, it just doesn't pay for people to get involved
in struggles that might be of great benefit to their lives, or to make sure the
reformed institutions that result from successful battles continue to serve their
interests.
For some, particularly reform-minded lawyers, the legal system itself might
be an obstacle, independent of collective action problems. In Part I, we saw that
the courts have repeatedly failed as an Archimedean point from which to trans-
form the American school system. Is there reason to suppose that this new
reform cycle will be different, and that the courts will promote changes aimed at
achieving objectives that eluded school desegregation and finance equity cam-
paigns in the past?
A. New Publics?
In the standard logic of collective action, compact minorities use the
apparatus of democracy to extract such substantial benefits for themselves that
Greenawalt, supra note 291, at 29.
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the per capita share of the prospective bounty is sufficient to galvanize each
coalition member into action. 368 Diffuse majorities allow the public interest to be
hijacked in this way because the gains to each member of the opposition are
outweighed by the costs. 369 Thus understood, the selfish power of minorities is
often invoked by advocates of school privatization to explain why it is so hard to
reform large, public institutions, and why the few reforms that do succeed are so
often diverted from their original purpose.
370
The education reforms we have detailed suggest, perhaps unexpectedly, that
these arguments apply in reverse. When policies manifestly fail the public, the
resulting crisis opens the way to a new logic of collective action. In a slight
exaggeration (of the sort of which no stylization is innocent), this new collective
action transposes the roles assigned by the first. Robbed of any public legiti-
macy, entrenched interests are exposed as only self-seeking and can be pushed
aside by diffuse coalitions that can claim substantial resources for reform
projects in the name of the public good. This section sketches the conditions
under which such new publics can arise, contrasts them with familiar social
movements, and identifies two threats to which their very successes expose
them.
Typically, we saw, the new coalitions ally disaffected insiders from the old
system whose professionalism is deeply offended by the deterioration of
conditions with citizens and business groups dependent on the failing public
service and with political reformers whose larger agendas are validated by the
breakdown of the old system and the prospect of renewing it. Once this coalition
acquires an identity, however fragile, its very existence becomes a lightning rod
for widespread public dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in general
and at the failings of the insiders in particular. A profusion of grassroots
initiatives and mass manifestations of public interest in reform of the sorts noted
above in the discussions of Texas and Kentucky is the result. Enterprising
politicians are quick to put themselves ahead of a movement that might
otherwise turn against them. 3
7 1
As the case studies have shown, courts often play a crucial role in the
emergence of these new forms of collective action, and public advocates of
school reform through litigation have tried to turn this development to their
benefit. In New York, for example, the advocates in a fiscal equity suit are try-
368. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
369. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982). As a background condition, this logic presumes,
often implicitly, that the policies pursued by the concentrated minorities are also of some benefit to
the public at large. These "payoffs" form part of the calculus of consent by which dispersed
majorities acquiesce in policies that in some measure expropriate them. ADAM PRZEWORSKI,
CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1985).
370. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 12.
371. See supra notes 219-49, 298-333 and accompanying text.
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ing to assemble a coalition of dissident professionals and community-based
elements. Grassroots are built through a technique called "Public Engage-
ment." 372 The reformers organize many local "focus group discussions" of
school reform hosted by community-based organizations. 373 The results of the
discussion provide, in theory, a glimpse of authentic community sentiment
unperturbed by routinized partisan conflict and undistorted by the filtration of
issues and agendas through the media. Affiliation with a multitude of local host
organizations suggests a broad base of continuing institutional support. The New
York experience and others like it draw explicitly on the experience of the
Prichard Committee in Kentucky. 374 Following its example, the aim is to ensure
both that the legal remedy demanded in a fiscal equity suit against the state
meets the dual test of "public" and "expert" opinion and that it is more com-
pelling to the court and eventually the legislature because it does.375
These campaigns, of course, sometimes fail. In Alabama and Ohio, for
example, they have been checked by the established interests, acting in part
through familiar channels and in part using their own techniques of "public
engagement" to resist reform. 376 But looking across the country the reformers
read the evidence of recent debates on school reform, correctly we believe, as an
indication that the broad public will at least tolerate an assault on the established
interests; that the latter are on the defensive, though far from routed; and that
state supreme courts attuned to this shift in the political winds and attracted by
the collaborative institutional possibilities associated with the adequacy (as op-
372. See Jacqueline P. Danzberger & Will Friedman, 'Public Conversations About the
Public 's Schools': The Public Agenda/Institute for Educational Leadership Town Meeting Project,
78 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 744 (1997); Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engage-
ment: The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neal-and a Proposed Solution, 29 CoNN. L.
REv. 1115 (1997); Deborah Wadsworth, Building a Strategy for Successful Public Engagement, 78
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 749 (1997); Campaign For Fiscal Equity, The Courts and Public Engagement:
The New York Experience (Apr. 26, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU Review of
Law & Social Change); Michael Rebell, Public Engagement and the Courts: A Proposed
Constitutional Colloquy (April 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU Review of Law
& Social Change); Selected Readings Prepared for Conference on Public Engagement, Education
Reform and the Courts, (May 2000) (on file with NYU Review of Law & Social Change)
[hereinafter Selected Readings]. See also George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A
Federal Courts Perspective on State Court School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 543 (1994)
(arguing that state courts are more advisory and dialogic and less managerial than federal courts in
education reform setting); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE
L.J. 1763, 1771-72 (1993).
373. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Blueprint for Better Schools: Definition of a
Sound Basic Education; Statewide Fair Funding Principles; Principles for Effective Accounta-
bility, at app. (Fall 1999), in Selected Readings, supra note 372, at 166-69 (listing organizations
that participated in public engagement discussions in New York State during 1999).
374. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Studies in Judicial Remedies and Public Engagement,
in Selected Readings, supra note 372, at 189-99.
375. Rebell, supra note 372, at 110.
376. See Selected Readings, supra note 372, at 170-75, 204-10 (presenting summaries of
case studies of school reform debates in Alabama and Ohio, among other states).
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posed to equity) doctrine are open to change.377 Indeed, school reform plaintiffs
have prevailed in eighteen of twenty-eight of the relevant decisions in the highest
state courts since 1989.378 The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, we argue
below, will make defense of the legal status quo still more difficult, not least by
making school improvement a matter of urgent local concern across the
country. 37
9
The same constellation of dissident insiders and publicly-minded outsiders
has emerged in cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and Phila-
delphia in the absence of substantial intervention by courts and legislatures. In
these cities and in other settings besides, "civic-minded" reforms mobilized
hundreds of millions of dollars of philanthropy to change practices at the class-
room, school or district level, typically by fostering new forms of professional
development. 380
Because these initiatives quickly discovered the need to change framework
rules, if only to create free spaces within which to experiment, unperturbed, with
new solutions, they soon engaged in a form of political advocacy. In doing so,
they discovered the possibility of the new collective action.381 Because of their
dissatisfaction with existing hierarchies, and because their own initiatives
required them to operate across the boundaries of established institutions, they
quickly discovered as well the need to stabilize new forms of local participation
operating within the current school system but contributing by design to its
incremental transformation.382 These "private" reform movements often yield a
profusion of local innovation that dissipates for want of an encompassing
political and (new) administrative framework. They tend, therefore, to be more
fragile than the "public" reforms on which we have focused, but not funda-
mentally different in the constituencies they aim to mobilize.
377. See Rebell, supra note 372.
378. See Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy Litigation and the Quest for Equal
Educational Opportunity, in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: CONFERENCE
SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 228 n.54.
379. See infra notes 495-512 and accompanying text.
380. See Joseph P. McDonald et al., Agents of Reform: The Role and Function of
Intermediary Organizations in the Annenberg Challenge 4-6 (Apr. 27, 2000) (paper presented at
the Annual Meeting, American Educational Research Association, on file with NYU Review of
Law & Social Change). In describing the response to a $500 million Annenberg Challenge grant
for school reform at the municipal, regional and national levels, McDonald and his colleagues have
documented the emergence of a number of intermediary organizations funded by Annenberg and
other foundations to organize reform efforts in particular areas of the country. The authors found
that the organizations played one or more of "five distinct roles": champions of reform, educators,
political advocates, program developers and management coaches. See id. at 7-8. In addition to the
listed roles, however, the report provides evidence that nearly all of the organizations also
performed a sort of meta-function of continuously redefining the purposes and architecture of the
reforms being supported even as the reforms were being implemented, while using the initiatives'
results in the way of improved student outcomes as an important guide in this ongoing reconsider-
ation. See id. at 19-20.
381. See, e.g., id. at 8-10, 12-15.
382. See id. at 11-17.
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The similarities between these initiatives and the changes in Texas and
Kentucky were obscured by the "civic-minded" reformers' distrust of the public
school system and probably also the public school system's distrust of the
reformers. For roughly the first half of the last decade, the private organizations
operated independently of, and often in opposition to, what almost without re-
gard to the actual content and potential of the officially sponsored changes they
assumed were "policy-minded" or managerial efforts to patch the public school
system. 383 But as the substantive goals of large-scale public reform have come in
some leading cases to converge with the goals of the "private" initiatives, the
two strategies, and the possibilities for collective action on which they depend,
seem no longer to be alternatives but instead paths to the same end.
The case that deviates most from this pattern of alliance between insiders
and outsiders is New York City's District 2. There, we saw, professional culture
is so strong and buffered from the surrounding bureaucratic and political
environment, that it has been possible to create largely self-sustaining transfor-
mations under the leadership of reformist insiders. 384 But as the most thought-
fully admiring observers of these successes have recognized, they depend on
fortuitous inversions of the normal subordination of classroom activity to ad-
inistrative routine and interest group politics that typically dominate American
public schools. 385 Professional recrudescence may be a necessary condition of
reform, but only in extraordinary circumstances is it a sufficient one.
These new forms of collective action overlap with but are distinct from the
"new social movements." 386 The latter, originally conceived as the successors to
the Marxist proletariat, refer to emergent, potentially transformative, groupings
or identities not rooted in the division of labor.387 Feminism, the civil and human
rights movements, and the movement for gay rights are typical examples.
388
383. See id. at 4-5.
384. See supra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
385. See ELMORE, supra note 148, at 5-10. Put another way, although District 2-style
professional training of school leaders to make them the handmaidens of continuous reform of
classroom practice is almost certainly a necessary part of a reformed school system, it is unlikely
that it can be the sole fulcrum of reform given the isolation of most progressive professionals in the
current system.
386. See, e.g., HANSPETER KRIESI ET AL., NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE: A COMPARA-
TIVE ANALYSIS (1995); Steven M. Buechler, New Social Movement Theories, 36 Soc. Q. 441
(1995); Russell J. Dalton, Manfred Kuechler, & Wilhelm Burklin, The Challenge of New Move-
ments, in CHALLENGING THE POLITICAL ORDER: NEW SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 3-20 (Russell J. Dalton & Manfred Keuchler eds., 1990); Hank Johnston,
Enrique Larana & Joseph Gusfield, Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements, in id at
84-101; Gunnar Oloffson, After the Working-Class Movement? An Essay on What's 'New' and
What's 'Social' in the New Social Movements, 31 ACT SOCIOLOGICA 15 (1988); Nelson A.
Pichardo, New Social Movements: A Critical Review, 23 ANN. REV. OF Soc'Y 411 (1997).
387. See, e.g., SIDNEY G. TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTEN-
TIOUS POLITICS (2d ed. 1998).
388. See, e.g., Margit Mayer & Roland Roth, New Social Movements and the Transformation
to Post-Fordist Society, in CULTURAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 311 (Marcy Damovsky et
al. eds., 1995).
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Like these, the movement for school reform mobilizes citizens to disrupt estab-
lished patterns of authority in favor of an arguably more equitable alternative.
But unlike the new social movements, school reform does not emphasize
articulation and official recognition by the state of the identity of a distinctive
group. Nor does it aim to secure justice for its partisans or potential beneficiaries
by seeking statutory or constitutional protection for them against various, pre-
cisely delimited forms of discrimination or abuse. Rather, it aims to establish a
new form of participatory collaboration between citizens and the agencies of
government.
Compared to the typical new social movement, the movement for school
reform is less "militant" in the period when it is mobilizing citizens for change,
although it is far from docile. But over the long haul, the school reform move-
ment is more "activist" in the sense of encouraging, or even requiring, more
sustained participation in the ongoing operations of the reformed institutions. For
instance, the protest marches associated with the civil rights movement
intuitively embody a "higher" degree of mobilization than the statewide town
meetings organized by the Prichard Committee at the height of its public
agitation. But the new responsibilities of parents engaged, for instance, in local
improvement planning in response to a finding by the state that their children's
school has failed its pupils, or at least those of color, requires more sustained
engagement with the machinery of governance than does even a personally risky
visit by a person of color to a racially segregated department store or restaurant.
In the case of integration, persons formerly denied full enjoyment of their rights
of citizenship joined the established public. In the case of the new school
reforms, citizens broadly aggrieved by the performance of their institutions agree
to renew them, and some of their number assume special responsibilities for the
undertaking. 389
Whether or not the transformations of the personal identities of participants
and the allocation of authority to public and private entities caused by these new
reforms is more or less consequential than those achieved by the new social
389. Environmentalism is a kind of hybrid or halfway house between the new social move-
ments and the novel forms of civic engagement connected with school reform. On the one hand,
some parts of the environmental movement are closely akin to identity politics. For this kind of
environmentalist, the world is divided between those who will make sacrifices to protect nature
against human predation and those who, knowingly or not, profit from the despoilment of the
earth. On the other hand, a substantial part of the environmental movement combines public
protest with problem-solving collaboration among public authorities and private interest groups-
for example, in the restoration of complex habitats. See SABEL, FUNG & KARKKAINEN, supra note
23, at 3-9. The emergent school reform movement is akin to environmentalism in enjoying broad
support that cuts across many traditional political divisions. See, e.g., Angela B. Mertig & Riley E.
Dunlap, Environmentalism, New Social Movements, and the New Class: A Cross-National
Investigation, 66 RURAL SOC'Y 113 (2001). For a discussion of school desegregation, particularly
in certain multi-district contexts, as a form of political, not mainly educational reform, that also
locates the endeavor somewhere between the new social movements and the forms of civic
engagement sketched in this Article, see Liebman, supra note 29, at 1614-35; other sources cited
supra note 76.
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movements is open to question. But either way, it seems appropriate to conceive
of the new forms of collective action as constituting new publics-new and
arguably transformative forms of civic engagement that aim and have the power
to change both the decisions and the forms of decision-making of representative
democracy.
Assuming, as we do, that these new publics will frequently succeed in dis-
placing the established interests, they will themselves face at least three serious
threats. One is that the new coalition, having dislodged the old, is unable to put
any coherent regime in its place. The unintended effect of its success, therefore,
is to encourage a wildcat devolution of authority that gives fortunate localities
the freedom to prosper but offers no help to the unfortunate ones that need it.
Some argue that this will be the effect, for example, of the federal No Child
Behind Act. We return to this possibility below.
390
The second threat is familiar from the skeptical interpretation of develop-
ments in Kentucky, insofar as that judgment is not eventually modified by the
kind of reorientation signaled by the formation of the Community Accountability
Team in Jefferson County. 39 1 It is that the new political coalition, emboldened
by its success in battle, forgets its commitments to local autonomy and tries to
reorganize the schools by fine-tuning standards from the commanding heights of
the state supreme court or the state legislature. 392 As criticism of the No Child
Left Behind Act further suggests, this reassertion of centralized control might
come as much from those (on the "left"?) interested in diagnostic standards as
those (on the "right"?) interested in discrediting public schools entirely using
high-stakes outcome measures.
The third danger is the reassertion of professional technocratic control under
the cover of the new decentralization of authority to schools and districts. Once
the reformed system is up and running, the fine-grained decisions about what
and how to teach will be made by teachers, principals, and district officials.
Their decisions will be subject to peer review and the public scrutiny afforded by
the new accountability systems. But it would be foolhardy to think that the
reformed professionals, while reviling the hierarchies built by their Progressive
ancestors, have no selfish or shortsighted interests themselves, or that the
accountability system automatically and infallibly eliminates these from the
calculus of decision making.
In all three cases, an indispensable element of an effective response is the
constitution of a local, countervailing power. Parents and others must have the
political capacity, rooted in and responsive to the needs of their communities, to
challenge attempts at re-centralization or power grabs by professionals or
resurgent local oligarchs. And they must have the data and disposition to do so in
a way that reinforces, rather than undermines, the key features of the new
390. See infra notes 485-94 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 364-67 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 354-63 and accompanying text.
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system. 39
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The necessary local capacity might grow from traditional community-based
activism, or from the opening of the schools to the community through the new
professionalism itself, or perhaps from the interaction of novel combinations of
insiders and outsiders. Each potential line of development faces obstacles,
however, or at least important imponderables. More to illustrate the nature of the
emerging problems than to suggest even a preliminary resolution, we note both
the promise and problems of each.
Traditional community-based organizations seem to be the natural starting
points for the development of a new countervailing power. They are, after all, the
local associations with the most experience fighting for fair housing, safe streets
and jobs. Because the health of local schools is increasingly seen as indis-
pensable to the health of communities, many of these groups have become
concerned with organizing for school improvements as well. A recent report by
New York University's Institute for Education and Social Policy suggests that
there are almost 200 community groups engaged in education organizing, with
new groups emerging rapidly and established ones taking up education as an
issue. Coalitions of such groups also are forming to influence school policy. 394
A key obstacle these groups face is their close kinship to social movements.
Like those movements, these groups are expert at disrupting business as usual to
gain a fairer share of centrally distributed benefits. But they have less experience
shaping connected decisions on multiple organizational levels in an ongoing
way. The result, the NYU report found, is a frustrating oscillation from tradi-
tional issues that easily focus community attention to systemic concerns that do
not, and back:
As groups identify and choose organizing issues, they do not progress
from initial concerns about adequate facilities and safety in the
lunchroom-what we call presenting issues-to issues about improving
the instructional core of schooling. Instead, groups seem to spiral con-
tinuously from presenting issues to core issues and back again.395
The idea that the organizational problem has conceptual roots is further sup-
ported by the report's finding of a systematic mismatch between the goals of the
393. See Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Power and Reason, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT 237 (Archon Fung &
Eric Olin Wright eds., 2003) available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/-wright/Deepening.pdf; Archon
Fung, Collaboration and Countervailing Power: Making Participatory Governance Work (2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.archonfung.com/docs/pal2l8/Collab2.pdf.
394. KAVITHA MEDIRATA & NORM FRUCHTER, MAPPING THE FIELD OF ORGANIZING FOR
SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT: A REPORT ON EDUCATION ORGANIZING IN BALTIMORE, CHICAGO, Los
ANGELES, THE MississiPPi DELTA, NEW YORK CITY, PHILADELPHIA, SAN FRANCISCO AND
WASHINGTON D.C. 5 (2001), available at http://www.nyu.edu/iesp/publications/cip/mapping/
mappingfinalreport.pdf. For additional reports in this vein, see The Cross City Campaign for
Urban School Reform website, http://www.crosscity.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
395. MEDIRATTA & FRUCHTER, supra note 394, at 34.
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community organizers engaged in community organizing and the goals of the
school reformers themselves, as summarized in the following figure:
Central Issues of Educators Versus Community Organizing Groups396
Issues Central to the Learning





examination of student work;
New teacher support;
Standards implementation;









other structural forms of
creating smaller and more
personalized units.
Issues Central to the Agendas of






















But this juxtaposition overstates the divide between the two worlds. Both
sides are aware of the difficulties of establishing a common language that allows
for productive joint discussion of their shared concern for making schools work.
National groups such as the Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform, an
396. Id. at 45 fig.13.
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alliance of school reform organizations in Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, New
York, Oakland and other major cities, are addressing the problem directly.
Recently, the Campaign set out to define indicators of school improvement that
reflect the interests of both professional reformers and community activists,
while at the same time articulating concepts such as "reciprocal accountability"
to identify each sides' obligations in the setting of standards-based reform.
39 7
Local efforts to integrate the concerns of both groups are also taking place.
398
One of the most incisive efforts to locate the common ground between
school reformers and community parents is Research for Democracy. Research
for Democracy is a joint project of the Temple University Center for Public
Policy and the Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing Project, a coalition of com-
munity- and faith-based democratic organizations working for neighborhood
improvement in Philadelphia. 399 Instead of reporting the views of representative
institutions-community-based organizations on the one hand and lead school
reformers on the other-Research for Democracy conducted a random survey in
Philadelphia in 2002 of the underlying constituencies of both parents and school
teachers. Although 92% of the parents in the survey did say that safer schools
were a "very important" priority for school reform in Philadelphia, 80% or more
of them also considered higher academic standards, better professional develop-
ment, lower class size and a more equitable distribution of resources to be "very
important." Given that only 58% of the parents ranked maintenance of school
buildings at that same level of importance, the report concludes that "the
traditional view of parents as only concerned with safety and building conditions
is inaccurate.
40 0
Even more surprising is the finding that Philadelphia parents have substan-
tially more ambitious educational goals for their children than do the children's
teachers. Only 41% of the teachers thought their schools should give more
emphasis to teaching students to think critically, whereas 82% of the parents
identified this as an important goal. Again, 41% of the teachers wanted more
emphasis on preparing students for college, while 87% of the parents wanted
better college preparation for their children. Eighty-nine percent of the parents
wanted more attention to the students' reading and 67% wanted better prepa-
ration for student tests, compared to only 21% and 20% of the teachers. The only
397. EVA GOLD & ELAINE SIMON, SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY ORGANIZING FOR SCHOOL
REFORM (2002), available at http://www.crosscity.org/pdfs/stmbrhdsstrschls.pdf See also LAUREN
E. ALLEN & ANNE C. HALLETT, BEYOND FINGER-POINTING AND TEST SCORES (1998), available at
http://www.crosscity.org/pdfs/beyondfinger.pdf.
398. See, e.g., Community Collaborative to Improve District 9 Schools, Platform for
Educational Improvement in District 9 (undated) (draft manuscript, on file with NYU Review of
Law & Social Change).
399. See Eastern Philadelphia Organizing Project website, at http://www.epopleaders.org
(last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
400. RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY, A RIGHT TO KNOW: A PARENT-TEACHER STRATEGY TO
IMPROVE TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 17 (2002), available at
http://www.temple.edu/CPP/content/reports/arighttoknowreport.pdf.
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area where the teachers were more zealous in the pursuit of educational goals
than the parents concerned student moral and ethical development, where 81% of
the teachers saw a need for more emphasis, as against 56% of the parents. 40 1
Notwithstanding the divergent views of reformers and organizers, therefore,
the deep divide may run within the professional community itself, not between
communities and reforming schools. If so, initiatives such as the Cross City
Campaign and Research for Democracy may prove indispensable to creating a
political context within which professional reformers can ally with parents to get
the new reforms adopted and keep them flourishing. Likewise, some of the most
powerful and widely-watched community-based organizations, such as the
Southwest Region of the Industrial Areas Foundation ("IAF"), a federation of
largely Hispanic community organizations directed by Ernesto Cortes, Jr., are
trying to develop a "critical friendship" with reforming schools in Austin and
elsewhere in Texas that secures a community voice in the operation of the decen-
tralized institutions while also transforming traditional organizing. 40 2
A convergent fusion of professional and community reform efforts might
alternatively arise from the professional-based reform of the schools. The logic
that devolves decision-making, with accountability, from district to school to
classroom can plainly be extended to include families. This is already happening
at least sporadically. For example, before becoming superintendent of New York
City's District 2, Shelley Harwayne organized groups of school parents at
Manhattan New School, where she was principal, to recount their life stories to
each other under the guidance of a teacher in writing groups. In this way the
parents learned to trust and work with one another while learning firsthand
something of what their children did in class, what they could do to help, and,
perhaps, how to criticize the school's decisions from the vantage point of a
shared understanding of its goals.40 3 The Patrick O'Heam Elementary School in
Boston goes considerably further in institutionalizing parent involvement in
reading instruction and in school planning generally.404 If such forms of
participation proliferate, community-based organizations such as the IAF might
work to federate the local bodies, advising them on effective countervailing
dealings with schools and learning themselves how to exercise the new kinds of
participatory power at higher levels of aggregation.
A third possibility could arise from novel constellations of local and state-
wide or national groups that individually and collectively grow out of and
401. Id. at 22.
402. For a detailed case study of IAF intervention in the Austin schools, see ELAINE SIMON &
EVA GOLD, CASE STUDY: AUSTIN INTERFAITH, STRONG NEIGHBORHOODS, STRONG SCHOOLS (2002).
For background on Cortes and the IAF see Cheryl Dahle, Social Justice: Ernesto Cortes, Jr., FAST
COMPANY, Dec. 1999, at 294. The IAF was not one of the groups studied in the NYU report. See
MEDIRATTA & FRUCHTER, supra note 394.
403. HARWAYNE, supra note 161, at 171-76.
404. See Patrick O'Hearn Elementary School website, at http://boston.kl2.ma.us/schools/
rc373.asp#intro (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 28:183
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL REFORM
contribute to the progress of systemic reform. Consider, for example, changes in
the work of Kentucky's Prichard Committee. As we discuss above, the com-
mittee began essentially as a statewide lobbying organization for educational
reform legislation.40 5 More recently, however, through its sponsorship of the
Commonwealth Leadership Institute and its support of the Community
Accountability Team in Jefferson County, the Committee has been transforming
itself into an organization at the service of local reform groups. The state and
local groups have worked together to use data generated by the state's accounta-
bility machinery to make reform work-and, as we saw, to reform the accounta-
bility system itself.40 6 If this development is generalized, one result would be a
group of truly local Prichard/Community Accountability Teams linked both to
their home communities and to the institutional viscera of their corresponding
schools as well as to the statewide network. Another result would be a re-
juvenated statewide Prichard Committee able to intervene more effectively at the
legislative level, given its deep knowledge of local affairs, and better able to aid
the local committees because of its ability to pool experience statewide. This
relation of "top" to "bottom" is familiar: The "apex" of this novel public interest
movement would be at the service of its local "bases" in something of the way
districts and the principals become providers of services to their notional sub-
ordinates in reforming school systems. "
Something analogous could be emerging at the national level. Groups such
as the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights (a collaborator with Research for
Democracy in the Philadelphia parent-teacher survey discussed above) are
making detailed systematic efforts to categorize the performance of states in
meeting the new federal accountability requirements that we discuss below.40 7
They also train advocates to use the information-disclosure provisions of the new
accountability systems to assess school performance, and they illustrate through
case studies of successful schools with poor and minority populations how data-
driven comparisons of rapidly improving and failing schools with similar
populations might be used to motivate reform at the latter institutions.408 In time
the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights and other organizations like it might
provide just the kinds of services to statewide and regional advocacy groups that
the Prichard Commission is beginning to provide to local advocacy groups in
Kentucky.
405. See supra notes 296-331 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 364-67 and accompanying text.
407. See Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights website, http://www.cccr.org (last visited
Nov. 22, 2003); RAISING STANDARDS, CLOSING GAPS, FINDINGS FROM THE CITIZENS' COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS TITLE I MONITORING PROGRAM (2002) [hereinafter RAISING STANDARDS, CLOSING
GAPS], available at http://www.temple.edu/CPP/rfd/Raising_Standards_ClosingGaps.pdf, infra
notes 429-72 and accompanying text.
408. See RAISING STANDARDS, CLOSING GAPS, supra note 407; CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, WILL TITLE I LEAVE No CHILD BEHIND? (2002), available at http://www.temple.edu/
CPP/rfd/WillTitielLeaveNoChildBehind.pdf.
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But these remarks about wholly novel public interest group constellations
are conjectures. It is at least as likely that the new countervailing power, if it
emerges at all, will have origins beyond our current imagination. All we can say
for now is that without local participation, the surprising successes of the new
logic of collective action in redefining the roles of the center and individual
schools will be dangerously hostage to chance.
B. The New Meaning of Judicial Review
Another source of skepticism about the robustness of the changes traced
above concerns their relation to the law and the courts. What we are blandly
calling new governance arrangements do not fit easily, if at all, within the basic
categories of our democracy as understood by the American Legal Process
School. 409 In that jurisprudential tradition, both the need for extensive
government regulation of transactions and the separation of powers among the
executive, legislature and judiciary are taken for granted. As we observed earlier,
the central question posed for theorists of public decision-making and master
practitioners of government-essentially law professors and federal judges-is
the assignment of responsibility for changing rules at the margin to that branch
of government best equipped to regulate in the public interest. Administrative
experts are called on to resolve technical ambiguities in the regulation of private
transactions. Legislators are required to settle political disputes. Judges decide
which disputes are technical, which are political, and which they themselves can
resolve by adjudicating disputes about contractual or property rights among
private individuals. 410
409. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
410. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 38, at 70 (posing this central question in the
context of the famous cantaloupe dispute: "Would the court of appeals have acted justly if it had
relied solely upon an intuitive ad hoc sense of what is to be done when a carload of cantaloupes
turns out to be spoiled... ? Or is it a central ingredient of justice that due respect be paid to prior
institutional settlements which have a claim to being authoritative?"); supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text. See also HART & SACKS, supra note 38, at 75 (discussing importance of "the
various assignments of legal power as well as the distribution of practical ability to make effective
decisions which the law governing the interstate trade in fresh fruits ... exhibits," including "the
role of private determinations," "state law, including not only the general state law of contract and
sales but state legislative and administrative power," and "the federal government, including
Congress, the Department of Agriculture, and the federal courts"); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE
OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SlECLE) 118-19 (1997) ("The [Hart & Sacks] idea is that different law
making institutions, including private parties, administration agencies, and legislatures, as well as
state and federal courts, have intuitively accessible 'jobs' in the overarching scheme. It seems
obviously desirable that each institution specialize in the job it does best. Any other solution
threatens both organizational chaos and a reduction of the quality of outputs, because institutions
will do jobs that will be 'better' performed by others .... There are two symmetrical sins in this
model: to ignore policy when the judge should consider it (the case of the spoiled cantaloupes),
and to apply policy analysis to questions that should be resolved 'elsewhere' (Brown v. Board of
Education, for Herbert Wechsler)."); see also id. at 35-37 (treating Hart & Sacks as an important
precursor to Ronald Dworkin's and others' "coherentist" vision of the law in which judges are so
constrained by legal doctrine, principle, and the institutional division of labor that they are
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Under the new architecture of reform laid out here, the legislature (at any
level) is not setting precise goals but only general frameworks (often derived
from the experiences of others in similar situations). Local units (teams of
principals at the district level; teachers, parents, and students at schools)
transform this general framework into particular goals. Using the local and
supra-local standards generated by this process, the courts can periodically
determine whether particular schools, districts, new administrative centers, and
legislatures are providing constitutionally adequate levels of education. Put
another way, in creating the infrastructure for generalizing successful local
initiatives, holding poor performers to account, and periodically redefining
framework rules, the legislature is not delegating authority for rule-making to the
fourth, administrative, branch, nor is the court deferring to the legislature or to
administrative rule-makers. Instead, in separate but complementary ways, both
the legislature and the courts are exercising oversight over a new form of civic
self-government.411
This new architecture is immediately suspect from the point of view of our
Madisonian tradition of using the separation of powers to protect the people
from the government and the government from the demos. The novelty is less
alarming, however, from the standpoint of democratic accountability and consti-
tutionalism broadly conceived. This is so precisely because the performance of
local units, the center's response to that performance, and the legislature's
response to that reaction can be scrutinized by the other actors, the public and
eventually the courts in a way that is currently impossible. Whether this form of
accountability amounts in the end to a neo-Madisonian successor to the disci-
pline imposed on government by competition among the branches and between
the states and federal level is a matter for another time.412
But there remains a special worry about judicial review. Although it was not
self-evidently a part of the original Madisonian synthesis, 4 13 judicial review is
now widely thought to be essential to the preservation and development of the
constitutional protections that undergird our democracy. 414 Part I's account of
periodic waves of court-driven school reform generally vindicates this view: In
essentially compelled to find "right" answers even in "hard" cases).
411. See Dorf& Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 23.
412. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN & BRANDON L. GARRETT, THE FEDERALIST AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that central monitoring of local innovation is not neo-
Madisonianism at all, but instead classical Madisonianism, which, to Madison's great disappoint-
ment at the Philadelphia Convention, the other framers rejected); SABEL, FUNG & KARKKAINEN,
supra note 23, at 110-12 (advancing a neo-Madisonian interpretation of central monitoring of local
experimentation); Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 23, at 881 (same).
413. For a discussion of the debate over the centrality of judicial review to the Madisonian
scheme, see, for example, James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696
(1998).
414. See, e.g., FRANK MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999). For an opposing
view, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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the cases of desegregation, school finance-equity, and more lately the right to an
adequate education, citizens could avail themselves of courts when politics shut
them out.415 How, then, does the new architecture of reform recast the role of
judicial review and the role of the judiciary more generally so as to capture the
advantages of courts as a disentrenching institution without embroiling them in
the day-to-day reorganization of complex institutions that has repeatedly over-
taxed their own institutional capacities?
Typically, judicial review in the context of complex institutional reform
entails a choice among three courses of action, two of them patently unattractive.
One unattractive possibility is for the court simply to defer to existing arrange-
ments because the political branch continues to tolerate them. In this case, the
courts' self-restraint can become an apology for political abuse. 416 A second and
contrary, but also ineffectual, alternative is for the court to declare the institution
unconstitutional; define the principles of constitutional operation; and then,
eventually recognizing that the very administration that had produced the
unconstitutional conditions is unlikely to remedy them, take control itself of
transforming the troubled institution in accord with the constitutional principles.
As our review of the role of courts in desegregation shows, the judiciary is
neither able to translate constitutional values into crisp operating principles nor
to manage the restructuring of complex institutions. 417 The third possibility is for
courts to obligate the parties to work out a settlement that meets a constitutional
standard.4 18 But this apparently more appealing course of action often amounts
to little more than a deferral of a choice between the first two alternatives. For
once the parties have arrived at a settlement, often based on guesses about what
the judge will do once they have or have not reached agreement, the court has to
decide whether to defer to their decision-bow to the inevitable-or to assume
direct control-attempt the impossible.
We believe, however, that this third possibility can be transformed into a
true alternative to the first two. That belief is fueled by the success of adequacy-
based school reform litigation in Texas and Kentucky in articulating standards
and producing useful information about the performance of officials in
elucidating and enforcing them. With respect to the articulation of both consti-
tutional principles and feasible expectations of complying with them, the courts
can rely on a vastly richer record of the actors' experience than was previously
available to them. The same pooling of information that allows actors to learn
from each other allows the court to learn what the actors as an ensemble can do,
and in particular to learn of innovation both in the interpretation of principle and
415. See supra notes 44-52 and 80-94 and accompanying text.
416. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975).
417. Compare Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976), with supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
418. See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1993).
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in organizational design that otherwise might have remained unexplained and
almost surely would have gone unnoticed. Just as important, it allows the courts
to distinguish between good faith and bad faith efforts at compliance. Thus, a
court in Texas can use the same information on comparable schools available to
parents, teachers *and administrators in order to determine if a particular school
or district is violating the law. By the same token, the court can use this kind of
information to determine whether the Texas Education Agency is living up to its
obligation to support schools and districts that are at risk. So, too, by judging the
response of the legislature to the TEA's efforts, the court can determine whether
the political branch is meeting the obligation it has assumed in reaction to the
judicial decrees. 419 Call this new form of judicial review "non-court-centric
judicial review," because it allows the court to participate in a process of build-
ing a constitutional order, rather than imposing one or abandoning its obligation
to do so. 42
0
Notice that in arriving at this result, the courts and reformers are also-at
least for now-resolving two longstanding, show-stopping dilemmas about
judicial supervision of institutional reform in the name of constitutional values.
The first is of particular moment to the redistributivist left. The other is more
salient to the property-minded right.
The worry on the left, articulated by Frank Michelman among others, is that
inequality-based arguments for school reform, and social reform generally, are
doomed by conceptual indeterminacy. 421 On the one hand, the state could meet a
constitutional obligation to treat all citizens equally by providing all with none of
some good or service, leaving those unable to provide for themselves no better
off than without the right to equal treatment.422 On the other hand, arguments
that the state is obligated to provide citizens with "minimum protection," i.e.,
with adequate amounts of goods and services necessary to citizenship (such as
education), seemed conceptually sound but legally impracticable. As Michelman
concluded, the "advantage" of the minimum protection hypothesis (if we would
so regard it) remains utterly theoretical until (if ever) we can develop a
justiciable standard for specifying the acceptable minimum and the acceptable
gap. Absent such a standard, the supposed duty of minimum protection cannot
be directly enforced; in fact, its violation cannot even be coherently alleged.
Evidently, some notion of equality or nondiscrimination is needed to provide a
419. See supra notes 239-46, 328-31 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes
505-06.
420. These paragraphs grow out of many conversations with Michael Dorf and William
Simon. See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 23, at 874-81; SABEL & SIMON,
supra note 23.
421. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
422. Id. at 11. See supra notes 93-94, 240-41 and accompanying text (discussing the "level-
ing down" of resources for public schools that accompanied equity-based challenges to many
states' mechanisms for funding education).
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foothold for litigants and judges intent upon defining a grievance and fashioning
a remedy. 423 The new standards and the institutional architecture that generates
them, we argue, provide just such a foothold.
The concern on the right, often associated in Supreme Court matters with
the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist, is that court-ordered institutional reform
untethered from doctrinal constraints will violate the bedrock principle of private
law that remedies be directly deduced from infringed rights.424 In Missouri v.
Jenkins,425 for example, the Court severely limited a wide-ranging program of
educational reconstruction that the district court had ordered as the remedy in a
desegregation suit. Writing for a majority of the Court, Rehnquist cited
approvingly a court of appeals judge's complaint that "this case, 'as it now
proceeds, involves an exercise in pedagogical sociology, not constitutional
adjudication.' 426 Here, too, the new standards and the associated accountability
regime substantially reduce the possibility for judicial caprice by giving
substance to the interpretation of rights and remedies that courts cannot derive
from doctrine alone. 427 Thus, to continue with the Texas example, a constitu-
tionally inadequate education comes to mean one in which particular schools are
not closing achievement gaps between African-American and white students to
the extent that other comparable schools show to be possible. The corresponding
remedy is for the laggards to adopt strategies with effects equivalent to those
pursued by the leading schools and districts.
Notice, too, that this new kind of judicial review effaces familiar dis-
tinctions between public and private and between the sovereign and the citizen
subjects. Because the legislative authorization is more a general framework for
institutional experimentation in the elaboration of principle than the enactment of
a well-defined public mandate, the court's role as constitutional guardian is not
primarily to police the permissibility of the legislature's delegation of authority
or the delegate's fidelity to legislative intentions. Rather, it is to collaborate via
the continuing definition of standards with an emergent public in giving meaning
to constitutional principle.
We set aside any assessment of whether this collaboration will prove
successful in the long run, and whether, in any case, it is to be counted a
(transformative?) gain for democracy. The least that can be said on the basis of
the school examples is that non-court-centric constitutional review draws on
deep changes in our civil society and our economy-whence the emergence of
actors capable of engaging in the standards-setting that adequacy judgments
suppose-to respond in a broadly public sense to both our continuing insistence
423. Michelman, supra note 421, at 57.
424. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406, 417 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
425. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
426. Id. at 83 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J.,
dissenting)).
427. See SABEL & SIMON, supra note 23.
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on respect for constitutional principle, and our dearly bought respect for the
limitations of traditional forms of judicial intervention.
Such large constitutional questions could remain in the background as long
as education reform proceeded state by state in the shadow of familiar
institutions and doctrines. But with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001 ("NCLB"), 428 which applies many of the principles of school reform
discussed so far to the nation as a whole, they are likely to become of urgent
practical relevance. In the next Part, therefore, we briefly characterize the NCLB
and suggest the role that non-court-centric judicial review might play in the tug
of war that is likely to ensue over its implementation.
V.
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE REFORM OF PUBLIC EDUCATION:
THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The NCLB was inspired by developments in Texas. 429 It inherits from that
state the attractively transparent governance structure of districts and schools that
exemplify the New Accountability. It also, however, inherits Texas's inattention
to mechanisms by which states, districts and schools can share effective practices
and learn directly from one another. Even where the NCLB is defective, how-
ever, it provides important handholds for improvement, just as reform in Texas
and Kentucky permitted-even encouraged-structural changes that their
statutes did not themselves anticipate.
Consider first the NCLB's generalization of Texas-style school governance.
The Act for the most part imposes obligations on states and local education
agencies ("LEAs," typically school districts) that receive federal funds under
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.430 Those funds
428. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001). The ideas outlined in this Part are
developed in more detail in Liebman & Sabel, supra note 23.
429. See, e.g., Brownstein, For a Start, supra note 26.
430. Title I is an $8 billion-per-year program created as part of Lyndon Johnson's War on
Poverty, in large measure as a consequence of the Civil Rights movement. The core idea was to
provide supplemental funds to schools serving the most impoverished children in order to provide
assistance that their families and schools could not. Originally, much of the money went to highly
specialized programs directed to students judged to have one or more learning disabilities.
Categorizing students in this way, with the result that they often were removed from regular
classes in order to provide the additional services, has more recently been found to be disruptive to
the point of being counterproductive. Accordingly, when Title I was reauthorized in 1994, it was
amended to give state and local educators more discretion to use funds for purposes that they
defined as, among other things, "effective approaches to whole reform." See Act of Oct. 20, 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 1002(g)(2), 1502(a), 108 Stat. 3519, 3522, 3604 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§
6302(g)(2), 6492(a) (2000) (repealed 2001)); Paul Weckstein, Social Reform and Enforceable
Rights to Quality Education, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 6, at 314-18. In return,
Congress, imposing the bargain that was repeatedly attempted in this period (and indeed was
anticipated by the previous reauthorization of the Act in 1988) but was only brought to fruition by
the 2001 reauthorization, encouraged states (albeit ineffectually) to adopt accountability systems,
created test-based improvement standards of its own, and insisted on increased evaluation and
monitoring of results. See id. §§ 1101-20 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6320 (2000) (repealed
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are targeted on schools with the highest proportions of low-income families.4 3 1
Under NCLB, states must: set "challenging academic content standards" and
"student academic achievement standards" defining an adequate education for all
schools and students in the state;4 32 create annual standardized tests in literacy
and mathematics (and subsequently science) in grades three through twelve that
are aligned with those standards;4 33 report the results of performance on these
tests and other valid indicators for individual schools and for all relevant ethnic
and socioeconomic subpopulations within those schools;434 set goals for "annual
yearly progress" ("AYP") so that students in all the relevant subpopulations can
be expected to meet the state standard of adequacy within twelve years;
435
require LEAs to present annual "report cards" ranking the performance of each
of the relevant subpopulations at all of their schools on the state's tests;
4 36
implement, more generally, an accountability system to assure that schools and
2001)); see also Chun & Goertz, supra note 279, at 120; Gary Natriello & Edward L. McDill, Title
I: From Funding Mechanism to Educational Program, in HARD WORK, supra note 279, at 31, 35-
36 (citing literature); Margaret C. Wang et al., The Need for Developing Procedural Accountability
in Title I Schoolwide Programs, in HARD WORK, supra note 279, at 175, 178-91; Weckstein,
supra, at 324-41. By 1996, nearly 10,000 schools were registered as having failed to improve at
rates required by the 1994 Act. See, e.g., Natriello & McDill, supra, at 32.
By all accounts, however, the Department of Education neither provided vigorous assistance
to these persistently failing schools nor sanctioned them in substantial ways. See, e.g., Orfield &
DeBray, supra note 279, at 4-9 (discussing the limited impact and spotty implementation of the
1994 reforms on the actual behavior of educators); Robert E. Slavin, How Title I Can Become the
Engine of Reform in American Schools, in HARD WORK, supra note 279, at 86, 94; Weckstein,
supra, at 317. The entire oversight of the program was assigned to a sixty-person unit within the
Department, effectively leaving states on their own to address the problem. Orfield & DeBray,
supra note 279, at 4-5 (concluding that, in administering the 1994 reauthorization, the Department
"failed to fulfill the needed federal role, created no credible sanctions, and left the states on their
own").
431. See NCLB, Title 1, Part A, §§ 1113-15, 115 Stat. 1469-78 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §
6311-15). Based on their proportions of low-income children, some schools qualify for funding for
school-wide programs. See id. § 1114, 115 Stat. 6314. Others qualify only for programs providing
services to low-income children within otherwise non-qualifying schools. See id. § 1115. Still
other schools do not qualify for any funds at all, because the school's proportion of children from
low-income families is lower than the proportion in the district as a whole. See id. § 1113.
432. Id. § 111 (b)(1).
433. See id. § Illl(b)(3).
434. See id §§ 111 1(b)(2)(C)(v), lll(b)(2)(G)(iii), 1111(b)(2)(I), 111 1(b)(10). For
thoughtful discussions of the diagnostic value of, but also the technical difficulties posed by,
disaggregating educational outcomes and measuring success in regard to a variety of ethnic,
socioeconomic and developmentally defined groups-and of the need, even given the
disaggregation, to assure that individual children are not lost in the averages-see Thomas J. Kane,
Randomly Accountable, EDUC. NEXT, Spring 2002, at 57; Lynn Olson, Testing Researchers Make
Pitches for Refining ESEA Rules, EDUC. WEEK., Sept. 25, 2002, at 10; David Figlio, Aggregation
and Accountability (Feb. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU Review of Law &
Social Change), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/Figlio.doc; Richard J.
Wenning et al., No Child Left Behind: Who Is Included in New Federal Accountability
Requirements (Feb. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU Review of Law &
Social Change), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/Wenning.doc.
435. NCLB, Title 1, Part A, §§ I 11(b)(2)(B)-(G), 111 l(b)(2)(I).
436. Id. §§ 1111(c)(1), 1111(h).
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school districts meet these obligations to provide an adequate education to all
subpopulations; 437 along with LEAs, provide technical assistance premised "on
scientifically based research" to schools that have persistently failed to meet
their AYPs, including through state-organized peer support teams of master
teachers;438 and provide academic achievement awards for schools that "signi-
ficantly closed the achievement gap" between students from different ethnic
groups.
439
Each year, LEAs are required to use the results on the annual statewide
standardized tests and other indicators to review the progress of each of their
schools and each of the schools' relevant subpopulations under the improvement
criteria set by the state. 440 LEAs must additionally publicize and disseminate the
results of the local annual review to parents, school personnel and the com-
munity so that educators at each level "can continually refine, in an instruction-
ally useful manner, the program of instruction to help all children... meet the
challenging State student academic achievement standards established under [theAct]. , '44 1
Schools that fail to meet their obligations must present a plan for doing
SO. 44 2 Parents and staff must actively participate in the planning process.443 In
presenting the Act, the Bush Administration has explicitly characterized it as a
"'flexibility for accountability' bargain." 444 The states receive substantial flexi-
bility in combining funds received under various federal programs. In return,
they must discipline schools and LEAs that fail to improve at an acceptable
rate.445 Schools that fail to meet their annual improvement goals for five years
must be completely reconstituted under a restructuring plan that may include the
engagement of private management companies to take over failing schools.44 6
Schools that fail to meet state improvement standards for at least three of the
four preceding years must permit low income students to use federal funds to
which the schools and their LEAs would otherwise be entitled for supplemental
education services from accredited public or private providers chosen by the
students and their parents. 447 Students in schools that fail to meet state improve-
ment standards for two consecutive years may transfer to a different public
437. See id § llll(b)(2).
438. Id. §§ 1111(c)(3), 1111(c)(4), 1116(b)(4), 1117.
439. Id. § 11 17(b)(1)(B)(i).
440. See id. § 1116(a).
441. Id. § 1116(a)(1)(C).
442. See id. § 11 16(b)(3).
443. See id. § 1118(a)(1).
444. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: Executive Summary,
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/esaa/exec-summ.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
445. See NCLB, Title 1, Part A, §§ 1116(b), 1116(c).
446. See id. § 1116(b)(8).
447. See id. §§ 1116(b)(5), 1116(e).
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school of their choice located in the same LEA, with transportation provided by
the LEA.448
Just as the Texas reforms establish detailed obligations for schools and
districts to report their performance and progress without establishing in corres-
ponding detail the state's own responsibilities to monitor and foster these
developments, 449 so the NCLB is virtually silent about the federal government's
role in helping states pursue the goals of the Act and sanctioning them in case
they do not. For example, in order to receive funds under the flexible provisions
of the Act, the state educational agency must submit a consolidated plan setting
forth how its challenging academic content standards, test regime, and other
policies and practices will constitute and be implemented as "a single statewide
State accountability system that will be effective in ensuring that all local
educational agencies, public elementary schools, and public secondary schools
make adequate yearly progress as defined [by the Act] .,450 The Secretary of
Education has 120 days from the submission of the plan to convene a peer
review process and, based on the peer reviewers' recommendations, demand
necessary modifications. 451
As many states will submit initial plans nearly simultaneously during
2003,452 it is unlikely, except in cases of willful and blatant defiance of statutory
provisions, that there will be anything like close scrutiny of states' proposals.
Statutory provisions for subsequent review of plans deemed acceptable are
nonexistent, and the Act has next to no discussion of enforcement. In case a state
fails to meet any requirement of the new law, "the Secretary may withhold funds
for State administration and activities under this part until the Secretary deter-
mines that the State has fulfilled those requirements." 453 The one exception is
that "the Secretary shall withhold 25 percent of the funds that would otherwise
be available to the State for State administration under this part" from any state
that fails in a timely manner to put "in place challenging academic content
standards and student achievement standards, and a system for measuring and
monitoring adequate yearly progress." 454
The NCLB's enforcement thus is left almost entirely up to the discretion of
the Secretary of Education. Yet, thus far, the Secretary's regulations have served
448. See id. §§ 11 16(b)(1)(E), 11 16(b)(9), 1116(b)(10). The NCLB requires LEAs to use up
to twenty percent of their Title I allocations to pay for transportation in support of choice options
exercised by, or to fund supplemental educational services demanded by, students assigned to
public schools that have failed to meet their improvement goals for the requisite period. See id. §
II 16(b)(9).
449. See supra notes 250-67 and accompanying text.
450. NCLB, Title 1, Part A, § 111 l(b)(2)(A). See generally id. § 1111.
451. See id § lll(e).
452. See letter from Sec'y of Educ. Rod Paige to State Educ. Officials 2 (July 24, 2002),
available at http://www.ed.gov/News/Letters/020724.html (noting that "States will be required to
submit their AYP for review at the beginning of 2003").
453. See NCLB, Title 1, Part A, § I ll(g)(2).
454. See id. § 111 (g)(1).
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mainly to relax, not stiffen, the Act's monitoring and enforcement mechan-
isms.455 That laxity is consistent with the Department of Education's (and the
predecessor Department of Health, Education and Welfare's) regrettable history
of weak enforcement of federal requirements.
456
The Act's insistence on school improvement, in combination with its dis-
inclination to monitor, let alone enforce, its own accountability provisions raises
suspicions for some that the NCLB is a Trojan horse for nefarious political
designs. Others, while not doubting the good faith of the Bush Administration
and Congress, fear the legislation will have disastrous unintended consequences
for the public schools and especially their poor and minority pupils. On the
suspicious reading, the accountability-for-flexibility bargain that supposedly
legitimates the legislation is, for one or another reason, a sham. One fear is that
the states are getting flexibility without giving anything in return. In this view,
the Act does little more than deregulate: By removing preexisting constraints on
how federal funds may be spent, it delivers students, particularly poor and
minority students, into the hands of selfish local oligarchs.457 Another worry is
that the standards and accountability system may have teeth but may not be
intended to achieve reform. In this view, the NCLB's true purpose is to speed
privatization by exposing the incapacity of schools and districts to meet their
annual improvement goals.458 The concerns about disastrous unintended con-
sequences go to the capacity of the states and schools to advance reform under
conditions established by the Act, 459 and to the fear that the Act will undercut
455. See Lynn Olson, Long-Awaited ESEA Rules Are Released, EDUC. WEEK., Aug. 7, 2002;
Erik W. Robelen, Senate Panel Examines Ed. Department Efforts to Enforce New ESEA, EDUC.
WEEK., May 1, 2002, at 24; Diana Jean Schemo, Schools Face New Policy on Transfers, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at A26; see also infra note 472.
456. See, e.g., Michael Cohen, Implementing Title I Standards, Assessments and Accounta-
bility: Lessons from the Past, Challenged for the Future (Feb. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with NYU Review of Law & Social Change), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/
NCLBconference/Cohen.doc ("No one believes the Education Department will really enforce Title
I requirements.... The fact of the matter is that the Education Department does not have a strong
track record of compliance monitoring in [Elementary and Secondary Education Act] programs,
and hasn't for decades spanning Administrations of both parties. There is a widespread view that
the Department has few effective sanctions to apply, since no one believes that it will ultimately
withhold funds from states or local districts. [The Title I program] lacks both the staff capacity and
clear focus to pay attention to the most important requirements."); supra note 430.
457. See, e.g., Dan Goldhaber, What Might Go Wrong with the Accountability Measures of
the "No Child Left Behind Act?" (Feb. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NYU
Review of Law & Social Change), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/
Goldhaber.doc.
458. Inveterate opponents of public education consider that failure to be inevitable. See, e.g.,
Abigail Thernstrom, Comments In Response to Papers (Feb. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with NYU Review of Law & Social Change), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/
NCLBconference/Thernstromcomments.doc.
459. See, e.g., Richard F. Elmore, Unwarranted Intrusion, EDUC. NEXT (Spring 2002), at
http://www.educationnext.org/20021/30.html; Matthew Gandal, Multiple Choice, How Will States
Fill in the Blanks in Their Testing Systems? (Feb. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
NYU Review of Law & Social Change), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/NCLB
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
2003]
NYU REVIEW OF LAW& SOCIAL CHANGE
the nation's remaining commitment to desegregation. 460 The deregulation and
privatization worries about the Act do not, we think, bear much scrutiny. The
reasons why that is so, in turn, help limit-although they do not fully banish-
concerns about state and school capacity on the one hand and the effects of the
NCLB on racial equality on the other.
Because it focuses so single-mindedly on long term consequences, the
privatization reading overlooks the enormous and probably self-limiting political
disruption that use of the accountability system to punish the public schools
would almost surely provoke in the shorter term. Recall that the first obligation
of LEAs with schools failing to meet their improvement goals is to afford their
students the chance to transfer and to reimburse the costs of transporting
them to another school of their choice within the district. Districts with poorly
performing schools thus may be forced in effect to bus poor and minority
students to the presumably richer and whiter schools in the district with better
educational track records. 461 If all the schools in a district are failing, or the
successful ones are likely to be swamped by transfers, the situation would be
manageable only if limited to very few districts statewide. But the pressures
released by the failure of schools in many districts statewide would be incal-
culably great-as was indicated by the ferment in a number of cities that
accompanied the implementation of this part of the NCLB in its first year of
operation.462 Given the great flexibility accorded states in setting standards and
conference/Gandal.doc.
460. See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education 's 'Perfect Storm?' Racial Resegregation,
'High Stakes' Testing & School Inequities. The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375
(2003). But see William L. Taylor, Using Title I to Compel States to Provide Equal Educational
Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751 (2003).
461. See supra note 447 and accompanying text. For an argument that this provision provides
a potentially strong tool for civil rights advocates, see Taylor, supra note 460.
462. See, e.g., Marjorie Coeyman, Just When You Thought You Knew the Rules ...; Schools
Are Scrambling to Comply by Fall with a Slew of Demands, as the No Child Left Behind Act Turns
the Status Quo Upside Down, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 2002, at 11; Derrick Z. Jackson,
The Big Lie: "No Child Left Behind," BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2002, at A19; Robert Kelly,
Brooklyn Hopes that Parents Will Stick with the District, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 17, 2002,
at B 1; Susan Levine, Few Families Seek School Switch in Montgomery, WASH. POST, June 22,
2002, at B 1; Mary Lord, The New School Choice: Suddenly, Thousands of Students Can Transfer,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 5, 2002, at 38 (noting that after "President Bush signed the
[NCLB], vowing to free 'children trapped in schools that will not change and will not teach,'...
students in 8,752 chronically low-performing schools.., must weigh whether to jump ship in the
next few days-while school districts scramble to accommodate thousands of students eligible to
seize that option," including nearly 125,000 pupils in the Chicago district alone); Lori Olszewski,
Few Pupils Who Sought Switch Got Their Wish, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 2002; Michael Resnick,
'Choice' Cannot Be Rushed, USA TODAY, July 9, 2002, at A14; Erik W. Robelen, Few Choosing
Public School Choice for this Fall, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 7, 2002; Jen Sansbury, Obstacles Hold Kids
in Bad Schools, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 15, 2002; Megan Tench & Anand Vaishnav, Payzant
Faults Bush Plan as Impractical: Transfer Rule Called a Logistical Problem, BOSTON GLOBE, June
12, 2002. The chancellor of the New York City School System, Joel I. Klein, recently committed
the district to full "citywide" implementation of the NCLB's transfer provisions. See Press
Release, Citywide Public School Choice Process, available at http://www.nycenet.edu/press/02-
03/n50_03.htm (Dec. 9, 2002) (stating that the New York City "Department of Education will
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annual improvement goals, the more likely response to this threatened dis-
location would be to adjust one or both of these so that widespread failure, and
the privatization to follow, does not occur.463
The deregulation reading, for its part, overlooks the possibility that there can
be more to accountability than rule-following. Before the NCLB was enacted,
school officials were in compliance with federal requirements if they could
document, for example, that they had provided the number of hours of remedial
education per pupil or of professional development per teacher that federal law
required for schools receiving Title I funds. The grant of money in the absence
of such rules, and hence of any efforts to verify compliance with them, looks like
deregulation. But as we have seen both at the classroom level in New York
City's District 2,464 and in developments at both the classroom and district levels
in Texas, 465 continuous, diagnostic monitoring of performance can provide a
kind of accountability that not only identifies bad actors-something traditional
rule-based accountability systems are competent to do-but also gives scope to
experimentation and helps diffuse the better practices it reveals.
The NCLB plainly rests on these same foundations. The provisions for
information to be presented in the annual state and LEA "report cards" 466 are as
detailed as provisions for enforcement 467 (which immediately precede them in
the statute) are scant. In addition to reporting the results of standard tests
disaggregated by each of the relevant ethnic and socioeconomic subpopulations,
the state report cards must compare the actual achievement of each of those
subgroups to the state's annual goal for that subgroup. It must also report the
percentage of students in each group not tested.468 And it must require LEAs
(mainly school districts) to do the same for themselves and for each of their
establish a citywide public school transfer process for eligible children under the No Child Left
Behind Act" that aims "to provide these [transfer] options in a more efficient, equitable and cost
effective way").
463. Some such adjustment is already taking place. See Diana Jean Schemo, Sidestepping of
New School Standards Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A21. But cf infra note 471 and
accompanying text (discussing limits on a state's ability to dilute its standards to the point where
they have no diagnostic or incentivizing capacity). Sources arguing that large-scale privatization is
unlikely for either political or economic reasons include James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The
Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043 (2002) (arguing that the preferences of
the large numbers of families with children enrolled in suburban school districts pose a substantial
political obstacle to the adoption of comprehensive educational choice plans because of their
opposition both to giving up their current public school subsidy and to large-scale transfers of poor
and minority children from urban schools to their own) and sources cited supra note 13 (arguing
that full-scale privatization of the schools is likely to cost substantially more than the current
public school system).
464. See supra notes 162-93 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 250-90 and accompanying text. See also supra note 214 (reporting
similar results in North Carolina).
466. NCLB, Title 1, Part A, § 1111 (h).
467. See id. § 1111 (g).
468. See id. § l l(h)(l)(C).
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schools. 469 Consequently, the citizens in the state will be easily able to determine
whether all the state's school children are progressing as desired, and whether
some students are being excluded from the tests with the purpose or effect of
improving scores.
Even more important, as is currently the case in Texas, parents and students
will potentially be able to judge the performance of their school in serving
families like them against the performance of demographically similar schools
throughout the district and state. Moreover, as a result of the NCLB, parents and
the public nationwide will be able to make more reliable judgments about the
academic performance of individual states. Although the NCLB requires only
that the state standards be "challenging," 470 and the Secretary of Education is
prohibited from imposing any particular standard on states as a condition for
approval of its consolidated plan, 471 the Act takes an important first step towards
establishing the comparability of state standards and their accountability systems
more generally by requiring all states receiving Title I money (at federal
expense) to administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress
("NAEP") in reading and mathematics to samples of fourth and eighth graders. If
states standards are so low that all students are easily proficient, but a sample of
these students shows poorly on this demanding national test, no one will be
fooled.47 2
A far more substantial concern is that states, districts and schools will fail
publicly, and with disastrous effects on the reforms under way, at the inter-
locking tasks of building an adequate school governance system and achieving
classroom-level reform. Considering first the states' lack of capacity, only a few
469. See id. § I llI(h)(2)(B).
470. Id. § 111 (b)(1)(A).
471. See id. § 1111(e)(1)(F).
472. See id. § 111 1(c)(2); supra notes 191, 283-84 (discussing NAEP). Just for the Kids, a
Texas intermediary organization discussed above, see supra notes 265-67, 271-73 and
accompanying text, has already begun mapping proficiency levels as measured on state tests to the
proficiency levels defined by NAEP. For example, Just for the Kids reports in regard to the Texas
test for fourth grade mathematics that "the state's passing standard is comparable to the NAEP
basic standard but easier than the NAEP proficiency standard." Just for the Kids website, at
http://www.just4kids.org/us/usotherstates.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). Also of interest in this
regard is a "blistering letter" sent by federal Secretary of Education Rod Paige "to school
commissioners across the nation warning against efforts to sidestep the intent" of the NCLB by
dumbing down state educational standards. Diana Jean Schemo, States Get Federal Warning on
School Standards, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 2002, at A25; see U.S. Department of Education, Letter
Released from U.S. Education Secretary Paige to State School Chiefs on Implementing No Child
Left Behind Act (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://www.nclb.gov/media/news/102302.html.
Confirming the weakness of the NCLB's formal enforcement mechanisms, see supra notes 449-56
and accompanying text, but also predicting-and taking steps to provoke-the public intolerance
for weak standards and results that we anticipate, Secretary Paige called state officials who water
down educational standards "enemies of equal justice and equal opportunity" and "apologists for
failure," and forecast that "they will not succeed" because, "[o]nce parents discover that children in
their local schools are not learning as well as they could, they will demand results-no matter how
much one state tries to buck accountability." Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 28:183
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL REFORM
have accountability systems as sophisticated as those of Texas and Kentucky. As
of early 2002, only sixteen states had the grade-by-grade tests that the NCLB
requires in reading and mathematics. In only nine of those states were the tests
aligned with curricular standards as the NCLB also requires. One estimate is that
over 200 new state-level tests will have to be created in the next several years to
meet federal requirements. 473 And of course without an adequate assessment
regime in place, it will be hard for states to set proficiency levels and annual
improvement goals as required by the Act. Given that the Department of
Education is unlikely to provide much assistance to struggling states,4 74 it is not
unreasonable to worry that a governance-based reform will fail because the
governance it supposes will not be in place to guide the reform.
The related worry about the lack of capacity for reform at the district and
school levels grows out of the experience of the pioneers of the new classroom
practices such as District 2, and is most compellingly articulated by careful
observers of that experience such as Richard Elmore. 4 75 The fear here is that
even good governance will produce reform only if schools and districts are
already reforming, in the sense of having made some determination about the
need to change themselves, and the direction change should take. As Elmore
puts it:
[I]nternal accountability precedes external accountability. That is,
school personnel must share a coherent, explicit set of norms and
expectations about what a good school looks like before they can use
signals from the outside to improve student learning.... Low-
performing schools, and the people who work in them, don't know
what to do. If they did, they would be doing it already.
47 6
These are hardly frivolous worries. Many states will have a hard time
putting in place an accountability system, and some will almost surely fail to do
so within the limits imposed by the new law, however leniently interpreted. By
the same token, many schools and districts will have trouble reorganizing to
meet the demands placed on them by even by well-designed governance
systems, and some will fail.
As inevitable as they are, however, these difficulties divert attention from
the crucial questions: Is the NCLB so demanding in relation to the limited
capacities of states and schools that its implementation is more likely to paralyze
reforms in the more advanced jurisdictions than it is to help laggards advance?
Will its implementation increase or decrease incentives for reform at the state
and national levels? Answers to these questions are necessarily tentative. But the
473. Gandal, supra note 459, at 1.
474. See supra notes 448-51 and accompanying text.
475. See generally Elmore, supra note 459. See also David K. Cohen & Susan L. Moffitt,
Title I: Politics, Poverty, and Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE 1N ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 78, 87-88 (Ctr. on Educ. Pol'y, 2001).
476. See Elmore, supra note 459, at 33-34.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
2003]
N.YU. REVIEW OF LAW& SOCIAL CHANGE
record of capacity-building detailed in the account of standards-based reform in
New York's District 2 on the one side, and changes in school and district-
organization in Texas on the other, suggest that resolutely pessimistic answers to
these questions are premature, and even mischaracterize the obstacles to reform.
Consider first the concern with the cultural preconditions for change. The
lesson of District 2 that emerges from Elmore's own work is that the culture of
change is as much a product of change-including especially change in
governance, or accountability, systems-as a precondition for it. District 2 might
well have remained another case of anti-institutional or cultural, professional
revolt but for the intervention of a new monitoring and assessment regime per-
sonified by key administrators such as reform superintendents Anthony Alvarado
and Elaine Fink.477 Moreover, the decision to adopt this regime was the starting
point, not the conclusion, of change. District 2 is, as we saw, still figuring out
"what to do"; its teachers and administrators do their figuring by trying different
things and evaluating the results, not by deducing actions from settled cultural
principles. For these reasons, as we have seen, District 2's leaders have had to
engage in continuous exegetic exertions to establish that its institutional
innovations remain consistent with the master culture of individualized
attentiveness. 478 Indeed, given the vicissitudes of culture in District 2, and the
overlapping experience of Deborah Meier in District 4,479 it is legitimate to
wonder whether a high level of traditional professionalism might sometimes ob-
struct reform more than aiding it.480
In any case, many of the consistently improving Texas districts do
extraordinarily well at adopting the team-based diagnosis and response to
individual learning difficulties that are key to District 2's success even though
they are innocent of the latter's progressive tradition of pedagogy. More exactly,
the Texas example admits of two interpretations, both of which suggest that
there is not likely to be a show-stopping incapacity for ground-level reform. One
is that the "cultures of reform" are more numerous and widely diffused than
simple extrapolation of District 2 experience would suggest. We do not know
how many the cultures or how wide their diffusion simply because we have not
undertaken a comprehensive search for them. But given the diversity of the
robustly improving Texas districts, it is unlikely that the list is short or the boun-
daries very narrowly drawn: Until they succeeded in improving, for example, the
Texas school districts such as Weslaco and its Margo Elementary School were
not on anyone's list of learning communities well-endowed for robust
improvement.481
477. See supra notes 142-44, 162-83 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 138-39, 174-81 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 141-45, 163-65, 185-88, 194-201 and accompanying text and
especially note 186.
481. See SKRLA ET AL., supra note 274, at 11-13; supra notes 273-79 and accompanying
text. See also supra note 214 (reporting similar findings in regard to rapidly improving schools and
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A second, compatible interpretation is that it is wrong to think of capacity as
a cultural endowment that is either present or not. Our analysis of Texas shows
that many schools and districts are bootstrapping their way to systemic reform.
Thus, changes in the framework of governance at the state level, such as
improvement goals for racially and economically identified groups of pupils,
provoke halting reforms at the school and district level, such as monitoring by
principals of the implementation of curricular reforms in classrooms. The upshot
is that not having "already" built a culture of reform, invested in professional
development, or completed a blueprint for restructuring is not a disqualification
for doing so. It does not mean that governance reform is self-effectuating in the
sense that a once-and-for-all change of incentives at the top is sufficient to
produce real reform at the bottom.
Elmore is right to emphasize the need for coordinated investments in
professional development and other institutional change as conditions for the
success of the reforms. 482 If we understand our case studies above correctly,
however, they suggest that schools and districts may be at least as capable of
making these investments correctly in response to the imposition of accoun-
tability regimes such as the NCLB as they are of making them effectively before
such regimes are adopted.
A similar argument about capacity as a property emerging from the process
of reform, rather than as a precondition for it, applies to state-level governance
systems. The pessimistic view compares the current state-level governance
capacity to the ideal envisioned by the NCLB at the point of full implementation
and concludes that most states fall seriously below what is necessary. But if we
are right that capacity can be built on the fly, the ideals of the Act are the wrong
baseline for assessment. Instead, we should gauge the seriousness of the existing
governance-capacity gap by considering states' ability to improve their gover-
nance and accountability systems under circumstances in which that is required.
From this perspective, the situation is delicate but not dire. It is widely
acknowledged, for example, that a sea change in state attitudes toward public
education accompanied general acceptance of standards-based accountability.
"In 1993 when the Clinton Administration took office," writes Michael Cohen,
former Assistant Secretary of Education in that administration, "only a handful
of states were developing standards and aligned assessments .... Nine years
later, every state is organizing its K-12 system around standards-based re-
form." 483 By now there also is a substantial accumulation of expertise about how
to deal with such technical problems of the new accountability such as year-to-
year volatility in test scores and the unreliability of highly disaggregated data.484
districts in North Carolina operating under the influence of that state's highly developed accounta-
bility scheme).
482. See Elmore, supra note 459.
483. See Cohen, supra note 456, at 4.
484. See sources cited supra notes 120, 203, 434, 457.
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At the same time, the successes of states such as Texas and North Carolina in
implementing NCLB-style governance reforms have been widely remarked
within the educational reform community.
48 5
This combination of the states' growing general orientation towards
standards-based reform, accumulating expertise in the use of diagnostic data, and
leading examples of how to link classroom-level reform via attention to
disaggregated diagnostic data to governance systems is likely to encourage rapid
learning among new tiers of reforming states. This is especially likely to be true
if, as we expect, the quality of testing and reporting in one state will be a goad to
improvement in others. Just as the provision of information on school and district
performance in Texas touched off a statewide movement for improvement of
both, the hope is that the provision of equivalent information through the NCLB
will touch off a mutually reinforcing race to the top nationwide in school
governance and classroom reform.
In arguing that the NCLB may launch a race to the top, we do not mean to
suggest that the law as enacted provides all that is required for a general and
continuing improvement of education in every district and school across the
country. All races produce losers as well as winners, even if we know too little
about the enabling conditions of reform to predict who will place where.
Moreover, as we note above, the NCLB provides little support for stragglers. As
in the case of the corresponding legislation in Texas and Kentucky, however, the
Act creates a framework that may well be corrigible in light of the experience it
induces. Efforts to improve the Act's framework of enforcement and assistance
in relation to lagging institutions could be in substantial part the work of the
federal Department of Education or of public-private intermediary groups. Or it
might emerge in response to community and legal pressure occasioned by public
evaluation of schools, districts, states, and the federal government itself in the
light of the new accountability systems. This public engagement may in turn
provide new tools and a new direction for the Civil Rights Movement, while
spurring the creation of the "countervailing power" among parents and
communities and the "new publics" that we discuss above.
For starters, the federal Department, acting under its own steam, could
periodically convene the states to review experience under their consolidated
plans and to revise their standards, assessments and accountability systems
accordingly. The Secretary of Education could report the results of this deliber-
ation to Congress and explain how, through its own enforcement activities, the
Department itself is drawing framework lessons from developments instigated
by the NCLB. Such a process could in time lead the relationship of the federal
government to the states to approximate the cascading relation of states to school
485. On Texas and North Carolina, see GRiSSMER ET AL., supra note 279 and accompanying
text; sources cited supra note 215. For a careful analysis of the often considerable regulatory value
of the release of comparative data on the harms and achievements of regulated entities, see
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation, supra note 23.
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districts, districts to schools, and schools to classrooms. In each case, the higher
order unit creates a framework for the initiative of the lower-level ones and an
infrastructure that allows the latter to revise the framework in the light of their
pooled experience. 48
6
Much of the information-pooling and reflection that such changes would
make possible might also be achieved without direct acton by the federal
government. In Texas it is a private intermediary organization, Just for the Kids,
that provides the most useful school-by-school and district-by-district data for
parents and schools to use in building a constituency for reform. Just for the Kids
also, as we saw, culls best practices from the successes of leading schools and
districts. 487 Another intermediary organization, the EIN team at the Dana Center,
links leading districts in a network that facilitates the kind of "inter-visitation"
that amounts to rolling peer review.488 Just for the Kids is making a determined
effort to become a national provider of detailed comparable information on
school performance in the states and to monitor the quality of state tests by
comparing their results to those generated by the most advanced assessment
tools.489 Education Week publishes annual report cards on state education policy,
student performance and standards and accountability systems, 490 and academic
comparisons of state accountability and assessment systems are also being
published.49' Presumably, these and other rating bodies will compete to com-
mand national attention and the resources that go with it.492 A variety of national
486. For thoughtful convergent views of the possible reorientation of the federal role in
educational reform and a concomitant use of its enforcement policies, see Weckstein, supra note
430, at 314-18; Wang et al., supra note 430, at 177.
487. See supra notes 265-67, 273-74, 471 and accompanying text.
488. See supra notes 270-72, 274-81 and accompanying text.
489. As the home page of the website of Just for the Kids explains, the organization
"analyze[s] state test data to identify how well individual schools are performing[,] ... stud[ies]
the highest-performing schools to find out what works" and develops "tools and instruction [to]
help others replicate educational best practice." Just for the Kids, http://www.just4kids.org/us/us_
home.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). The organization's website already lists the additional
information that each state needs to collect to make Texas-style reporting available there. See, e.g.,
Just for the Kids, http://www.just4kids.org/us/newyork.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). See also
supra note 472 (discussing Just for the Kids' efforts to monitor the comparative quality of state
tests).
490. See, e.g., Lori Meyer, Quality Counts 2002: The State of the States, EDUC. WEEK., Jan.
10, 2002, at 68.
491. See, e.g., Margaret E. Goertz & Mark C. Duffy, Assessment and Accountability Across
the 50 States, in CPRE POL'Y BRIEFS (Consortium for Pol'y Research in Educ., RB-33, May 2001)
(presenting detailed comparisons of states based on how they measure student performance and
report it to the public, how they hold schools and districts accountable for student outcomes, how
well they have aligned their accountability systems for Title I and non-Title I schools and how they
assist low-performing schools).
492. For analogous competition among forestry codes and the learning that occurs through
detailed comparisons of their features as judged by users, see CATHERINE M. MATER ET AL., PRICE
CERTIFICATION ASSESSMENTS ON PUBLIC & UNIVERSITY LANDS: A FIELD-BASED COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION OF THE FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (FSC) AND THE SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY
INITIATIVE (SFI) PROGRAMS (2002), available at http://www.pinchot.org/pic/PinchotReport_
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analogues to EIN networks linking high-performance districts and state edu-
cation agencies may also emerge and compete with the rating agencies as
providers of best practices and performance benchmarks to educators and the
public.
Provision of services by non-governmental organizations may arise from
and contribute to grassroots engagement of parents and students in school reform
on the models of the O'Heam experience in Boston and the Community
Accountability Team in Louisville.493 Locally, these movements can increase
pressure on particular schools and districts to improve to levels achieved by
comparable institutions elsewhere. Moreover, as the connection of Louisville's
Community Accountability Team to the Kentucky-wide Commonwealth
Leadership Institute and the Prichard Committee suggest, local movements can
go hand in hand with campaigns for reform of statewide accountability
systems. 494 More broadly, proliferating efforts across the country to link school
reform efforts to community organizations suggest that a series of horizontal
coalitions connecting reforming schools and districts in different cities and states
may form and intersect with vertical alliances connecting local reform with more
encompassing efforts. The Cross City Campaign, the Research for Democracy
Project and the Citizens' Civil Rights Commission are examples. 495 Together or
separately, these new publics could pressure the federal Department of Edu-
cation to take a more active role in monitoring school reform under the NCLB
than the legislation now mandates, or to partner with some of the new entities
that are already operating. If the government fails to act, a national coalition of
these organizations-catalyzed perhaps by groups like the Washington D.C.-
based Citizens' Civil Rights Commission-could urge Congress to amend the
NCLB to require it to do so.
As we began to suggest above,496 these political remedies for the NCLB's
enforcement defects could be greatly augmented if an array of enforcement
opportunities opened up by modem accountability systems were used to update
and transform the Civil Rights Movement's litigation strategies. One potential
strategy builds on the tradition of private litigation by aggrieved parties
vindicating civil rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection provisions and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbid
racial discrimination by recipients of federal funds.497 Under both the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI, privately enforceable claims require proof that,
as a result of deliberate discrimination, a minority group has suffered harm from
the racially disparate impact of a government policy.498 Proving intentional
CertificationDualAssessment.pdf.
493. See supra notes 404-07 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 398-402, 408-09 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 410-28 and accompanying text.
497. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2000).
498. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81, 285-86, 293 (2001) (limiting private
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discrimination directly is nearly impossible. Bigots with official responsibility
rarely are foolish enough to make bigotry an express motive for their official
acts. In most cases, therefore, racial animus must be proved circumstantially.
Officials may be found to be deliberately discriminating if they adopt policies
with a racially disparate impact when they know of, but ignore, at least equally
beneficial alternatives to the chosen policy that would have avoided or
moderated the disparity. 499
The accountability systems established by the NCLB could, we think,
facilitate such circumstantial demonstrations of intentional discrimination. Until
now, circumstantial claims of racial discrimination seemed almost necessarily
conjectural. Courts could never be sure there was a feasible alternative to the
impugned policy that would nearly equalize the benefits of a government service
to all protected groups. But the whole thrust of NCLB accountability is to make
the public and school officials alike inescapably aware of just such proven
equality-enhancing alternatives. Under the NCLB, schools and districts are
required to bring all sub-populations of students up to a state-defined level of
educational adequacy, and improve the performance of those sub-populations at
a threshold rate defined by state law. States, in turn, are required to divide
schools and districts into similarly situated cohorts (ones with racially and socio-
economically comparable student bodies), and publicly identify the institutions
in each cohort that do and do not satisfy those adequacy and improvement
requirements. Given these mandates and the information they generate, the most
difficult burden will no longer be the one on the plaintiff class of minority
children to show that school officials willingly ignored policies and practices
that are demonstrably superior based on the school system's own criteria.
Information generated by the state's accountability system will do this for the
plaintiffs. Instead, the most demanding burden will be the one the administrative
scheme itself places on persistently poorly performing schools and districts: to
explain to courts and administrators why they have not been able to meet the
state's own adequacy and improvement goals for their students when schools
that the state and federal legislatures have formally defined to be similarly
situated (ethnically, economically, and the like) are able to do so. 50 0
The NCLB may also smooth the way of plaintiffs pursuing relief through
two additional causes of action under which a showing of "disparate impact,"
actions under Title VI to deliberate discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976) (limiting actions under the Equal Protection Clause to deliberate discrimination).
499. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-27 (1982); Dayton Bd. Of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979); Columbus Bd. Of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65
(1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977);
Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-43; Liebman, supra note 29, at 1576 n.483, 1614-35 (citing lower court
cases). See generally John Benjes et al., The Legality of Minimum Competency Test Programs
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 537, 600 (1980).
500. This same argument works to the advantage of minority plaintiffs in suits filed under
state analogues to the federal Equal Protection Clause in states-the majority-where such
provisions require proof of intentional discrimination.
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regardless of official intent, is sufficient to establish liability. The first cause of
action is available in suits brought by the United States Department of Education
to enforce its longstanding regulations permitting the government to withhold
federal funds from schools, districts and states whose programs have a harmfully
disparate impact on minority children.50 1 The Supreme Court has explicitly left
this power intact and invited the Department to continue applying it through
lawsuits and administration enforcement actions. 50 2 The second cause of action
is available in those states-a minority-where disparate impact is an alternative
basis for relief under their Equal Protection Clauses. 50 3
The typical response of defendant officials in disparate impact cases has
been to claim that uneven outcomes are the result not of state action or inaction
but of the "oppositional behavior" of poorly performing students and the in-
adequate endowments of their families and communities. Under the NCLB,
however, state actors are required to acknowledge their responsibility to enable
all subpopulations of students to reach threshold levels of performance and
ongoing improvements. Moreover, claims by schools and districts that they
cannot do so for reasons that inhere in the social and economic status of their
students-and thus are beyond public control-will in many cases be disproved
by data the NCLB now requires the states themselves to collect. Achievement of
better outcomes by other institutions in the state with identical cohorts of
students (as defined by authoritative federal and state criteria) will create at least
the presumption that it is not the children, parents and communities that are to
blame for the failing institution's outcomes, but instead the institution's cor-
rigible educational practices.
In celebrating the adoption of the NCLB, the Bush Administration charac-
terized the statute as an attack on the "soft bigotry of low expectations" and
"commit[ted the Government] to eliminating the achievement gap, not hiding it
within statewide averages." 50 4 In keeping with these undertakings, the Act
potentially eviscerates many of the traditional defenses to racially disparate
outcomes. These undertakings would also seem to place a special responsibility
on the Department of Education to interpret and enforce its NCLB and Title VI
regulations in this spirit.
501. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82 (citing and discussing the relevant regulations).
502. See id. at 289-91.
503. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that Connecticut has
an affirmative responsibility under the state's constitution to remedy segregation in public schools
regardless of whether segregation has occurred de jure or de facto); Helen Hershkoff, Positive
Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv.
1131, 1144 & n.60 (1999) (citing cases); Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation
of Educational Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERs L.J. 827, 844-54
(1998) (discussing interpretation of the equality provision in New Jersey's Constitution); Robin
Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Consti-
tution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297, 301 (1977) (citing cases).
504. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Reaching Out.. Raising African American Achievement-No Child
Left Behind, http://www.nclb.gov/start/facts/achievement aa.html (visited July 30, 2002).
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The same logic applies in spades with respect to suits premised on a state
constitutional right to an adequate education. 50 5 We saw earlier how rulings in
Texas and Kentucky solve the justiciability problem long associated with claims
for adequate levels of education. 50 6 The NCLB now makes it incumbent on all
states to define educational adequacy, to specify and measure sufficient progress
towards it, and to make (via the accountability system) institutional corrections
when progress is insufficient. Each step states take to comply with these require-
ments provides plaintiffs in failing schools and judges adjudicating their claims
with the definition of an adequate education and with effective ways to achieve
it. By requiring states to provide that definition, the NCLB again removes what
in the past has been a major obstacle to successful adequacy suits.50 7
Finally, this change of evidentiary contexts may invigorate private tort
claims in education that have proved singularly unsuccessful until now. Modeled
on medical and legal malpractice suits, these actions typically have sought
monetary damages based on claims that individual teachers and principals
breached professional duties of care by, for example, authorizing a functionally
illiterate student to be passed up through the grades and awarded a high school
diploma.50 8 Courts almost always rejected these claims on the grounds that in
teaching, unlike in medicine and law, there is no settled view-not even within
particular communities-as to the due standard of care.
50 9
Again, however, the whole thrust of the classroom-level reforms prompted
by the NCLB and the New Accountability is precisely to establish local and
statewide standards of professional care, even as the focus of responsibility shifts
from individual teachers to more encompassing institutions. It is conceivable,
therefore, that a new generation of educational tort claims might be used to
obtain injunctive relief from failing educational institutions. To underscore the
legitimacy and utility of these standards, these suits might refer directly to the
NCLB, to the obligations that states assume in accepting funds under it, or to
state legislation or regulations adopted to implement those obligations.
For each of these litigation strategies, the NCLB and associated state
reforms provide the same compelling enforcement logic: Failing schools and
districts are now required by federal and state law to learn from other institutions
that are demographically like themselves but are doing better. If they persistently
fail at this manifestly feasible task, they are reconstituted.5 10 An equivalent logic
can also be applied to state educational administrations that are found to be
similarly failing in whole or in part.5 11 Linking wrong to remedy in this way
505. See supra notes 82-89, 234-46, 296-97 and accompanying text.
506. See supra notes 422-24 and accompanying text.
507. See Liebman, supra note 94, at 385-97.
508. See generally John Elson, Common Law Remedy for Educational Harms Caused by
Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 641 (1978).
509. See Liebman, supra note 94, at 385-97.
510. See supra notes 250-66, 334-36, 430-48 and accompanying text.
511. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Helen Hershkoff, School
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avoids, as we saw, the problem of judicial discretion that that led the Supreme
Court in Jenkins v. Missouri to curtail expansive, exploratory school reform in
the school desegregation context. 512 Under accountability systems such as those
required by the NCLB, therefore, court orders determining rights and remedies
under conditions of non-court-centric judicial review promise to be both more
encompassing and yet less intrusive than traditional decrees in earlier phases of
educational reform litigation.
CONCLUSION
With these last considerations, our argument has come full circle. We began
with an examination of the limits of desegregation and traditional finance equity
litigation. We then saw how the commingling of a top-down movement for
standards and a bottom-up movement of professional protest focused on the
classroom produced a reform model-and a method of non-court-centric judicial
review-addressing many of the problems of educational inadequacy, parti-
cularly in relation to poor and minority pupils, that desegregation and allied
litigation had left unsolved. Last, we traced the generalization of this reform,
through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, from the state to the national
level. We argued that the accountability mechanisms established by the statute,
in combination with broader political movements and non-court-centric judicial
review, could be used to cure many of the Act's insufficiencies.
But have we come full circle back to the hopes and aspirations of the early
Civil Rights Movement? Can this new movement be thought of as the legitimate
legatee of the concern for equal treatment in a diverse society that motivated the
earlier and heroic attempts to recast the school system? Or, on the other hand,
have crucial values and goals that inhered in the original Civil Rights Movement
and made the federal courts and government the champions of equal respect for
all citizens been lost along the way?
In concluding we want to argue the former. The new standards-based reform
movement, we believe, provides an attractive way to deal with the realities of
race in the aftermath of desegregation. It acknowledges the limits of equal pro-
tection commended by sustained reflection on the complexities of cohabitation
in a multicultural society while making difference itself both a crucial instrument
for addressing apparently prosaic problems of public problem-solving and an
Archimedean point from which we can in time redefine who we are.
In the aftermath of desegregation, the United States has come to understand
itself as a racially mixed, multicultural society. On the one side, the rejection of
explicit segregation is now a deeply entrenched value in our society. On the
other, judicial grappling with desegregation revealed the impossibility of trans-
Finance Reform and the Alabama Experience, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY: CREATING
PRODUCTIVE SCHOOLS IN A JUST SOCIETY 24 (Marilyn Gittell ed., 1998).
512. See supra notes 425-26 and accompanying text.
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lating the ban on segregation and closely related forms of discrimination into an
unambiguous and operable program of deracialization of schools and other
public institutions. The recognition of this irreducible ambiguity does not,
however, end discussion. On the contrary, the abiding commitment to assure that
segregation and other forms of discrimination are not continuing or reintroduced
where they were once extirpated obligates us as a nation to constant vigilance,
lest the fact of racial difference result in constitutionally unacceptable differen-
tiation in the treatment and social endowment of citizens. Like it or not, the
continuing open consideration of race and its effect on life chances has become a
constitutive part of who we are.
We know from bitter experience just how difficult and self-defeating the
debate over the fundamental attributes of equal protection can be. We know, for
example, that separation or separateness can sometimes be inimical to, and can
sometimes be a precondition for, the acquisition of wider solidarities, and that it
can be nearly impossible to tell the two cases apart from a distance. We know, as
well, that the imposition of democratic values, including even the value of
respect for individual autonomy, can itself constitute a democratically imper-
missible and self-defeating intrusion into the lives of the members of sub-
national groups. Together, the recognition of the ambiguity of the cohesion of
sub-national groups, and the respect due the values of others in a liberal
democracy, counsel restrained use of state authority even in the service of the
deep goals of equality. Hence the resigned consensus of recent decades: Once
the worst excrescences of discrimination have been effectively outlawed, we
don't want the state-in the schools or elsewhere-regulating the fine details of
our association, undermining the social basis of our toleration, and denaturing
our constitutional values in a vain effort to spell out which groupings in the long
run encourage inclusion and which are antithetic to it.513
A chief advantage of the standards-based reform movement is that it
respects this concern for restraint while still advancing the national self-
interrogation on race in relation to effective equality and schooling that our
commitments obligate. The new reforms are able to square this circle precisely
because of the bargain they strike between enhanced local autonomy in return for
increased supra-local accountability. The power of initiative increasingly
accorded to classrooms, schools and districts allow local groupings to address
problems from the concrete standpoint of their activity and associations. Indeed,
if participation in such governance is for now largely a matter of professional
self-criticism and renewal, it may in time spark or fuse with a new kind of direct
local democracy, where citizens decide the rules by which they live without, or
513. Many participants in recent debates about multiculturalism are less resigned about the
possibilities of the use of state power than this summary might suggest. We present the debate at
its most pessimistic both because it is in the main conducted on the defensive-with a profound
sense of the contradictions inherent in using state power to assure individual autonomy-and
because, more importantly, we want to show that the current reform movement could pass muster
even when judged in the light of apparently fatalistic conclusions.
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at least with less, mediation by representatives. But because their organizational
choices are subjected to comparative scrutiny, their articulation of their own
identity cannot come at the expense either of minorities within their midst or, if
the group is homogeneous, at the cost of withdrawal from the surrounding
community.
Take first the danger of a group's withdrawal from the larger community.
Consider a caricatural example in which a group is committed to a form of
comprehensive schooling that inculcates blind obedience to authority rather than
the generally critical, liberal values held by the larger society. Recall that under
the new reforms, all students, including those in the school for obedience, will
have their performance measured on certain statewide or comparable tests. If the
capacity for autonomous problem solving is valued in the larger society, the test
will reflect those values and schools that (improbably) succeed in crushing
autonomy will show poorly on it, and suffer the consequences. Similarly,
schools wholly absorbed in the history and culture of one group to the exclusion
of all others will do poorly on tests that require more general knowledge. Thus,
acceptance of standards-the precondition for increased local autonomy-sets
limits to the school's isolation and obliges at least a minimal level of
engagement with the outside society. We cannot say for sure that this engage-
ment-in the form of a capacity for autonomous problem solving, or knowledge
of other cultures, or whatever-is enough to ensure an effective schooling for
democratic citizenship. But the multiculturalists are right to be skeptical of
anyone who claims to know how to do that.
The discipline of general standards also protects minority subgroups. The
example of Texas shows how reporting and ranking systems can be designed to
make improvement in the performance of sub-populations a crucial measure of
the success of schools and school districts. Here too we have no final assurance
that the level of engagement will be sufficient to remedy wrongs. What can be
said is that abuses will not be hard to find, and, more important, that the measure
of what counts as intolerable neglect of sub-populations will be continuously
raised as the successes of the leading schools in addressing this problem reshape
the standards by which others are judged.
This very last remark aside, we have focused so far on the harms of political
intrusion that the standards-based movement can arguably avoid. Provisional
assurance on this point is important, but should hardly count as a decisive
argument in favor of the reforms and the novel collaboration between courts and
social actors on which they are based. It may well be that traditional consti-
tutional review can serve such defensive purposes as well.
The decisive advantage of the new reforms and the associated reorientation
of the American legal process is, rather, to combine such restraint with a far-
ranging public and institutionally consequential interrogation of matters of race
and equality that would otherwise be impossible. In this sense, the deep
significance of standard-setting, peer review and many other forms of
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information pooling is not to prevent abusive self-absorption by individuals or
groups but rather to bring to light new forms of participation and joint problem
solving that meet the needs of individuals with their group attachments-
providing them, for example, with an adequate education-and at the same time
reshaping incrementally but powerfully our understanding of how different
groups can learn together and from each other. Many of these new forms of
participation and problem solving will constitute or suggest new ways of living,
and some will call into question conventional social values. In this sense the
institutionalization of standards-based reform, and the new collaboration with
other branches of government creates an engine of non-conformity, if not of
incrementalist insurgency against the status quo. 51
4
Put another way, the chief virtue of the new reforms is to transform diversity
and difference from an obstacle to the fruitful investigation of possibilities to a
means for accelerating and widening such inquiry. Comparison of different
projects for school reform by teams that are themselves diverse in their compo-
sition (local school councils, peer evaluators, standard-setting bodies and so on)
makes it possible to examine each proposal both in the mirror of the alternative
projects and from the varying angles presented by different, specialized points of
view. This kind of examination has been shown in many settings to bring to light
deep flaws in individual projects that remain long undetected when they are
pursued in isolation, and to reveal novel possibilities that are missed when many
projects are pursued simultaneously but in willful indifference to each other.515
Again, the weightiest effects of this problem- solving diversity are higher order:
It is less the immediate problem solved than the ramifications and generali-
zations of new techniques and principles contained in the solution that in the
long run produces the profound effect on the actors' and the institutions within
which they operate.
Seen as a whole, then, the new standards-based movement has resolved a
daunting impasse-how to reform schools given the exhaustion of both the
privatization and bureaucratic public school models-while bringing the
emerging implications of experimental reform to the attention of the public in a
way that assures accountability and provokes further reflection. The reform
movement gives new meaning to the question of diversity amidst the give and
take of the most local of local politics, school politics, while connecting school
reform to a possible reorientation of the constitutional judiciary and the
514. See Jeremy Waldron, Mill as a Critic of Culture and Society, in JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 224 (David Bromwitch & George Kateb eds., 2003) (arguing that John Stuart Mill
thought that something like an engine of non-conformity was required to assure freedom of
expression and individual self-development in democracy).
515. See, e.g., Susan Helper, John P. MacDuffie & Charles F. Sabel, Pragmatic
Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 443 (2000). See also MARTIN VANCREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR (1985); Todd LaPorte,
High Reliability Organizations: Unlikely, Demanding and At Risk, J. OF CRISIS AND CONTINGENCY
MANAGEMENT, 4, 2 (June 1996), 60-71. For an application to learning in schools, see JOHN BRUER,
SCHOOLS FOR THOUGHT (1993).
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American legal process more broadly. It commands attention as an innovative
response by civil society and the courts to the remaking of the schools and more
generally to the unfinished business of providing citizens with an adequate
supply of those basic goods required for participation in our democracy.
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